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Coup d’état? . . . Or, Self-Inflicted Coup?
On 15 July 2016, a coup d’état was attempted in Turkey against state institutions, including the government and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The attempt was carried out by a faction within the Turkish Armed Forces that organized themselves as the Peace at Home Council. They attempted to seize control of several key places in Ankara, Istanbul, and elsewhere, but failed to do so after forces loyal to the state defeated them. The Council cited an erosion of secularism, elimination of democratic rule, disregard for human rights, and Turkey’s loss of credibility in the international arena as reasons for the coup. The government accused then coup leaders of being linked to the Gülen movement, which is designated as a terrorist organization by the Republic of Turkey and led by Fethullah Gülen, a Turkish businessman and cleric who lives in the state of Pennsylvania in the US. The Turkish government accuses Gülen of being behind the coup — a claim that Gülen denies — and accused the United States of harboring him. Gülen has suggested the coup was in fact a “self-coup” carried out by Erdoğan to consolidate his grip on power, a belief shared among some analysts and Turks. Events surrounding the coup attempt and the purges in its aftermath reflect a complex power struggle between Islamist elites in Turkey.
During the coup, over 300 people were killed and more than 2,100 were injured. Many government buildings, including the Turkish Parliament and the Presidential Palace, were bombed from the air. Mass arrests followed, with at least 40,000 detained, including at least 10,000 soldiers and, for reasons that remain unclear, 2,745 judges. Fifteen thousand education staff were also suspended and the licenses of 21,000 teachers working at private institutions were revoked as well after the government alleged they were loyal to Gülen. More than 77,000 people have been arrested and over 160,000 fired from their jobs, on accusations of connections to Gülen.
Reactions to the event were largely against the coup attempt, both domestically and internationally. The main opposition parties in Turkey condemned the attempt, while several international leaders —such as those from the United States, NATO, the European Union, and other neighboring countries — called for “respect of the democratic institutions in Turkey and its elected officials.” International organizations expressed themselves against the coup as well. The United Nations Security Council, however, did not denounce the coup after disagreements over the phrasing of a statement.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan accused the head of United States Central Command, chief General Joseph Votel of “siding with coup plotters,” after Votel accused the Turkish government of arresting the Pentagon’s contacts in Turkey.
In March 2017, Germany’s intelligence chief said Germany was unconvinced by Erdoğan’s claim that Fethullah Gulen was behind the failed coup. Also in March, the British Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee said some Gulenists were involved in coup d’état attempt but found no hard evidence that Fethullah Gülen masterminded the failed coup and found no evidence to justify the UK designating the Gülen movement as a “terrorist organization.”
Kemalism
It is widely believed that Kemalist ideology played little or no role in motivating the 15 July 2016 coup attempt, unlike all previous political interventions in the history of Turkey’s military. Since the establishment of multiparty democracy in Turkey in 1946, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), together with the judiciary, have viewed themselves as guardians of Kemalist ideals and the secular Turkish nationalist state established under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk against political parties that have promoted a larger role for Islam and minorities in public life. The military and judiciary have regularly intervened in politics to block or ban popular parties representing conservative Muslim Turks who were attempting to relax the restrictions on traditional religious practices, such as women’s wearing of headscarves. The military has toppled four elected governments: by coups in 1960 and 1980, and by military decisions in 1971 and 1997. In addition, the military has banned several major political parties. In 1998, Erdoğan, who was the mayor of Istanbul at the time, was banned for life from politics, and jailed, because he had read a certain poem several years before, at a public meeting. In 2007, the military expressed its opposition to the election of Abdullah Gül, of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), as president, by issuing an e-memorandum, but Gül was eventually elected when the AKP won both a referendum on the matter, and also a snap election, and the party returned with a larger majority in the parliament.
AKP–Gülen Alliance And “Ergenekon”
Movement Conflict
As opposed to previous political interventions by the Turkish military, Turkey’s AKP government and pro-government media maintain that the 15 July 2016 coup attempt was not motivated by allegiance to Kemalist ideology, but rather to the vast political, economic, and religious network led by U.S.-based Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen. Between 2007 and 2012, high-profile Kemalists, including high-ranking officers of the Turkish Armed Forces, faced a series of trials and purges, under allegations of involvement in a secret society codenamed “Ergenekon.” Supported by Islamist (both pro-Gülen and pro-Erdoğan) prosecutors, security officials and media, the purges gave an opportunity to lower-rank Islamist officers to assume high-ranking military positions. They were seen as a bid by Turkey’s civilian leaders under President Erdoğan to establish dominance over the military. In these trials in 2013 – viewed as “sensational” and “one of the biggest in recent Turkish history” – 275 people, including senior military officers, journalists, lawyers and academics, were accused of being involved in the so-called “Ergenekon” conspiracy, allegedly plotting a coup in 2003/04 against then–Prime Minister Erdoğan. Additionally, some military officers were accused of involvement in a separate alleged plot, Sledgehammer. Simultaneously, Erdoğan promoted lower-ranking officers up the chain of command, ensuring that the military chief of staff was loyal to him and thereby demoralizing the army.
The AKP’s alliance with Gülen started to collapse during 2013 as Gülenists targeted the AKP using corruption charges. After the split, Erdoğan decided it would be advantageous to rehabilitate the army. The “Ergenekon” convictions were overturned in April 2016 by the Court of Cassation, which ruled that the existence of the network was unproven.
Role Of Corruption
In 2013, law enforcement efforts to fight corruption, which had led to the 2013 corruption scandal in Turkey, were faulted by Erdoğan. The anti-corruption efforts were a source of tension between the Gülenists and the AKP. In political analysis in the months prior to the coup attempt, the incidence of corruption was reported to be “rife” in Turkey. Following the coup attempt, some coup leaders cited corruption as a reason for their actions.
Immunity Bill
On 13 July, less than two days before the coup was launched, Erdoğan signed a bill giving Turkish soldiers immunity from prosecution while taking part in domestic operations. The bill requires cases against commanders to be approved by the prime minister, while cases against lower-ranking soldiers may be signed off on by district governors. The immunity bill was seen as part of the détente between the government and the armed forces, while the latter have increasingly been taking over military operations in Kurdish-inhabited areas from police and paramilitary units.
Events
Reasons For Failure
One of the primary reasons that the coup failed was chaos among the plotters’ ranks. Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MİT) head Hakan Fidan discovered the coup plot, and the plotters were forced to execute the coup six hours ahead of schedule. One of the main organizers, General Semih Terzi, was shot dead by loyalist Sgt. Maj. Ömer Halisdemir at the onset, demoralizing and disrupting command and control of the rebels. These two incidents resulted in the coup being carried out in an uncoordinated manner. The highest ranking staff officers opposed the coup, and publicly ordered all personnel to return to their barracks. Acting outside the military chain of command, the rebels lacked the coordination and resources to achieve their goals. The conscripted soldiers that the rebels mobilized were uninformed of the true purpose of their mission, and became demoralized. Many surrendered rather than shoot demonstrators. The commander of the First Army in Istanbul, General Ümit Dündar, personally called Erdoğan to warn him of the plot, persuading him to evacuate his hotel ahead of the plotters, and helped to secure Istanbul for Erdoğan to land. The MİT also mobilized its anti-aircraft guns, which the plotters were unaware existed, deterring rebel jets and commando teams.
Equally important to the coup’s failure, according to military strategist Edward N. Luttwak, was the inability of the rebels to neutralize Erdoğan and other high ranking government officials, either by killing or detaining them. A unit of special forces was sent via helicopter to kill or capture the president, but missed because he had been evacuated by his security detail just minutes before. Once Erdoğan landed at Atatürk International Airport (which had been recaptured from the rebels by his supporters), the coup was doomed. According to a military source, several rebel F-16s targeted Erdoğan’s presidential jet en route to Istanbul, but they did not fire. A senior Turkish counter-terrorism official later revealed that the jets did not fire because the fighter jet pilots were told by President Erdoğan’s pilot over the radio that the (flight of the) Gulfstream IV was a Turkish Airlines flight.
According to Naunihal Singh, author of Seizing Power, the coup attempt also failed because the plotters failed to secure control of the media, and thus shape the narrative. Successful coups require that the mass media be controlled by the rebels. This allows even small rebel contingents to portray themselves as fully in control, and their victory as inevitable. Consequently, they convince the public, along with neutral and even loyalist soldiers, to defect to them, or at least not to resist. The rebels failed to properly broadcast their messages effectively across the media that they controlled. They failed to capture Turksat, Turkey’s main cable and satellite communications company, and failed to gain control of the country’s television and mobile phone networks. This allowed Erdoğan to make his Facetime call, and to speak on television.
Other scholars of civil-military relations, like Drew H. Kinney, have argued explanations like Luttwak and Singh’s miss the point of their own analysis: civil resistance thwarted the coup. Luttwak’s argument is that wayward elements of the Turkish armed forces were not able to silence Erdoğan. Singh argues that the rebels could not project success because they couldn’t control the message. Kinney claims that neither of these reasons on their own matter, but rather it’s their effect — civil disobedience — that is important. We might find that “[Gülen’s movement] . . . [might] have had nothing to do with the attempted takeover in July, but civilians [nevertheless] definitely played a role in thwarting the coup,” writes Kinney. “. . . [A]n unhappy civilian populace mobilized to face down the military.”
Erdoğan wasn’t censored (Luttwak’s point) and was therefore able to use FaceTime to mobilize resistance, which in turn hindered the conspirators’ ability to project success (Singh’s point). The end result is civilian resistance to soldiers, i.e., people power. The reason Singh, Luttwak, and other scholars of civil-military relations miss this is, according to Kinney, because they “usually do not study extra-military reasons for coup failures/successes,” but rather put a premium on “the inner-workings of the [military] operation.” In short, they blame the military for its failure rather than acknowledge the power of the masses and their successes.
Pro-government forces sent text messages to every Turkish citizen calling for them to protest against the coup attempt. Throughout the night sela prayers were repeatedly recited from mosques across the country to encourage people to resist the coup plotters. While sela prayers are traditionally recited during funerals, they are also performed to rally people.
The coup plotters initiated their operation hours ahead of the planned time when they understood that their plans had been compromised. Had the coup been launched at its original time in the middle of the night, much of the population would have been asleep and the streets would have been mostly empty.
Reports have emerged, neither confirmed or denied by Russia or Turkey, that the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate intercepted signals on an imminent coup which were passed on to loyal Turkish operatives. The intercepted plans revealed several helicopters with commandos were on the way to the coastal resort of Marmaris, where Erdoğan was staying, to capture or kill him. Pre-warned, Erdoğan left quickly to avoid them.
Aftermath
Arrests And Purges
An extensive purge of the Turkish civil service began in the wake of the coup attempt, with President Erdoğan warning his opponents that “they will pay a heavy price for this.” The New York Times along with some other Western media such as The Economist, described the purges as a “counter-coup,” with the Times expecting the president to “become more vengeful and obsessed with control than ever, exploiting the crisis not just to punish mutinous soldiers but to further quash whatever dissent is left in Turkey.” As of 20 July 2016, the purge already had seen over 45,000 military officials, police officers, judges, governors and civil servants arrested or suspended, including 2,700 judges, 15,000 teachers, and every university dean in the country.
One-hundred and sixty-three generals and admirals were detained, around 45 percent of the Turkish military’s total.
On 18 July 2016, United States State Secretary John Kerry urged Turkish authorities to halt the increasing crackdown on its citizens, indicating that the crackdown was meant to “suppress dissent.” French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault voiced concern, warning against a “political system which turns away from democracy” in response to the purges.
On 17 August 2016, Turkey started releasing what was expected to eventually amount to about 38,000 prison inmates, to make more space in the penal system for detainees, numbering about 35,000, who were arrested or detained after being involved in or suspected of association, with the 2016 failed coup.
On 28 September 2016, Turkish justice minister Bekir Bozdağ said 70,000 people had been processed and 32,000 were formally arrested.
Major General Cahit Bakir, who commanded Turkish forces under NATO in Afghanistan, and Brigadier General Sener Topuc, responsible for education and aid in Afghanistan, were detained by authorities in Dubai in connection with the failed coup.
General Akın Öztürk, former Commander of the Turkish Air Force, was the Turkish military attaché to Israel. He was arrested on charges of having played a leading role in the failed coup. Öztürk has denied the charges.
General Adem Huduti, the commander of the Second Army, positioned along the southern borders with Syria and Iraq, and General Erdal Öztürk, the commander of the Third Army, were also arrested.
Rear Admiral Mustafa Zeki Ugurlu, who had been stationed at NATO’s Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, Virginia, sought asylum in the United States after being recalled by the Turkish government.
In July 2018, Istanbul’s 25th Criminal Court sentenced 72 former soldiers involved in the coup attempt to life in prison.
Turkish Government Allegations About Coup Attempt
Allegations Against Fethullah Gülen
Turkish authorities blamed Fethullah Gülen who condemned the coup attempt and denied any role in it.
Fethullah Gülen, whom President Erdoğan had accused as being one of the principal conspirators, vehemently condemned the coup attempt and denied any role in it. “I condemn, in the strongest terms, the attempted military coup in Turkey,” he said in an emailed statement reported by The New York Times. “Government should be won through a process of free and fair elections, not force. I pray to God for Turkey, for Turkish citizens and for all those currently in Turkey that this situation is resolved peacefully and quickly. As someone who suffered under multiple military coups during the past five decades, it is especially insulting to be accused of having any link to such an attempt. I categorically deny such accusations.”
President Erdoğan asked the United States to extradite Gülen: “I call on you again, after there was a coup attempt. Extradite this man in Pennsylvania to Turkey! If we are strategic partners or model partners, do what is necessary.” Prime Minister Yildirim has threatened war against any country that would support Gülen. Turkish Labor Minister Süleyman Soylu claimed that “America is behind the coup.”
Regarding the AKP’s allegations against Gülen, Secretary of State Kerry invited the Turkish government “to present us with any legitimate evidence that withstands scrutiny,” before they would accept an extradition request.
On 15 August 2016, former United States diplomat James Jeffrey, who was the United States ambassador to Turkey from 2008 until 2010 made the following remarks: “The Gülen movement has some infiltration at the least in the military that I am aware of. They of course had extreme infiltration into the police and judiciary earlier. I saw that when I was in Turkey previously, particularly in the Sledgehammer case, Hakan Fidan case, and the corruption cases in 2013. It is very clear that significant segment of the bureaucracy in Turkey were infiltrated and had their allegiance to a movement. That of course is absolutely unacceptable and extremely dangerous. It is highly likely that it led to the coup attempt.”
Outside Turkey, in Beringen, Belgium, anti-coup protesters attempted to attack a building owned by the pro-Gülen movement group ‘Vuslat.’ The police brought in a water cannon to keep the attackers at bay. In news articles it was stated that the police also protected the houses of Gülen supporters. People advocated on social media to go to Beringen once more, and there was unrest in Heusden-Zolder, elsewhere in Belgium. Furthermore, in Somalia the government ordered “the total closure of all activities” of an organization linked to the Gülen movement, and gave its staff seven days to leave the country.
On 2 August 2016, President Erdoğan accused Western countries of “supporting terrorism” and a military coup, saying “I’m calling on the United States: what kind of strategic partners are we, that you can still host someone whose extradition I have asked for?”
Allegations Against The U.S. And The West, And The U.S. Response
General Erdal Öztürk (left), shown here with U.S. Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, right, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, has been arrested over alleged involvement in a coup attempt.
In a speech on 29 July 2016, President Erdoğan accused U.S. Central Command chief Joseph Votel of “siding with coup plotters;” Erdoğan accused the United States of protecting Fethullah Gülen, whom the Turkish government blames for the coup attempt. Turkish Prime Minister Binaldi Yildirim made similar comments. In response, Votel said that the Turkish government’s claims were “unfortunate and completely inaccurate” and expressed concern that the mass arrests and firings of military officers would damage military cooperation between the U.S. and Turkey. Similarly, then-U.S. Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper said that the Turkish military purges were impairing the fight against ISIS.
On 2 August 2016, in an escalation of tensions with the United States, Erdoğan questioned Turkey’s relationship with the United States and criticized the West, claiming that “script” for the abortive putsch last month was “written abroad.” Erdoğan stated that he had personally asked Obama to extradite Gülen to Turkey. When the U.S. government replied it would need evidence of the cleric’s guilt before extradition, to which Erdoğan said: “When you asked for the return of a terrorist, we did not ask for documentation . . . Let us put him on trial.”
Yeni Şafak daily, a Turkish pro-government newspaper, claimed that the former commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, now-retired United States Army General John F. Campbell, was the “mastermind” behind the coup attempt in Turkey. Campbell called the claim “absolutely ridiculous” and President Obama said “Any reports that we had any previous knowledge of a coup attempt, that there was any U.S. involvement in it, that we were anything other than entirely supportive of Turkish democracy are completely false, unequivocally false.”
On 1 December 2017, Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s office issued arrest warrant for American political analyst, former CIA official and former vice chairman of US National Intelligence Council Graham Fuller, alleging his involvement in the coup. A career US State Department official who was once CIA Station Chief in Kabul and later went on to be a political scientist in Rand Corporation specializing in the Middle East, Fuller was accused by the Turkish authorities to have attended a meeting in Istanbul on 15 July 2016 involving organization and coordination of the botched coup. Another American among the attendance, as alleged by the Turkish prosecutors, was academic Henri Barkey who was named a suspect a week after the failed coup.
Social Unrest
On 16 July, anti-coup protesters chanted against locals in areas of Istanbul with high concentration of Alevis, including Okmeydanı and Gazi. Such incidents also occurred in a quarter of Antakya with a high Alevi population, where a motorcyclist claiming to be a shari’a advocate was lynched. In a neighborhood of Ankara, shops belonging to Syrians were attacked by a mob. In Malatya, Sunni Islamists harassed residents of an Alevi neighborhood, particularly the women, and attempted to enter the neighborhood en masse. Police intervened and blocked all roads leading there. In Kadıköy, people drinking alcohol in public were attacked by a group of religious fundamentalists.
Calls To Reintroduce The Death Penalty
Following the arrests, thousands of anti-coup protesters demanded instituting the death penalty against detainees connected with the coup, chanting “we want the death penalty.” President Erdoğan has been open to re-instituting the death penalty, noting that “in a democracy, whatever the people want they will get.” Turkish authorities have not executed anyone since 1984, but legally abolished capital punishment only in 2004 as a pre-condition to join the European Union.
European Union officials have been vocal about their opposition to purges by Turkish authorities in connection to the coup. French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault noted that Turkey must work within the framework of the law to uphold Europe’s democratic principles. Furthermore, on 18 July 2016, Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of Foreign Affairs of the European Union, announced that no country will be admitted into the European Union “if it introduces the death penalty.” Moreover, German press secretary, Steffen Seibert, stated that re-instituting the death penalty will end Turkey’s accession talks with the European Union.
Turkey is a member of the Council of Europe, and ratified the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as part of its terms of membership. The ECHR is an international treaty that includes the abolition of the death penalty among its terms. As such, Turkey is legally bound not to reintroduce the death penalty.
State Of Emergency
On 20 July 2016, President Erdoğan announced a three-month state of emergency in response to the attempted coup, invoking Article 120 of the Constitution of Turkey (“Declaration of state of emergency because of widespread acts of violence and serious deterioration of public order”). Under the state of emergency, under Article 121, “the Council of Ministers, meeting under the chaipersonship of the President of the Republic, may issue decrees having the force of law on matters necessitated by the state of emergency . . . with decrees subject to subsequent parliamentary approval. The state of emergency was endorsed by the Parliament on 21 July by 346 votes to 115. The Justice and Development Party and the Nationalist Movement Party supported the state of emergency, whilst the Republican People’s Party and the Peoples’ Democratic Party opposed it. Prime Minister Yıldırım said at the Parliament that the state of emergency was necessary to “get rid of this scourge rapidly.”
lAs part of the state of emergency, deputy prime minister Kurtulmuş announced that Turkey was temporarily suspending part of the European Convention on Human Rights following the attempted coup, invoking Article 15 of the Convention (“war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation”). The suspensions must be notified to the Council of Europe and may not affect the right to a fair trial or the prohibition on torture.
State Of Emergency Extension
On 3 October 2016 Deputy Prime Minister Numan Kurtulmuş declared the government’s intention to extend the state of emergency by a further three months raising objections from both the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) were critical of the governments use of their emergency powers and declared that they would vote against an extension.
Following the National Security Council’s recommendation for the extension President Erdoğan stated that it was possible that the state of emergency could last for longer than a year prompting outcry from the opposition, Leader of the Main Opposition Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu said that “The president saying that the state of emergency can last longer than twelve months is strengthening the fear of a counter-coup” and that it was “raising the prospect of opportunist measures.”
The AKP’s governmental majority allowed the three-month extension to take effect on 19 October 2016. The two-year-long state of emergency ended on 19 July 2018.
The Aftermath
After the failed coup, there was a massive demonstration in Cologne, Germany in late July, in support of Turkish President Erdoğan. Erdoğan wanted to address the participants via video but was rejected by the local authorities and the German Constitutional Court due to security concerns. Turkey said that the ban was unacceptable and a violation of freedom of expression. German authorities accused Turkish mosques in Germany of playing Turkish politics and worried that Turkey’s internal politics are spilling over into German cities.
As of January 2018, Germany was first place and Greece second as EU destinations of choice for Turkish nationals requesting asylum after the coup attempt.
Staged Coup Allegation
During and after the events, several politicians and commentators suggested that the government knew about the coup in advance and possibly directed it. The facts that the coup attempt began in the evening rather than at a more inconspicuous time and that the events were largely confined to Ankara and Istanbul contributed to doubts about the authenticity of the coup attempt. Journalists and opposition politicians branded it a ‘tragic comedy’ and ‘theatre play.’ Advocates of such theories pointed to how Erdoğan stood to gain from the coup attempt in terms of increasing his popularity and support for his calls for an executive presidency, while being able to legitimize further crackdowns on judicial independence and the opposition in general.
Other elements that were claimed to support the conspiracy theory included:
- No list of demands by the coup plotters;
- The organization and response of the police;
- The long lists of arrests that seemed to be ready surprisingly quickly (including arrests of 2,745 judges and 2,839 soldiers); and,
- The highly visible nature of the coup actions.
Fethullah Gülen, whom Erdoğan had accused as being one of the principal conspirators, commented, “I don’t believe that the world believes the accusations made by President Erdoğan. There is a possibility that it could be a staged coup and it could be meant for further accusations [against the Gülenists].” Journalist Cengiz Çandar, a veteran observer of Turkey’s coups, said “I have never seen any with this magnitude of such inexplicable sloppiness.”
Evidence Of Pre-Planning
The organisation and spontaneous synchronization by large numbers of mosques was perceived tto be unachievable unless there had been prior preparation, with journalists also pointing to how the call to prayer could have been strategically used by Erdoğan to invoke religious sentiment in a political situation as a veiled attack on state secularism.
Thousands of arrests and purges were conducted by Turkish authorities between 16–18 July 2016, as noted above. The sheer number of these arrests made at such a speed could only be done so if the “Turkish government had all those lists ready,” as suggested by Johannes Hahn, European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, on 18 July 2016. Hahn also claimed that because these lists were already available immediately after the coup, the “event was prepared” and the lists were to be used “at a certain stage.”
Accusations of spying, continued fallout, and more accusations from the military, the media, the arts, education and yes, government, abound. What is the truth? Only a few people may be around who can honestly answer this, but one thing is for sure . . . the list is growing smaller all the time.
Aspirations
Whether real or staged, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been able to acquire new and broader powers. Words like ‘Caliphate,’ and ‘Caliph’ have been tossed about. However, both have already been claimed when it comes to Sunnī Islam and neither has been released. When it comes to Shi’a Islam, those are words that Iran’s Supreme Leader is holding tight himself. The real Supreme Leader though, will be the one who lays claim to being al-Mahdi, the savior of Islam . . . and can keep it.
Coup d’état? . . . Or, Self-Inflicted Coup?
725 – 002
Last Updated: 12/2021
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