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Islamic Schools And Branches: Part III

Ithnā’ashariyyah

Twelvers believe in twelve Imams.  The twelfth Imam is believed to be in occultation, and will appear again just before the Qiyamah (Islamic view of the Last Judgment).  The Shi’a hadiths include the sayings of the Imams.  Many Muslims criticize the Shi’a for certain beliefs and practices, including practices such as the Mourning of Muharram (Mätam).  They are the largest Shi’a school of thought (93 percent), predominant in Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Bahrain and have a significant population in Pakistan, India, Afghanistan Kuwait and the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia.  The Twelver Shi’a are followers of either the Jaf’ari or Batiniyyah madh’habs.

Imami-Ja’faris

Followers of the Jaf’ari madh’hab are divided into the following sub-divisions, all of them are the followers of the Theology of Twelvers.

Usulism

The Usuli form the overwhelming majority within the Twelver Shi’a denomination.  They follow a Marja-i Taqlid on the subject of taqlid and fiqh.  They are concentrated in Iran, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, India, Iraq, and Lebanon.

Akhbarism

Akhbari, similar to Usulis, however reject ijtihad in favor of hadith. Concentrated in Bahrain.

Shaykhism

Shaykhism is an Islamic religious movement founded by Shaykh Ahmad in the early 19th century Qajar dynasty, Iran, now retaining a minority following in Iran and Iraq.  It began from a combination of Sufi and Shi’a and Akhbari doctrines.  In the mid 19th-century many Shaykhis converted to the Bábí and Bahá’í religions, which regard Shaykh Ahmad highly.

Alawism

Alawites are also called Nusayris, Nusairis, Namiriya or Ansariyya. Their madhhab is established by Ibn Nusayr, and their aqidah is developed by Al-Khaṣībī.  They follow Cillī aqidah of “Maymūn ibn Abu’l-Qāsim Sulaiman ibn Ahmad ibn at-Tabarānī fiqh” of the ‘Alawis.  One million three hundred and fifty thousand of them lived in Syria and Lebanon in 1970.  It is estimated they are 10-12 percent of the population of Syria of 23 millions in 2013.

Alawites consider themselves to be Muslims, although some Sunnis dispute that they are.  Alawite doctrine incorporates Gnostic, neo-Platonic, Islamic, Christian and other elements and has, therefore, been described as syncretistic.  Their theology is based on a divine triad, or trinity, which is the core of Alawite belief.  The triad comprises three emanations of the one God: the supreme aspect or entity called the “Essence” or the “Meaning” (both being translations of ma’na), together with two lesser emanations known as his “Name” (ism), or “Veil” (hijab), and his “Gate” (bab).  These emanations have manifested themselves in different human forms over several cycles in history, the last cycle of which was as Ali (the Essence/Meaning), Muhammad (the Name) and Salman the Persian (the Gate).  Alawite belief is summarized in the formula: “I turn to the Gate; I bow before the Name; I adore the Meaning.”  The claim that Alawites believe Ali is a deity has been contested by some scholars as a misrepresentation on the basis that Ali is, in fact, considered an “essence or form”, not a human being, by which believers can “grasp God.”  Alawites also hold that they were originally stars or divine lights that were cast out of heaven through disobedience and must undergo repeated reincarnation (or metempsychosis) before returning to heaven.  They can be reincarnated as Christians or others through sin and as animals if they become infidels.

Alawite beliefs have never been confirmed by their modern religious authorities.  Alawites tend to conceal their beliefs (taqiyya) due to historical persecution.  Some tenets of the faith are secret, known only to a select few; therefore, they have been described as a mystical sect.  In addition to Islamic festivals, the Alawites have been reported to celebrate or honor certain Christian festivals such as the birth of Jesus and Palm Sunday.  Their most-important feast is Eid al-Ghadeer.

The ‘Alawite ʿaqīdah

Alawites have always described themselves as being Twelver Shi’ite Muslims and have been recognized as such by the prominent Lebanese Shi’ite cleric Musa al-Sadr.  The Sunni Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Haj Amin al-Husseini issued a fatwa recognizing them as part of the Muslim community in the interest of Arab nationalism.  However, Athari Sunni (modern day Salafis) scholars such as Ibn Kathir (a disciple of Ibn Taymiyya) have categorized Alawites as pagans in their writings.

Barry Rubin has suggested that Syrian leader Hafiz al-Assad and his son and successor Bashar al-Assad pressed their fellow Alawites “to behave like regular Muslims, shedding (or at least concealing) their distinctive aspects.”  During the early 1970s a booklet, al-`Alawiyyun Shi’atu Ahl al-Bait (“The Alawites are Followers of the Household of the Prophet”) was published, which was “signed by numerous ‘Alawi’ men of religion,” described the doctrines of the Imami Shi’a as Alawite.  Additionally, there has been a recent movement to unite Alawism and the other branches of Twelver Islam through educational exchange programs in Syria and Qom.

Some sources have discussed the “Sunnification” of Alawites under the al-Assad regime.  Joshua Landis, director of the Center for Middle East Studies, writes that Hafiz al-Assad “tried to turn Alawites into  (read Sunnified) Muslims in exchange for preserving a modicum of secularism and tolerance in society.”  On the other hand, Al-Assad “declared the Alawites to be nothing but Twelver Shiites.”  In a paper, “Islamic Education in Syria”, Landis wrote that “no mention” is made in Syrian textbooks (controlled by the Al-Assad regime) of Alawites, Druze, Ismailis or Shi’a Islam; Islam was presented as a monolithic religion.  Ali Sulayman al-Ahmad, chief judge of the Baathist Syrian state, has said:

“We are ‘Alawi Muslims.  Our book is the Qur’an.  Our prophet is Muhammad.  The Ka`ba is our qibla, and our Dīn (religion) is Islam.”

Kızılbaşlık

The Qizilbash ʿaqīdah

Shah Ismail I, the Sheikh of the Safavi tariqa, founder of the Safavid Dynasty of Iran, and the Commander-in-chief of the Kızılbaş armies had contributed a lot for the development and implementation of The Qizilbash ʿAqīdah amongst the Turkmen people.

Qizilbash and Bektashi tariqah shared common religious beliefs and practices becoming intermingled as Alevis in spite of many local variations.  Isolated from both the Sunni Ottomans and the Twelver Shi’a Safavids, Qizilbash and Bektashi developed traditions, practices, and doctrines by the early 17thcentury which marked them as a closed autonomous religious community.  As a result of the immense pressures to conform to Sunni Islam, all members of Alevism developed a tradition of opposition (ibāḥa) to all forms of external religion.

The doctrine of Qizilbashism is well explained in the following poem written by the Shaykh of Safaviyya tariqah Shāh Ismāʿil Khatai:

Men daha nesne bilmezem, (I don’t know any other object)

Allah bir Muhammad-Ali’dir. (Allah is unique Muhammad-Ali)

Özüm gurbette salmazam, (I can’t let out my own essence to places far from my homeland)

Allah bir Muhammad-Ali’dir. (Allah is unique Muhammad-Ali)

Onlar birdir, bir oluştur, (They are unique, a single one, i.e. Haqq-Muhammad-Ali)

Yerden göğe nûr oluştur, (It’s a nūr from Earth to Sky)

Dört guşede sır oluştur, (It’s a mysterious occult secret in every corner of the square)

Allah bir Muhammad-Ali’dir. (Allah is unique Muhammad-Ali)

Khatai bu yolda sırdır, (Khatai in this tariqah is a mysterious occult secret)

Sırın verenler de erdir, (Those reveal their own secret are private as well)

Ayda sırdır, günde nûrdur, (Secret on Moon, nūr on day)

Allah bir Muhammad-Ali’dir. (Allah is unique Muhammad-Ali)

The lines of poetry above may easily be judged as an act of “Shirk” (polytheism) by the Sunni Ulama, but they have a bāṭenī taʾwīl (inner explanation) in Qizilbashism.

The belief of Incarnation was first emerged in Sabaʾiyya, and later some personalities like Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyyah, Abu Muslim, Sunpadh, Ishaq al-Turk, Al-Muqanna, Babak Khorramdin, Maziar and Ismail (I) had become the subject of God incarnates.

Karram’iyyah

Anthropomorphic-Anthropopathic Karram’iyyah was founded by Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. Karrām Ibn Karram considered that God was a substance and that He had a body (jism) finite in certain directions when He comes into contact with the Throne.

Ahmad’iyyah

The Ahmadis’ beliefs are more aligned with the Sunni tradition, such as The Five Pillars of Islam and The Six articles of Islamic Faith. Likewise, Ahmadis accept the Qur’an as their holy text, face the Kaaba during prayer, accept the authority of Hadiths (reported sayings of and stories about Muhammad) and practice the Sunnah (traditions) of Muhammad.  However, many Muslims consider Ahmadis as either kafirs or heretics.

Ahmadi teachings state that the founders of all the major world religions had divine origins.  God was working towards the establishment of Islam as the final religion, because it was the most complete and included all the previous teachings of other religion (but they believe that all other religions have gone astray in their present form).  The completion and consummation of the development of religion came about with the coming of Muhammad; and that the perfection of the ‘manifestation’ of Muhammad’s prophethood and of the conveyance of his message was destined to occur with the coming of the Mahdi.

The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community regard Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, who claimed to be the promised Messiah (“Second Coming of Christ”) the Mahdi awaited by the Muslims and a ‘subordinate’ prophet to Muhammad whose job was to restore the Shari’a given to Muhammad by guiding or rallying disenchanted Ummah back to Islam and thwart attacks on Islam by its opponents, as the “Promised One” of all religions fulfilling eschatological prophecies found in the scriptures of the Abrahamic religions, as well as Zoroastrianism, the Indian religions, Native American traditions and others.  Ahmadi Muslims believe that Ahmad was divinely commissioned as a true reflection of Muhammad’s prophethood to establish the unity of God and to remind mankind of their duties towards God and God’s creation.

List Of Ash’aris And Maturidis

The list of Ash’aris and Maturidis includes prominent adherents of the Ash’ari and Maturidi schools of thought.  The Ash’aris are a doctrinal school of thought named after Imam Abu al-Hasan al-Ash’ari, and the Maturidi school is named for Abu Mansur al-Maturidi.

List Of Extinct Shi’a Sects

The following is a list of extinct sects of Shi’a Islam.  These branches of Shi’a are thought no longer to have any living followers or practitioners.  The sects were created around certain beliefs that were unorthodox or otherwise not held by the majority of Shi’a Muslims.

Ghulat Sects

Bazighiyya – who believed that Ja’far al-Sadiq was God.

Dhammiyya – who believed that Ali was God and Muhammad was his appointed Messenger and Prophet.

Ghurabiyya – who believed the angel Gabriel was mistaken.

Hurufiyya – who believed God is incarnated in every atom, reminiscent of the Alevi-Bektashism.

Nuqtavites – who believed in a cyclical view of time, reminiscent of the Isma’ili Shi’a.

Kaysanites – who believed in the Imamate of Muhammad ibn al- Hanafiyyah after the death of Husayn Ibn ‘Ali Ibn abu Talib.

Bayaniyya – the followers of Bayān al-Nahdi, who believed that Abu Hashim was a prophet and would return to rule the world as Mahdi. Bayān claimed prophethood for himself after the demise Of Abu Hashim, as well.

Harbiyya – the followers of ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Harb ibn al-Kindi, who initially taught antinomianism then joined Ibn Mu’awiya’s party and later expressed many extremist views about him.  Furthermore, Ibn al-Harb introduced some fundamental doctrines including metempsy-chosis, cyclical history of eras and aeons into the radical branch of Shi’ism.  The group claimed that Abu Hashim designated Ibn Mu’awiya as his successor Imam of Hashimiyya.

Riyahiyya – Harbiyya and pro-Abbasid Hashimiyya disputed over Abu Hashim’s will about the imamate and eventually the disputed parties agreed upon the arbitration of their respected leader Abu Riyah, who decided that the imamate should remain in Abbasids.  The most of the followers of Harbiyya, who had previously recognized Ibn Mu’awiya as their imam, seceded and joined to the Abbasid party And they had been called Riyahiyya.  Those who stayed in Harbiyya and continued to recognize the imamete of Ibn Mu’awiya subsequently called as Janahiyya.

Janahiyya – the followers of ʿAbd Allāh ibn Mu’awiya ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Ja’far, who was a descendant of Ja’far ibn Abi Talib known as Dhu’l-Janahayn, believed incarnation of God in a succession of Prophets And imams passing eventually through Ibn al-hanafiya and Abu Hashim To Ibn Mu’awiya; transmigration of the souls; and the allegorical interpretation of the Qur’an.

Mughiriyya – who influenced by Mandean and Manichean doctrines, founded by the first Shi’i gnostic al-Mughira, who claimed that God is a man of light with a crown of light on his head resembling Mandean doctrine of deity referred to as “king of light.”  Al-Mughira further added that God has limbs corresponding to the letters of Arabic alphabet reminiscent of the teaching of Marcus the Gnostic.

Rawendis – who believed in the transmigration of souls.  They asserted that the spirit that was in Jesus was in Ali, and the spirit of Adam was in Othman ibn Nahik.

Soldiers of Heaven – who believed that their former leader Dia Abdul Zahra Kadim (died 2007 AD) was the Mahdi and reincarnation of Ali ibn Abi Talib.

Ya’furiyya – who believed in reincarnation and that a man named Mu’ammar al-Kufi was their Lord.

Zaydi Shi’a Sects

Dukayniyya – who believed Muhammad’s followers fell intoxicated ; Unbelief after his death because they did not uphold the Imamate of Ali.

Jarudiyya – who believed the companions were sinful in failing to recognize Ali as the legitimate Caliph.  They became extinct in Iran and Iraq but still survive in Yemen under the Hadawi sub-sect.

Khalafiyya – who believed in a unique line of Imams after Zayd ibn Ali ibn Husayn Ibn ‘Ali Ibn abu Talib, starting with a man named Abd al-Samad and continuing with his descendants.

Khashabiyya – who believed that the Imamate must remain only among the descendants of Hasan and Husayn, even if that Imam is ignorant, immoral and tyrannical.

Tabiriyya/Butriyya/Salihiyya – who believed the companions, including Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman, had been in error in failing to follow Ali, but it did not amount to sin.

Imami/Pre-Twelver Shi’a Sects

Fathites – who believed Abdullah al-Aftah was the succeeding Imam after his father Ja’far al-Sadiq’s death.

Muhammadites – who believed that Muhammad ibn Ali al-Hadi was the true 11th Imam, rather than Hasan al-Askari.

Tawussites – who believed that Ja’far al-Sadiq was the Mahdi And that he was alive and did not die.

Waqifites – who believed in the Imamate of Musa al-Kadhim but refused to accept the Imamate of his successor Ali ar-Ridha.

Ismā’īlī Shi’a Sects

Hafizi – who believed the ruler of the Fatimid Empire, Al-Hafiz, was also the Imam of the Time.

Qarmatians – who believed in a world view where every phenomenon repeated itself in cycles, where every incident was replayed over and over again.

Salafi Movement

The Salafi movement is an ultra-conservative reform movement within Sunni Islam.

Also called Salafist movement, Salafiya, and Salafism, is a reformed branch or revivalist movement within Sunni Islam that developed in Egypt in the late 19th century as a response to Western European imperialism, with roots in the 18th-century Wahhabi movement that originated in the Najd region of modern-day Saudi Arabia.  It advocated a return to the traditions of the salaf, the first three generations of Muslims, which include the generations of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad and his companions (the Sahabah), their successors (the Tabi‘un), and the successors of the successors (the Taba Tabi‘in). Not to be confused with Salaf.

The Salafist doctrine is centered around the concept of looking back to a prior historical period in an effort to understand how the contemporary world should be ordered.  They reject religious innovation or bid’ah, and support the implementation of Shari’a (Islamic law).  The movement is often divided into three categories: the largest group are the purists (or quietists), who avoid politics; the second largest group are the activists, who get involved in politics; the third group are the jihadists, who form a minority and advocate armed struggle.  In legal matters, Salafis are divided between those who, in the name of independent legal judgement (ijtihad), reject strict adherence (taqlid) to the four Sunni schools of law (madhahib), and others who remain faithful to these.

The majority of the Salafi Sunnis in the Persian Gulf states reside in Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.  It is estimated that 46.87 percent of Qataris and 44.8 percent of Emiratis are Salafi Sunnis; 5.7 percent of Bahrainis are Salafi Sunnis and 2.17 percent of Kuwaitis are Salafi Sunnis.  Salafi Sunnis are the “dominant minority” in Saudi Arabia.  There are four million Saudi Salafis since 22.9 percent of Saudis are Salafis (concentrated in Najd).  Salafi literalist creed has also gained some acceptance in Turkey.

At times, Salafism has been deemed a hybrid of Wahhabism and other post-1960s movements.  Salafism has become associated with literalist, strict and puritanical approaches to Islam – and, particularly in the West, with the Salafi Jihadis who espouse violent jihad against those they deem to be enemies of Islam as a legitimate expression of Islam.

Academics and historians have used the term “Salafism” to denote “a school of thought which surfaced in the second half of the 19th century as a reaction to the spread of European ideas” and “sought to expose support@vudu.com roots of modernity within Muslim civilization.”  However some contemporary Salafis follow “literal, traditional injunctions of the sacred texts”, looking to Ibn Taymiyyah, or his disciple Ibn Kathir rather than the “somewhat freewheeling interpretation” of 19th -century figures Muhammad Abduh, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, and Rashid Rida.

Major figures in the movement include Ibn Taymiyyah, Muhammad ibn al Uthaymeen, Rabee al-Madkhali, Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi’i, Muhammad Nasiruddin+ al-Albani, and Saleh Al-Fawzan.

Etymology

Salafis consider a hadith that quotes Muhammad saying, “The best of my community are my generation, the ones who follow them and the ones who follow them,” as a call to Muslims to follow the example of those first three generations, known collectively as the salaf or “pious Predecessors” (as-Salaf as-Ṣāliḥ).  The salaf are believed to include Muhammad himself, the “Companions” (Sahabah), the “Followers” (Tabi‘un), and the “Followers of the Followers” (Tabi‘ al-Tabi‘in).

Tenets

According to Bernard Haykel, “temporal proximity to the Prophet Muhammad is associated with the truest form of Islam” among many Sunni Muslims.

The Salafi da’wa is a methodology, but it is not a madh’hab in fiqh (jurisprudence) as is commonly misunderstood.  Salafis may be influenced by the Maliki, Shafi’i, Hanbali or the Hanafi schools of Sunni fiqh.

Salafis place great emphasis on practicing actions in accordance with the known sunnah, not only in prayer but in every activity in daily life. For instance, many are careful always to use three fingers when eating, to drink water in three pauses, and to hold it with the right hand while sitting.

Views On Taqlid (scholarly authority)

In legal matters, Salafis are divided between those who, in the name of independent legal judgement (ijtihad), reject strict adherence (taqlid) to the four schools of law (madhahib) and others who remain faithful to these.  Salafi scholars from Saudi Arabia are generally bound by Hanbali fiqh and advocate following an Imam rather than having individuals try to interpret and understand scripture alone.

Other Salafi scholars, however, believe that taqlid is unlawful.  From their perspective, Muslims who follow a madhab without searching personally for direct evidence may be led astray.  The latter group of scholars include Rashid Rida, al-Khajnadee, Muhammad Abduh, Saleem al-Hilali and Nasir al-Din al-Albani.

At the far end of the spectrum of belief, some Salafis hold that adhering to taqlid is an act of polytheism.

Opposition To The Use Of Kalam

Modern-day proponents of the Athari school of theology largely come from the Salafi (or Wahhabi) movement; they uphold the athari works of Ibn Taymiyyah.  For followers of the Salafi movement, the “clear” (i.e., zahir, apparent, exoteric or literal) meaning of the Qur’an, and especially the prophetic traditions, has sole authority in matters of belief.  They believe that to engage in rational disputation (kalam), even if one arrives at the truth, is absolutely forbidden.

Atharis engage in an amodal reading of the Qur’an, as opposed to one engaged in Ta’wil (metaphorical interpretation).  They do not attempt to conceptualize the meanings of the Qur’an rationally, and believe that the “real” modality should be consigned to God alone (tafwid).

History

Historians and academics date the emergence of Salafism to late 19th-century Egypt.  Salafis believe that the label “Salafiyya” existed from the first few generations of Islam and that it is not a modern movement.  To justify this view, Salafis rely on a handful of quotes from medieval times where the term Salafi is used.  However, these quotes provide dubious and weak evidence for their claim since the term “Salafiyya” and its derivatives are not commonplace in medieval and pre-modern literature.

One of the quotes used as evidence and widely posted on Salafi websites is from the genealogical dictionary of al-Sam’ani (d. 1166), who wrote a short entry about the surname “al-Salafi” (the Salafi): “According to what I heard, this [surname indicates one’s] ascription to the pious ancestors and [one’s] adoption of their doctrine [madhhabihim].”  The scholar Lauzière comments that, “al-Sam’ani could only list two individuals — a father and his son — who were known by it.  Plus, the entry contains blank spaces in lieu of their full names, presumably because al-Sam’ani had forgotten them or did not know them.”  Further, he states that “al-Sam’ani’s dictionary suggests that the surname was marginal at best, and the lone quotation taken from al-Dhahabi, who wrote 200 years later, does little to prove Salafi claims.”

In the modern era, however, many Salafis adopt the surname “al-Salafi” and refer to the label “Salafiyya” in various circumstances to evoke a specific understanding of Islam that is supposed to differ from that of other Sunnis in terms of creed, law, morals, and behavior.

Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab

Modern Salafists consider the 18th-century scholar Muhammed bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab and many of his students to have been Salafis.   He started a reform movement in the remote, sparsely populated region of Najd.  He advocated purging practices such as shrine and tomb visitation, which were widespread among Muslims.  ‘Abd al-Wahhab considered this practice to be idolatry, representative of impurities and inappropriate innovations in Islam.

Trends Within Salafism

Some who have observed trends in the Salafist movement have divided Salafis into three groups – purists, activists, and jihadis.  Purists focus on education and missionary work to solidify the tawhid; activists focus on political reform and re-establishing a caliphate through the means of evolution, but not violence (sometimes called Salafist activism); and jihadists share similar political goals as the politicians, but engage in violent Jihad (sometimes called Salafi jihadism and/or Qutbism).

Purists

“Purists” are Salafists who focus on non-violent da’wah (preaching of Islam), education, and “purification of religious beliefs and practices.” They dismiss politics as “a diversion or even innovation that leads people away from Islam.”

They never oppose rulers.  Madkhalism, as an example, is a strain of Salafists viewed as supportive of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East.  Taking its name from the controversial Saudi Arabian cleric Rabee al-Madkhali, the movement lost its support in Saudi Arabia proper when several members of the Permanent Committee (the country’s clerical body) denounced Madkhali personally.  Influence of both the movement and its figureheads have waned so much within the Muslim world that analysts have declared it to be a largely European phenomenon.

Activists

Activists are another strain of the global Salafi movement, but different from the Salafi jihadists in that they eschew violence and different from Salafi purists in that they engage in modern political processes.  Due to numerical superiority, the movement has been referred to as the mainstream of the Salafist movement at times.  This trend, who some call “politicos,” see politics as “yet another field in which the Salafi creed has to be applied” in order to safeguard justice and “guarantee that the political rule is based upon the Shari’a”Al–Sahwa Al-Islamiyya (Islamic Awakening), as example, has been involved in peaceful political reform.  Safar Al-Hawali and Salman al-Ouda are representatives of this trend.  Because of being active on social media, they have earned some support among more educated youth.

“It’s very simple.  We want Shari’a.  Shari’a in economy, in politics, in judiciary, in our borders and our foreign relations.”

— Mohammed Abdel-Rahman, the son of Omar Abdel-Rahman

Time magazine. October 8, 2012

Salafi Jihadists

“Salafi Jihadism” was a term invented by Gilles Kepel to describe those self-claiming Salafi groups who began developing an interest in (armed) jihad during the mid-1990s.  Practitioners are often referred to as “Salafi jihadis” or “Salafi jihadists.”  Journalist Bruce Livesey estimates Salafi jihadists constitute less than 1.0 percent of the world’s 1.2 billion Muslims (i.e., less than 10 million).

Another definition of Salafi jihadism, offered by Mohammed M. Hafez, is an “extreme form of Sunni Islamism that rejects democracy and Shi’a rule.”  Hafez distinguished them from apolitical and conservative Salafi scholars (such as Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani, Muhammad ibn al Uthaymeen, Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd Allah ibn Baaz and Abdul-Azeez ibn Abdullaah Aal ash-Shaikh), but also from the sahwa movement associated with Salman al-Ouda or Safar Al-Hawali.  Jihadi Salafi groups include Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Boko Haram, and the Al-Shabaab.

An analysis of the Caucasus Emirate, a Salafi jihadist group, was made in 2014 by Darion Rhodes.  It analyzes the group’s strict observance of tawhid and its rejection of shirk, taqlid, ijtihad and bid‘ah, while believing that jihad is the only way to advance the cause of Allah on the earth.

Despite some similarities, the different contemporary self-proclaimed Salafist groups often strongly disapprove of one another and deny the other’s Islamic character.

Views On Violence

In recent years, the Salafi methodology has come to be associated with the jihad of extremist groups that advocate the killing of innocent civilians.  The European Parliament, in a report commissioned in 2013 claimed that Wahhabi and Salafi groups are involved, mainly via Saudi charities, in the support and supply of arms to rebel groups around the world.  Some Salafi scholars appear to support violent extremism.  The Egyptian Salafi cleric Mahmoud Shaaban “appeared on a religious television channel calling for the deaths of main opposition figures dMohammed ElBaradei – a Nobel Peace Prize laureate – and former presidential candidate Hamdeen Sabahi.”

Other salafis have rejected the use of violence.  The Saudi scholar, Muhammad ibn al Uthaymeen considered suicide bombing to be unlawful and the scholar Abdul Muhsin al-Abbad wrote a treatise entitled: According to which intellect and Religion is Suicide bombings and destruction considered Jihad?  Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani stated that “History repeats itself.  Everybody claims that the Prophet is their role model.  Our Prophet spent the first half of his message making dawah, and he did not start it with jihad.”

Some other Islamic groups, particularly some Sufis, have also complained about extremism among some Salafi.  It has been noted that the Western association of Salafi ideology with violence stems from writings “through the prism of security studies” that were published in the late 20th century and that continue to persist.

Islamic Schools And Branches: Part III

603 – 003 – 003

http://discerningislam.com

Last Update: 03/2021

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