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Women Of Iran
Commonly held views on Iranian women tend to regard the situation of Muslim-Iranian woman as one of categorical victimhood. However, a close examination of their situation in the past century shows a far more nuanced picture of Iranian women, conveying that they can be seen as agents of social change. Although it is true that there are areas where the situation of women, especially vis-à-vis their legal rights, is discriminatory, in many other spheres, women have taken major strides. Evidence of women being influential in the Iranian political arena can be found in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Aristocratic Qajar women were instrumental in the assignment of governorships and granting foreign development concessions during the reigns of Fathʾ Ali Shah (r. 1797–1835) and Nasir al-Din Shah (r. 1848–1896). In 1852, the Queen Mother, Malak Jahan Khanom, acted as a reactionary force and contributed to the downfall of Amir Kabir, who was making strides toward modernization of the court. Her actions have been criticized as a mechanism of corruption and ineffectiveness of the court at that time. These women were not the norm of the Qajar dynasty, but notable exceptions.
Shireen Mahdavi writes that travelers’ journals describe women as veiled and secluded from the public during the Qajar dynasty, a continuance from the Safavid dynasty, which declared Shiism the official religion of state. Mahdavi also noted that the Qajars strengthened the legacy that the Safavids instituted in secluding and veiling women. However, she also commented that the seclusion of women was largely an urban, upper-class phenomenon. Missionary accounts document that upper-class, urban women spent their time engaged in domestic activities such as sewing, embroidery, pickling, and jam making. Rural and lower-class women were documented as being engaged in agricultural production and therefore not secluded.
The Safavids developed what was then a cottage industry of Persian rugs into a national industry, with rugs handmade by tribal women and children. The first large-scale carpet factory was built by Shah Abbas (1588–1629) in Isfahan (Savory).
Madhavi further observes that placing women in seclusion also contributed to the further urbanization of Iranian cities. Private homes with gates became common, as did gardens, which separated the men’s areas of the house from the women’s. When women went outside the home, they wore a chador, a long, fully covering cloak with latticed fabric around the eyes. Inside the home, women wore skirts if they were not expected to perform chores. This was the clothing of high-class, urban women.
In the nineteenth century, Fatemeh “Tahereh” Zarrin-Taj Baraghani, who was raised in a family of famous Shīʿī scholars, shocked everyone by denouncing the religion and publicly removing her veil. This action has been interpreted in a variety of ways, either as a signal of her involvement in the Babi movement, a commitment to Sufism, or a proto-feminist demonstration.
A cursory review of major political events of the twentieth century illustrates the role women have played as a major social and political force in several historical events. Starting with the late nineteenth century, women protested against a semi-colonial treaty, which gave the British a monopoly over the production, sale, and export of tobacco, known as the Tobacco Régime, for fifty years. Iranian women embarked on a major protest against the British and announced that, because their religious leaders had banned this concession through a fatwā, breaking the fatwā for tobacco use meant that their authority would not be respected. Furthermore, if the authority of the religious leaders was to be disrespected, then marriages performed by them did not carry religious sanction and were annulled; therefore, women refused to allow their men to enter into their bedrooms unless they stopped supporting the British monopoly over tobacco. Others took leading roles in the anti-colonial effort and, as Sahimi argues, Zainab Baji or Deh-Bashi Zainab invited men to join in the direct fight against foreign oppression, announcing to a group of men, “If you men do not have the courage to punish the oppressors, wear our veil and go home. Do not claim to be men; we will fight instead of you” (Sahimi, 2010). The battle over the British tobacco monopoly was won.
Later on, with the advent of the constitutional revolution (1905–1911), many women fought in the armed struggle against the monarchy and against the bombarding of the parliament by the falling Qajar dynasty. In the aftermath of the First World War, and with the establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty and a constitutional monarchy, a policy of modernization/westernization was adopted by Reza Shah (1925–1941), who aimed to bring women into both the public sphere and the formal labor force. Similar to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Reza Shah encouraged the Western secular model for women and imposed a forced de-veiling policy, which many women of especially religious background protested against.
Reza Shah was ousted from power by the British for declaring Iran an independent zone. Once the war ended, however, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (Reza Shah’s son) was brought into power by the Allied forces. He continued his father’s effort for modernization/Westernization along with secularization. He also took further steps toward modernizing the situation of women and bringing them into the formal labor force by advocating for formal education and opening many schools for girls, as well as opening doors for women to enter colleagues and universities. His policies by and large benefited women of secular middle-class background. To the extent that veiled women were banned from holding formal employment in the growing public sector, these policies also prevented women from traditional backgrounds and lower income households from having access to education and many jobs in the formal and public sector.
The Shah, who started his rule after World War II, was initially open to opposition, including allowing independent women’s organizations. However, he soon changed his more democratic attitude for a repressive one. This was to some extent related to the fact that, in the early 1950s, a popular prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, campaigned on nationalization of the oil industry and mobilized people to rally behind him. The effort faced fierce resistance by the British who were the main beneficiaries of Iran’s oil industry. An uprising to support the popular prime minister was crushed by a military coup backed by the CIA in 1953, and the Shah (who had been forced to leave office in 1951) was brought back into power. This incident changed the post-World War II political atmosphere, in which the Shah had allowed political freedom. After the coup, the Shah became repressive toward all opposition and extremely intolerant of other political groups, including independent women’s organizations that had previously flourished impressively.
By the mid-twentieth century and toward the 1960s and the 1970s, masses of middle-class secular women had been part of the growing labor force in different parts of the economy, outside of their traditional role in the agricultural sector, and as part of the rising manufacturing sector (mainly in the carpet industry) and the growing service sector. However, perhaps the most significant breakthrough was entering into the public sector. Moreover, the Shah mobilized a large number of middle-class educated young women to take part in his modernization of the rural area, bringing basic health care and education to rural women. This initiative was part and parcel of the White Revolution of 1963, which was aimed at facilitating Iran’s modernization and transition into the twentieth-century global market. The White Revolution further gave women the right to vote. The development of a new economy provoked the Bazaar and religious forces to the point that the Shah’s major effort toward modernization/Westernization led to the formation of the religious opposition headed by Ayatollah Khomeini.
What should not be overlooked is the fact that women throughout the history of modern Iran have formed several women’s groups aimed at improving the status of women. After the 1953 clampdown on all civil and grass roots organizations, independent women’s right activism was limited, if not eliminated, as women’s efforts became co-opted by the state under the nationwide Women’s Organization, which nonetheless managed to lobby for the Family Protection Law, passed in 1967 and amended in 1975, to change family laws in favor of women.
During the Shah’s era, although major strides were made in the areas of education, labor force participation, health, and political participation, a growing number of women were forced to leave the declining rural economy. The women, who were mostly from traditional religious backgrounds and increasingly urban middle class yet also including the Bazaaris and massive migrants, subsequently became marginalized. Large cities, such as the capital, were flooded by rural peasants. Concurrently, there was a growing dissatisfaction, even among the secular and religious middle-class population, over the lack of freedom of expression due to the Shah’s rising authoritarianism. Increased political repression and dictatorial rule, as well as the Shah’s imposition of secularization, led to rising dissatisfaction with the Shah, which mobilized millions of Iranians against his rule toward the end of the 1970s.
Although there were many different groups of political forces mobilized against the Shah, the mosques were the only organizations that had remained and retained their structure. Thus, they became an important venue for political mobilization. With the revolution of 1979, the most organized opposition group was the religious authorities, headed by Ayatollah Khomeini. In the late 1970s, the Ayatollah changed his earlier views (published during the 1960s) regarding women’s participation and their public role and called upon women for their mass support. In fact, many pious women who wore the veil were at the forefront of street demonstrations, making it hard, if not impossible, for regime officers and police soldiers, who saw their sisters and mothers marching, unarmed, to fire. This pacified the revolution and made it one of the least bloody uprisings/revolutions of the twentieth century. As the events leading to the revolution unfolded, an increasing number of women not only were at the forefront of the street marches, but they also carried flowers, putting them in soldiers’ gun barrels to win their hearts.
Women’s massive role in the revolution became a key to the Ayatollah’s success. Yet, the Ayatollah, once in power, quickly changed some of the earlier legal reforms made to end discriminatory practices in family law in particular. Then, Iran was invaded by Saddam Hussein, who enjoyed the political and military support of the Americans. Ironically, the war against Iraq brought a new opportunity for women. As is common with many wars and similar to what happened during two world wars in Europe and North America, women’s work became essential. The Ayatollah called upon women to enter into the public sphere as volunteers. He formed the army of twenty million to fight against the enemy as well as build the country by working as volunteers in mosques to give basic education and deliver health and educational services to those in poor neighborhoods and rural areas.
Unlike the Shah, who had sought secular middle-class young women to work for development projects, the Ayatollah called upon religious women. One of his successful programs was a mass-based literacy campaign. The success was due, on the one hand, to the fact that it was delivered in the mosque, where men were not able to prevent their wives from attending — not to mention the fact that the Ayatollah made a jihad against illiteracy a religious duty; on the other hand, the type of education delivered was considered Islamic and, therefore, not a threat to the traditional values of the institution of family, which, in the context of a rapidly rising urban society, suffered major disruption.
While men were at war, a shortage of labor to assist social programs promised by the social justice claim of the Ayatollah during the revolution occurred and volunteers were needed. For this reason, women became part of the social landscape, paving the way for the massive presence of women in the public sphere, this time not just from the secular middle class, but also from the religious segments and low-income households. Ironically, mass participation of women took place while legal changes undermining women’s rights were being adopted, which slowly mobilized women against it, interestingly bringing religious as well as secular women together.
It has been argued that basic literacy is the engine of development and improvement of women’s status. There is certainly evidence for this in Iran where, after two decades of the revolution, women’s entry into primary and secondary schools and their percentage in the educational system increased. This stands in marked contrast to situations, such as in Afghanistan, where women were sent back home and schools were closed, reflecting a drastic drop in women’s status. Today, in Iran, there are more women studying at the university level than men (more than sixty percent), and many of them are in scientific departments, such as engineering.
In addition, the opening of Azad University (Open University) transformed the dynamics of women’s presence in small cities, as well as large ones. When Open University opened several branches in small cities, many young women from large cities left their families to live alone in smaller cities and vice versa. This meant that a large number of young women left their families and lived alone for a long time. As a result, they gained independence and became empowered enough to make their own life decisions, particularly with respect to marriage. To illustrate an example, the age of marriage rose from 19 years in the mid-1960s to 23.2 in 2006 in urban areas. The corresponding figures for rural areas are from 14 to 23.4 years.
Another interesting facet of women’s volunteer work after the revolution was improvement of some of the basic health indicators. Under the Shah, family planning had started in Iran but, similar to that in other countries in the Third World, had failed. In the aftermath of the revolution, particularly when the religious authorities endorsed family planning, the dynamics changed since those who tended to have large families were the poor and religious individuals. In urban areas, millions of women became aware of preventive methods of contraception. In the case of rural areas, many young women received basic health care skills and were trained to become health care workers (Behvarz). They were paid a salary by the ministry of health and the campaign was highly effective in bringing down the fertility rate. The birth rate dropped as a result from 6.56 in 1970 to 2.07 in 2000. Moreover, infant mortality declined from 122 per 1,000 births in 1970 to 34 in 2002 and life expectancy increased from 54 in 1970 to 72.8 in 2002 for women and from 52.2 to 69.6 for men.
Other than health and education indicators, there has been an increase in formal employment from 13.2 in 1966 to 15.5 percent in 2006. These figures, however, tend to be lower than women’s real participation since, as Jennifer Olmsted and Valentine Moghadam have argued, the female participation rate during the Shah’s regime was over reported while, in the aftermath of the revolution, there was a tendency to underreport the real participation rate. It is worth realizing that millions of women are in the informal sector and own micro-enterprises, which have a high tendency to fall outside of official statistics. Fieldwork indicates that many women do not even consider their contribution to the family income as “work” (something that only a time use survey can prove.) Therefore, official data on real employment figures can underestimate and undermine the reality of women’s work and, for this reason, the International Labour Office struggles with indicators to report female work.
What is alarming, however, is the growing unemployment rate, which is up to 28.3 percent, although, ironically, this itself is an indication that, increasingly, women seek employment and do not rely on their husbands’ incomes, not to mention the fact that two-income families are becoming a norm in large cities because it is harder for lower and low-income households to survive on only one income.
Moreover, in addition to health, education, and employment, women have taken large strides in political participation. This was highly evident in the countdown to the election of the reformist president Mohammed Khatami in 1997. Khatami’s main campaign targets were youth and women and he enjoyed massive support from both. This in turn led to his government being more responsive toward women’s demands, which shifted toward more equality and reform in the legal system, especially family law.
The reform era also witnessed a rise in the number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), many of them headed or highly supported by women, and other organizations and campaigns, which targeted women’s social, economic, and political status. In the parliament, a women’s faction was formed that pressed for the adoption of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). This attempt, however, was ultimately blocked by the Guardian Council.
With the election of Mahmood Ahmadinejad in 2005, some have argued that a turning point took place against improvement of women’s status. Twenty-first century women in Iran are adamant to show that their rights are not to be taken back. Even something as negative as high unemployment is an indication of the fact that a large number of women no longer define their role as housewives and are seeking jobs. Moreover, high divorce rates, especially in large urban areas, show that women are standing up against repressive marital arrangements. Finally, it is important to mention the high participation of women in political rallies during the 2009 election.
A recent and forthcoming survey conducted for the World Bank reveals a picture of a rising number of female entrepreneurs showing that women continue to resist and press for change and are seeking economic empowerment by venturing into the entrepreneurial world. Although their success in bringing legal changes has been limited, education, health, employment, and political participation remain spheres in which women show their constant and strong presence.
Since the 2009 election, many women have supported the Green Movement. Although it is evident that there is no turning back for women as far as their social, political, and economic situation is concerned, Iran’s political instability and economic condition will continue to impact the fate of women. For instance, the World Bank survey on entrepreneurship illustrated that women disproportionately suffered from the impact of international economic sanctions. Moreover, the government continues to adopt policies that attempt to curtail women’s public presence.
Iranian women are and will continue to be agents of their fate as well as the fate of their country and are determined to resist attempts to oppress and victimize them.
Women Of Iran
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Last Updated: 05/2022
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