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Criticism Of Islam: Part VI
Slavery
13th-Century Slave Market In Yemen
Bernard Lewis writes: “In one of the sad paradoxes of human history, it was the humanitarian reforms brought by Islam that resulted in a vast development of the slave trade inside, and still more outside, the Islamic empire.” He notes that the Islamic injunctions against the enslavement of Muslims led to massive importation of slaves from the outside. According to Patrick Manning, Islam by recognizing and codifying the slavery seems to have done more to protect and expand slavery than the reverse.
According to Brockopp, on the other hand, the idea of using alms for the manumission of slaves appears to be unique to the Qur’an, assuming the traditional interpretation of verses [Qur’an 2:177] and [Qur’an 9:60]. Similarly, the practice of freeing slaves in atonement for certain sins appears to be introduced by the Qur’an (but compares 21:26-7). The forced prostitution of female slaves, a Near Eastern custom of great antiquity, is condemned in the Qur’an. Murray Gordon notes that this ban is “of no small significance.” Brockopp writes: “Other cultures limit a master’s right to harm a slave but few exhort masters to treat their slaves kindly, and the placement of slaves in the same category as other weak members of society who deserve protection is unknown outside the Qur’an. The unique contribution of the Qur’an, then, is to be found in its emphasis on place of slaves in society and society’s responsibility toward the slave, perhaps the most progressive legislation on slavery in its time.
Critics argue unlike Western societies which in their opposition to slavery spawned anti-slavery movements whose numbers and enthusiasm often grew out of church groups, no such grass-roots organizations ever developed in Muslim society. ”In Muslim politics the state unquestioningly accepted the teachings of Islam and applied them as law. Islam, by sanctioning slavery, also extended legitimacy to the traffic in slaves.
According to Maurice Middleberg, however, “Sura 90 in the Qur’an states that the righteous path involves ‘the freeing of slaves.'” Murray Gordon characterizes Muhammad’s approach to slavery as reformist rather than revolutionary. He did not set out to abolish slavery, but rather to improve the conditions of slaves by urging his followers to treat their slaves humanely and free them as a way of expiating one’s sins which some modern Muslim authors have interpreted as indication that Muhammad envisioned a gradual abolition of slavery.
Critics say it was only in the early 20th century (post World War I) that slavery gradually became outlawed and suppressed in Muslim lands, largely due to pressure exerted by Western nations such as Britain and France. Gordon describes the lack of homegrown Islamic abolition movements as owing much to the fact that it was deeply anchored in Islamic law. By legitimizing slavery and – by extension – traffic in slaves, Islam elevated those practices to an unassailable moral plane. As a result, in no part of the Muslim world was an ideological challenge ever mounted against slavery. The political and social system in Muslim society would have taken a dim view of such a challenge.
However, In Islamic jurisprudence, slavery was theoretically an exceptional condition under the dictum. The basic principle is liberty (al-‘asl huwa ‘l-hurriya), so that for a foundling or another person whose status was unknown freedom was presumed and enslavement forbidden.
The issue of slavery in the Islamic world in modern times is controversial. Critics argue there is hard evidence of its existence and destructive effects. Others maintain slavery in central Islamic lands has been virtually extinct since mid-twentieth century, and that reports from Sudan and Somalia showing practice of slavery is in border areas as a result of continuing war and not Islamic belief. In recent years, according to some scholars, there has been a “worrying trend” of “reopening” of the issue of slavery by some conservative Salafi Islamic scholars after its “closing” earlier in the 20th century when Muslim countries banned slavery and “most Muslim scholars” found the practice “inconsistent with Qur’anic morality.”
Shaykh Fadhlalla Haeri of Karbala expressed the view in 1993 that the enforcement of servitude can occur but is restricted to war captives and those born of slaves.
In a 2014 issue of their digital magazine Dabiq, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant explicitly claimed religious justification for enslaving Yazidi women.
Apostasy
According to Islamic law apostasy is identified by a list of actions such as conversion to another religion, denying the existence of Allah, rejecting the prophets, mocking Allah or the prophets, idol worship, rejecting the Shari’a, or permitting behavior that is forbidden by the Shari’a, such as adultery or the eating of forbidden foods or drinking of alcoholic beverages.[188][189] The majority of Muslim scholars hold to the traditional view that apostasy is punishable by death or imprisonment until repentance, at least for adult men of sound mind.
The kind of apostasy which the jurists generally deemed punishable was of the political kind, although there were considerable legal differences of opinion on this matter. Wael Hallaq states that “[in] a culture whose lynchpin is religion, religious principles and religious morality, apostasy is in some way equivalent to high treason in the modern nation-state.”
Laws prohibiting religious conversion run contrary to Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.” The English historian C. E. Bosworth suggests the traditional view of apostasy hampered the development of Islamic learning, arguing that while the organizational form of the Christian university allowed them to develop and flourish into the modern university, “the Muslim ones remained constricted by the doctrine of waqf alone, with their physical plant often deteriorating hopelessly and their curricula narrowed by the exclusion of the non-traditional religious sciences like philosophy and natural science,” out of fear that these could evolve into potential toe-holds for kufr, those people who reject Allah.”
At a 2009 human rights conference at Mofid University in Qom, Araki stated that “if an individual doubts Islam, he does not become the subject of punishment, but if the doubt is openly expressed, this is not permissible.” As one observer (Sadakat Kadri) noted, this “freedom” has the advantage that “state officials could not punish an un-manifested belief even if they wanted to.”
In 13 Muslim-majority countries atheism is punishable by death. However, according to legal historian Sadakat Kadri, while apostasy was traditionally punished by death, executions were rare because “it was widely believed” that any accused apostate “who repented by articulating the shahada” (LA ILAHA ILLALLAH – “There is no Allah but Allah”) “had to be forgiven” and their punishment delayed until after Judgement Day. This principle was upheld “even in extreme situations”, such as when an offender adopts Islam “only for fear of death,” based on the hadith that Muhammad had upbraided a follower for killing a raider who had uttered the shahada.
Islamic Law: Shari’a
Decision of a Fatwa committee on the case of a convert to Christianity: “Since he left Islam, he will be invited to revert. If he does not revert, he will be killed pertaining to rights and obligations of the Islamic law.” The fatwa outlines the same procedure and penalty for the male convert’s children, on reaching the age of puberty.
Bernard Lewis summarizes:
“The penalty for apostasy in Islamic law is death. Islam is conceived as a polity, not just as a religious community. It follows therefore that apostasy is treason. It is a withdrawal, a denial of allegiance as well as of religious belief and loyalty. Any sustained and principled opposition to the existing regime or order almost inevitably involves such a withdrawal.”
The four Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence, as well as Shi’a scholars, agree on the difference of punishment between male and female. A sane adult male apostate may be executed. A female apostate may be put to death, according to the majority view, or imprisoned until she repents, according to others.
The Qur’an threatens apostates with punishment in the next world only, the historian W. Heffening states, the traditions however contain the element of death penalty. Muslim scholar Shafi’i interprets verse Qur’an 2:217 as adducing the main evidence for the death penalty in Qur’an. The historian Wael Hallaq states the later addition of death penalty “reflects a later reality and does not stand in accord with the deeds of the Prophet.” He further states that “nothing in the law governing apostate and apostasy derives from the letter of the holy text.”
William Montgomery Watt, in response to a question about Western views of the Islamic Law as being cruel, states that “In Islamic teaching, such penalties may have been suitable for the age in which Muhammad lived. However, as societies have since progressed and become more peaceful and ordered, they are not suitable any longer.”
Some contemporary Islamic jurists from both the Sunni and Shi’a denominations together with Qur’an only Muslims have argued or issued fatwas that state that either the changing of religion is not punishable or is only punishable under restricted circumstances. For example, Grand Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri argues that no Qur’anic verse prescribes an earthly penalty for apostasy and adds that it is not improbable that the punishment was prescribed by Muhammad at early Islam due to political conspiracies against Islam and Muslims and not only because of changing the belief or expressing it. Montazeri defines different types of apostasy. He does not hold that a reversion of belief because of investigation and research is punishable by death but prescribes capital punishment for a desertion of Islam out of malice and enmity towards the Muslim.
According to Yohanan Friedmann, an Israeli Islamic Studies scholar, a Muslim may stress tolerant elements of Islam for instance by adopting the broadest interpretation of Qur’an 2:256 (“No compulsion is there in religion . . .”) or the humanist approach attributed to Ibrahim al-Nakha’i, without necessarily denying the existence of other ideas in the Medieval Islamic tradition but rather discussing them in their historical context by for example arguing that “civilizations comparable with the Islamic one, such as the Sassanids and the Byzantines, also punished apostasy with death. Similarly, neither Judaism nor Christianity treated apostasy and apostates with any particular kindness.” Friedmann continues:
The real predicament facing modern Muslims with liberal convictions is not the existence of stern laws against apostasy in medieval Muslim books of law, but rather the fact that accusations of apostasy and demands to punish it are heard time and again from radical elements in the contemporary Islamic world.
Human Rights Conventions
“It is not a treaty . . . [In the future, it] may well become the international Magna Carta.” Eleanor Roosevelt with the Universal Declaration
Some widely held interpretations of Islam are inconsistent with Human Rights conventions that recognize the right to change religion. In particular article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.
To implement this, Article 18 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states:
No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion of his choice.
The right for Muslims to change their religion is not afforded by the Iranian Shari’ah law, which specifically forbids it. In 1981, the Iranian representative to the United Nations, Said Rajaie-Khorassani, articulated the position of his country regarding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, by saying that the UDHR was “a secular understanding of the Judeo-Christian tradition,” which could not be implemented by Muslims without trespassing the Islamic law. As a matter of law, on the basis of its obligations as a state party to the ICCPR, Iran is obliged to uphold the right of individuals to practice the religion of their choice and to change religions, including converting from Islam. The prosecution of converts from Islam on the basis of religious edicts that identify apostasy as an offense punishable by death is clearly at variance with this obligation. Muslim countries such as Sudan and Saudi Arabia, have the death penalty for apostasy from Islam. These countries have criticized the Universal Declaration of Human Rights for its perceived failure to take into account the cultural and religious context of non-Western countries. In 1990, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation published a separate Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam compliant with Shari’a. Although granting many of the rights in the UN declaration, it does not grant Muslims the right to convert to other religions, and restricts freedom of speech to those expressions of it that are not in contravention of the Islamic law.
Abul Ala Maududi, the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami, wrote a book called Human Rights in Islam, in which he argues that respect for human rights has always been enshrined in Shari’a law (indeed that the roots of these rights are to be found in Islamic doctrine) and criticizes Western notions that there is an inherent contradiction between the two. Western scholars have, for the most part, rejected Maududi’s analysis.
Violence
The September 11 attacks on the United States, and various other acts of Islamic terrorism over the 21st century, have resulted in many non-Muslims’ indictment of Islam as a violent religion. In particular, the Qur’an’s teachings on matters of war and peace have become topics of heated discussion in recent years. On the one hand, some critics claim that certain verses of the Qur’an sanction military action against unbelievers as a whole both during the lifetime of Muhammad and after. The Qur’an says, “Fight in the name of your religion with those who fight against you.” On the other hand, most Muslim scholars, including Ahmadiyya, argue that such verses of the Qur’an are interpreted out of context, and argue that when the verses are read in context it clearly appears that the Qur’an prohibits aggression, and allows fighting only in self-defense.
Orientalist David Margoliouth described the Battle of Khaybar as the “stage at which Islam became a menace to the whole world.” According to Margoliouth, earlier attacks on the Meccans and the Jewish tribes of Medina (e.g., the invasion of Banu Qurayza) could be at least plausibly be ascribed to wrongs done to Muhammad or the Islamic community. Margoliouth argues that the Jews of Khaybar had done nothing to harm Muhammad or his followers, and ascribes the attack to a desire for plunder.
Montgomery Watt mention another reason for the battle. He believes Jews’ intriguing and use of their wealth to incite tribes against Muhammad left him no choice but to attack. Vaglieri concurs that one reason for attack was that the Jews of Khaybar were responsible for the Confederates that attacked Muslims during the Battle of the Trench. Shibli Numani also sees Khaybar’s actions during the Battle of the Trench, and draws particular attention to Banu Nadir’s leader Huyayy ibn Akhtab, who had gone to the Banu Qurayza during the battle to instigate them to attack Muhammad.
Jihad, an Islamic term, is a religious duty of Muslims. In Arabic, the word jihād translates as a noun meaning “struggle.” Jihad appears 41 times in the Qur’an and frequently in the idiomatic expression “striving for the sake of Allah (al-jihad fi sabil Allah).” Jihad is an important religious duty for Muslims. A minority among the Sunni scholars sometimes refer to this duty as the sixth pillar of Islam, though it occupies no such official status. In Twelver Shi’a Islam, however, Jihad is one of the ten Practices of the Religion. The Qur’an calls repeatedly for jihad, or holy war, against unbelievers, including, at times, Jews and Christians. Middle East historian Bernard Lewis argues that “the overwhelming majority of classical theologians, jurists, and traditionalists (specialists in the hadith) understood the obligation of jihad in a military sense.” Furthermore, Lewis maintains that for most of the recorded history of Islam, from the lifetime of Muhammad onward, the word jihad was used in a primarily military sense. Andrew Bostom states that a number of jihads have targeted Christians, Hindus, and Jews.
The Qur’an: (8:12): “. . . cast terror in their hearts and strike upon their necks.” The phrase that they have been “commanded to terrorize the disbelievers” has been cited in motivation of Jihadi terror. One Jihadi cleric has said:
Another aim and objective of jihad is to drive terror in the hearts of the [infidels]. To terrorize them. Did you know that we were commanded in the Qur’an with terrorism? Allah said, and prepare for them to the best of your ability with power, and with horses of war. To drive terror in the hearts of my enemies, Allah’s enemies, and your enemies. And other enemies which you don’t know, only Allah knows them . . . So we were commanded to drive terror into the hearts of the [infidels], to prepare for them with the best of our abilities with power. Then the Prophet said, nay, the power is your ability to shoot. The power which you are commanded with here, is your ability to shoot. Another aim and objective of jihad is to kill the [infidels], to lessen the population of the [infidels] . . . it is not right for a Prophet to have captives until he makes the Earth warm with blood . . . so, you should always seek to lessen the population of the [infidels].
David Cook, author of Understanding Jihad, said “In reading Muslim literature – both contemporary and classical – one can see that the evidence for the primacy of spiritual jihad is negligible. Today it is certain that no Muslim, writing in a non- Western language (such as Arabic, Persian, Urdu), would ever make claims that jihad is primarily nonviolent or has been superseded by the spiritual jihad. Such claims are made solely by Western scholars, primarily those who study Sufism and/or work in interfaith dialogue, and by Muslim apologists who are trying to present Islam in the most innocuous manner possible.” Cook argued that “Presentations along these lines are ideological in tone and should be discounted for their bias and deliberate ignorance of the subject” and that “[i]t is no longer acceptable for Western scholars or Muslim apologists writing in non-Muslim languages to make flat, unsupported statements concerning the prevalence – either from a historical point of view or within contemporary Islam — of the spiritual jihad.” Magdi Allam, an outspoken Egyptian-born Italian journalist, has described Islam as intrinsically violent and characterized by “hate and intolerance.”
According to Fawzy Abdelmalek, “many Muslim scholars speak of Islam as a religion of peace and not of violence. They say that the non-Muslims misunderstand the Qur’an verses about Jihad and the conduct of war in Islam.”
Dennis Prager, columnist and author, in responding to a movement that contends that Islam is “a religion of peace,” wrote: “Now, Islam has never been a religion of peace. It began as a warlike religion and throughout its history, whenever possible, made war on non-Muslims – from the polytheists of North Africa to the Hindus of India, about 60 to 80 million of whom Muslims killed during their thousand-year rule there.” John R. Neuman, a scholar on religion, describes Islam as “a perfect anti-religion” and “the antithesis of Buddhism.”
Charles Mathewes characterizes the peace verses as saying that “if others want peace, you can accept them as peaceful even if they are not Muslim.” As an example, Mathewes cites the second sura, which commands believers not to transgress limits in warfare: “fight in Allah’s cause against those who fight you, but do not transgress limits [in aggression]; Allah does not love transgressors” (2:190).
Beheadings
Beheading was a standard method of execution in pre-modern Islamic law. Though a formerly widespread execution method, its use had been abandoned in most countries by the end of the 20th century. Currently, it is used only in Saudi Arabia. However, it also remains a legal method of execution in Iran, Qatar and Yemen, but it is no longer used.
Homosexuality
Critics such as lesbian activist Irshad Manji, former Muslims Ehsan Jami and the former Dutch politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali, have criticized Islam’s attitudes towards homosexuals. Most international human rights organizations, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, condemn Islamic laws that make homosexual relations between consenting adults a crime. Since 1994 the United Nations Human Rights Committee has also ruled that such laws violated the right to privacy guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
In May 2008, the sexual rights lobby group Lambda Istanbul (based in Istanbul, Turkey) was banned by court order for violating a constitutional provision on the protection of the family and an article banning bodies with objectives that violate law and morality. This decision was then taken to the Court of Cassation and the ban lifted.
In ten Muslim-majority countries homosexual acts may be punishable by death, though in some the punishment has never been carried out.
The ex-Muslim Ibn Warraq states that the Qur’an’s condemnation of homosexuality has frequently been ignored in practice, and that Islamic countries were much more tolerant of homosexuality than Christian ones until fairly recently.
Short-Term And Limited Marriages
Nikāḥ al-Mutʿah (literally pleasure marriage) is a fixed-term or short-term contractual marriage in Shi’a Islam. The duration of this type of marriage is fixed at its inception and is then automatically dissolved upon completion of its term. For this reason, nikah mut‘ah has been widely criticised as the religious cover and legalization of prostitution. The Christian missionary Thomas Patrick Hughes criticized Mut’ah as allowing the continuation of “one of the abominable practices of ancient Arabia.” Shi’a and Sunnis agree that Mut’ah was legal in early times, but Sunnis consider that it was abrogated. Ibn Kathir writes that “[t]here’s no doubt that in the outset of Islam, Mut’ah was allowed under the Shari’a.” Currently, however, mut’ah is one of the distinctive features of Ja’fari jurisprudence. No other school of Islamic jurisprudence allows it. According to Imam Jafar as Sadiq, “One of the matters about which I shall never keep precautionary silence (taqiyya) is the matter of mu’tah.” Allameh Tabatabaei defends the Shi’a view in Tafsir al-Mizan, arguing that there are mutawatir or nearly mutawatir traditions narrated from the Shi’a Imams that Mut’ah is permitted. For example, it has been narrated from Muhammad al-Baqir and Ja’far al-Sadiq that they said “regarding the [above] verse, and there is no blame on you about what you mutually agree after what is appointed.” It means that he increases her dowry or she increases his (fixed) period.
Sunnis believe that Muhammad later abolished this type of marriage at several different large events, the most accepted being at Khaybar in 7 AH (629 AD) Bukhari 059.527 and at the Victory of Mecca in 8 AH (630 AD). Most Sunnis believe that Umar later was merely enforcing a prohibition that was established during Muhammad’s time. Shi’a contest the criticism that nikah mut‘ah is a cover for prostitution, and argue that the unique legal nature of temporary marriage distinguishes Mut’ah ideologically from prostitution. Children born of temporary marriages are considered legitimate, and have equal status in law with their siblings born of permanent marriages, and do inherit from both parents. Women must observe a period of celibacy (idda) to allow for the identification of a child’s legitimate father, and a woman can only be married to one person at a time, be it temporary or permanent. Some Shi’a scholars also view Mut’ah as a means of eradicating prostitution from society.
Contractually Limited Marriage
Nikah Misyar is a type of Nikah (marriage) in Sunni Islam only carried out through the normal contractual procedure, with the provision that the husband and wife give up several rights by their own free will, such as living together, equal division of nights between wives in cases of polygamy, the wife’s rights to housing, and maintenance money (“nafaqa”), and the husband’s right of housekeeping and access. Essentially the couple continue to live separately from each other, as before their contract, and see each other to fulfill their needs in a legally permissible (halal) manner when they please. Misyar has been suggested by some western authors to be a comparable marriage with Nikah mut’ah and that they find it for the sole purpose of “sexual gratification in a licit manner.” According to Florian Pohl, assistant professor of religion at Oxford College, Misyar marriage is a controversial issue in the Muslim world, as many see it as practice that encourages marriages for purely sexual purposes, or that it is used as a cover for a form of prostitution.
Professor Yusuf Al-Qaradawi observes that he does not promote this type of marriage, although he has to recognize that it is legal, since it fulfills all the requirements of the usual marriage contract. He states his preference that the clause of renunciation be not included within the marriage contract, but be the subject of a simple verbal agreement between the parties. Islamic scholars like Ibn Uthaimeen or Al-Albani claim, for their part, that misyar marriage may be legal, but not moral. They agree that the wife can at any time, reclaim the rights which she gave up at the time of contract. But, they are opposed to this type of marriage on the grounds that it contradicts the spirit of the Islamic law of marriage and that it has perverse effects on the woman, the family and the community in general.
For Al-Albani, misyar marriage may even be considered as illicit, because it runs counter to the objectives and the spirit of marriage in Islam, as described in the Qur’an: “And among His signs is this, that He created for you mates from among yourselves, that ye may dwell in tranquility with them, and He has put love and mercy between your (hearts) . . .” Al-Albani also underlines the social problems which result from the “misyar” marriage, particularly in the event that children are born from this union. The children raised by their mother in a home from which the father is always absent, without reason, may suffer difficulties. The situation becomes even worse if the wife is abandoned or repudiated by her husband “misyar,” with no means of subsistence, as usually happens.
Ibn Uthaymeen recognized the legality of “misyar” marriage under Shari’a, but came to oppose it due to what he considered to be its harmful effects.
Women In Islam
Domestic Violence
A number of scholars claim Shari’a law encourages domestic violence against women, when a husband suspects nushuz (disobedience, disloyalty, rebellion, ill conduct) in his wife.
One of the verses of the Qur’an relating to permissibility of domestic violence is Surah 4:34. In deference to Surah 4:34, many nations with Shari’a law have refusedj to consider or prosecute cases of domestic abuse. Shari’a has been criticized for ignoring women’s rights in domestic abuse cases. Musawah, CEDAW, KAFA and other organizations have proposed ways to modify Shari’a-inspired laws to improve women’s rights in Islamic nations, including women’s rights in domestic abuse cases.
Personal Status Laws And Child Marriage
Shari’a is the basis for personal status laws in most Islamic majority nations. These personal status laws determine rights of women in matters of marriage, divorce and child custody. A 2011 UNICEF report concludes that Shari’a law provisions are discriminatory against women from a human rights perspective. In legal proceedings under Shari’a law, a woman’s testimony is worth half of a man’s before a court.
Except for Iran, Lebanon and Bahrain which allow child marriages, the civil code in Islamic majority countries do not allow child marriage of girls. However, with Shari’a personal status laws, Shari’a courts in all these nations have the power to override the civil code. The religious courts permit girls less than 18 years old to marry. As of 2011, child marriages are common in a few Middle Eastern countries, accounting for 1 in 6 all marriages in Egypt and 1 in 3 marriages in Yemen. However, the average age at marriage in most Middle Eastern countries is steadily rising and is generally in the low to mid 20s for women. Rape is considered a crime in all countries, but Shari’a courts in Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia in some cases allow a rapist to escape punishment by marrying his victim, while in other cases the victim who complains is often prosecuted with the crime of Zina (adultery).
Women’s Right To Property And Consent
Shari’a grants women the right to inherit property from other family members, and these rights are detailed in the Qur’an. A woman’s inheritance is unequal and less than a man’s, and dependent on many factors [Qur’an 4:12]. For instance, a daughter’s inheritance is usually half that of her brother’s [Qur’an 4:11].
The status of women in classical Islamic law compared favorably to their status under laws of other contemporaneous cultures such those of pre-modern Europe, both in terms of financial independence and access to divorce, but the situation is different if it is evaluated against modern conceptions. Furthermore, slave women were not granted the same legal rights. Shari’a recognizes the basic inequality between master and women slave, between free women and slave women, between believers and non-believers, as well as their unequal rights. Shari’a authorized the institution of slavery, using the words abd (slave) and the phrase ma malakat aymanukum (“that which your right hand owns”) to refer to women slaves, seized as captives of war. Under classical Islamic law, Muslim men could have sexual relations with female captives and slaves without her consent.
Slave women under Shari’a did not have a right to own property, right to free movement or right to consent. Shari’a, in Islam’s history, provided religious foundation for enslaving non-Muslim women (and men), as well as encouraged slave’s manumission. However, manumission required that the non-Muslim slave first convert to Islam. Non-Muslim slave women who bore children to their Muslim masters became legally free upon her master’s death, and her children were presumed to be Muslims as their father, in Africa, and elsewhere.
Starting with the 20th century, Western legal systems evolved to expand women’s rights, but women’s rights under Islamic law have remained tied to Qur’an, hadiths and their faithful interpretation as Shari’a by Islamic jurists.
José Policarpo Advice Controversy
On 14 January 2009, the Catholic Portuguese cardinal José Policarpo directed a warning to young women to “think twice” before marrying Muslim men: Christians should learn more about Islam and respect Muslims, but marrying a Muslim man is getting into a lot of trouble, that not even Allah knows where it would end, if the couple moved to an Islamic country. He also said that dialogue “with our Muslim brothers” is difficult, because it is possible to dialogue only with those who want to have dialogue. Human rights group Amnesty International criticized Policarpo for inciting “discrimination” and “intolerance”, and a representative of the Muslim community in Portugal said they were hurt and surprised by his words, but remarked that his words could be interpreted as a call to respect differences and get to know the other religion. A spokesman for the Portuguese Episcopal Conference said the cardinal had offered “realistic advice” rather than “discrimination” or “contempt for another culture or religion.”
Criticism Of Muslim Immigrants And Immigration
French philosopher Pascal Bruckner has criticised the effects of multiculturalism and qIslam in the West.
The extent of negative attitudes towards Muslims varies across different parts of Europe.
Unfavorable views of Muslims, 2019
Country Percent
Slovakia 77%
Poland 66%
Czech Republic 64%
Hungary 58%
Greece 57%
Lithuania 56%
Italy 55%
Spain 42%
Sweden 28%
Netherlands 28%
Germany 24%
France 22%
Russia 19%
United Kingdom 18%
The immigration of Muslims to Europe has increased in recent decades. Friction has developed between their new neighbors. Conservative Muslim social attitudes on modern issues have caused controversy in Europe and elsewhere. Scholars argue about how much these attitudes are a result of Islamic beliefs. Some critics consider Islam to be incompatible with secular Western society, and that, unlike other religions, Islam positively commands its adherents to impose its religious law on all peoples, believers and unbelievers alike, whenever possible and by any means necessary. Their criticism has been partly influenced by a stance against multiculturalism advocated by recent philosophers, closely linked to the heritage of New Philosophers. Statements by proponents like Pascal Bruckner describe multiculturalism as an invention of an “enlightened” elite who deny the benefits of democratic rights to non-Westerners by chaining them to their roots. They believe this allows Islam free rein to propagate what they state are abuses, such as the mistreatment of women and homosexuals, and in some countries slavery. They also state that multiculturalism allows a degree of religious freedom that exceeds what is needed for personal religious freedom and is conducive to the creation of organizations aimed at undermining European secular or Christian values.
Emigrants from nearly every predominantly Muslim country have immigrated to Canada. According to a 2001 poll, 54 percent of Canadians had an unfavorable view of Islam, which was higher than for any other religion.
In the United States, after the Boston Marathon bombings, the immigration processes in the country are assumed to be harder. Far-right commentator Bryan Fischer asked that no more visas be granted to Muslims, and no more mosques built; his opinion received support, most notably by the former presidential candidate Pat Buchanan.
Comparison To Communist And Fascist Ideologies
In 2004, speaking to the Acton Institute on the problems of “secular democracy,” Cardinal George Pell drew a parallel between Islam and communism: “Islam may provide in the 21st century, the attraction that communism provided in the 20th, both for those that are alienated and embittered on the one hand and for those who seek order or justice on the other.” Pell also agrees in another speech that its capacity for far-reaching renovation is severely limited. An Australian Islamist spokesman, Keysar Trad, responded to the criticism: “Communism is a Godless system, a system that in fact persecutes faith.” Geert Wilders, a controversial Dutch member of parliament and leader of the Party for Freedom, has also compared Islam to fascism and communism.
Islamism
Writers such as Stephen Suleyman Schwartz and Christopher Hitchens, find some elements of Islamism fascistic. Malise Ruthven, a Scottish writer and historian who writes on religion and Islamic affairs, opposes redefining Islamism as “Islamofascism,” but also finds the resemblances between the two ideologies “compelling.”
French philosopher Alexandre del Valle compared Islamism with fascism and communism in his Red-green-brown alliance theory.
Responses To Criticism
John Esposito has written a number of introductory texts on Islam and the Islamic world. He has addressed issues including the rise of militant Islam, the veiling of women, and democracy. Esposito emphatically argues against what he calls the “pan-Islamic myth.” He thinks that “too often coverage of Islam and the Muslim world assumes the existence of a monolithic Islam in which all Muslims are the same.” To him, such a view is naive and unjustifiably obscures important divisions and differences in the Muslim world.
William Montgomery Watt in his book Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman, addresses Muhammad’s alleged moral failings. Watt argues on a basis of moral relativism that Muhammad should be judged by the standards of his own time and country rather than “by those of the most enlightened opinion in the West today.”
Karen Armstrong, tracing what she believes to be the West’s long history of hostility toward Islam, finds in Muhammad’s teachings a theology of peace and tolerance. Armstrong holds that the “holy war” urged by the Qur’an alludes to each Muslim’s duty to fight for a just, decent society.
Edward Said, in his essay Islam Through Western Eyes, writes that the general basis of Orientalist thought forms a study structure in which Islam is placed in an inferior position as an object of study. He argues the existence of a very considerable bias in Orientalist writings as a consequence of the scholars’ cultural make-up. He states that Islam has been looked at with a particular hostility and fear due to many obvious religious, psychological and political reasons, all deriving from a sense “that so far as the West is concerned, Islam represents not only a formidable competitor but also a late-coming challenge to Christianity.”
Cathy Young of Reason Magazine writes that “criticism of the religion is enmeshed with cultural and ethnic hostility” often painting the Muslim world as monolithic. While stating that the terms “Islamophobia” and “anti-Muslim bigotry” are often used in response to legitimate criticism of fundamentalist Islam and problems within Muslim culture, she argues that “the real thing does exist, and it frequently takes the cover of anti-jihadism.”
In contrast to the widespread Western belief that women in Muslim societies are oppressed and denied opportunities to realize their full potential, most Muslims experience their faith as liberating or fair to women, and some find it offensive that Westerners criticize it without fully understanding the historical and contemporary realities of Muslim women’s lives. Conservative Muslims in particular (in common with some Christians and Jews) see women in the West as being economically exploited for their labor, sexually abused, and commodified through the media’s fixation on the female body.
A Gallup poll found that 89 percent of Muslim-Americans viewed the killing of civilians as unjustifiable, compared to 71 percent of Catholics and Protestants, 75 percent of Jews, and 76 percent of atheists and non-religious groups. When Gallup asked if it is justifiable for the military to kill civilians, the percentage of people who said it is sometimes justifiable were 21 percent among Muslims, 58 percent among Protestants and Catholics, 52 percent among Jews, and 43 percent among atheists.
Criticism Of Islam: Part VI
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Last Updated: 09/2021
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