351 – 001 – Jihad

0 0

Prologue

It became apparent to me early on the importance of this article. There are several reasons that come to mind … but, perhaps the main reason is because the terrorism our world faces today. Keeping this in mimd, I felt this topic deserved more attention to detail, correctness, in depth explanations, cross-referencing and a host of other reasons. What I had not counted on, though, was the amount of time it would take to bring it to completion, not knowing what I failed to discuss, etc. The most important concern I have, though, is reader understanding.

I first began research in April, 2021. Then, in June we were faced with a move from Colorado to Oklahoma due to health issues. It seems that somewhere along the way I have become accustomed to breathing. However, living at 8,000 feet as we did in Colorado, there is a limited supply of oxygen available. At this same time, my wife was under-going her third bout with cancer. So far, she has managed to beat this disease which affects so many people.

Back to Jihad. Books have been written on the subject, enough to fill a modest library. This is my interpretation. I continued with the research, began to write, then rewrite; read, then reread. Times ten (or so it seemed).

I hope you find this work interesting, informative, educational, challenging, thought provoking, and even entertaining. But mostly, I hope it helps you to understand the religion of Islam a little bit more.

JIHAD

Jihad is an Arabic word which literally means “striving” or “struggling,” especially with a praiseworthy aim. In an Islamic context, it can refer to almost any effort to make personal and social life conform with God’s guidance, such as struggle against one’s evil inclinations, proselytizing, or efforts toward the moral betterment of the Muslim community (Ummah), though it is most frequently associated with war. In classical Islamic law (Shari’a), the term refers to armed struggle against unbelievers, while modernist Islamic scholars generally equate military jihad with defensive warfare. In Sufi circles, spiritual and moral jihad has been traditionally emphasized under the name of “greater” jihad. The term has gained additional attention in recent decades through its use by various insurgent Islamic extremist, militant Islamist, and terrorist individuals and organizations whose ideology is based on the Islamic notion of jihad.

The word jihad appears frequently in the Qur’an with and without military connotations, often in the idiomatic expression “striving in the path of God (al-jihad fi sabil Allah),” conveying a sense of self-exertion. They developed an elaborate set of rules pertaining to jihad, including prohibitions on harming those who are not engaged in combat. In the modern era, the notion of jihad has lost its jurisprudential relevance and instead given rise to an ideological and political discourse. While modernist Islamic scholars have emphasized the defensive and non-military aspects of jihad, some Islamists have advanced aggressive interpretations that go beyond the classical theory.

Jihad is classified into inner (“greater”) jihad, which involves a struggle against one’s own base impulses, and external (“lesser”) jihad, which is further subdivided into jihad of the pen/tongue (debate or persuasion) and jihad of the sword. Most Western writers consider external jihad to have primacy over inner jihad in the Islamic tradition, while much of contemporary Muslim opinion favors the opposite view. Gallup analysis of a large survey reveals considerable nuance in the conceptions of jihad held by Muslims around the world.

The sense of jihad as armed resistance was first used in the context of persecution faced by Muslims, as when Muhammad was at Mecca, when the community had two choices: emigration (hijra) or jihad. In Twelver Shi’a Islam, jihad is one of the ten Practices of the Religion. A person engaged in jihad is called a mujahid (plural: mujahideen). The term jihad is often rendered in English as “Holy War,” although this translation is controversial. Today, the word jihad is often used without religious connotations, like the English crusade.

Meaning And Origins

The term jihad is derived from the Arabic root jahada, meaning “to exert strength and effort, to use all means in order to accomplish a task.” In its expanded sense, it can be fighting the enemies of Islam, as well as adhering to religious teachings, enjoining good and forbidding evil. The peaceful sense of “efforts towards the moral uplift of society or towards the spread of Islam” can be known as “jihad of the tongue” or “jihad of the pen,” as opposed to “jihad of the sword.” It is used as a term in fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) mostly in the latter sense, while in Sufism mostly in the sense of fighting the nafs al-ammara, which is the psychological state of being consumed by your own desires. Spiritual and moral jihad is generally emphasized in pious and mystical circles.

The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic defines the term as “fight, battle; jihad, holy war (against the infidels, as a religious duty).” However, given the range of meanings, it is incorrect to equate it simply with “holy war.” The notion of jihad has its origins in the Islamic idea that the whole humankind will embrace Islam. In the Qur’an and in later Muslim usage, jihad is commonly followed by the expression fi sabil illah, “in the path of God.” Muhammad Abdel-Haleem states that it indicates “the way of truth and justice, including all the teachings it gives on the justifications and the conditions for the conduct of war and peace.”

In Modern Standard Arabic, the term jihad is used for a struggle for causes, both religious and secular. It is sometimes used without religious connotation, with a meaning similar to the English word “crusade” (as in “a crusade against drugs”). Jihad is also used quite commonly in Arabic countries, in the neutral sense of “a struggle for a noble cause”, as a unisex name given to children. Nonetheless, jihad is usually used in the religious sense and its beginnings are traced back to the Qur’an and the words and actions of Muhammad.

Qur’an

Jihad is mentioned in four places in the Qur’an as a noun, while its derived verb is used in twenty-four places. Mujahid, the active participle meaning “jihadist”, is mentioned in two verses. In some of these mentions (see At-Tawbah 9/41, 44, 81, 86), it is understood that the word jihad directly refers to war, and in others, jihad is used in the sense of “the effort to live in accordance with Allah’s will.” Qur’anic exhortions to jihad have been interpreted by Islamic scholars both in the combative and non-combative sense. Ahmed al-Dawoody writes that there seventeen references to or derivatices of jihad occur altogether forty-one times in eleven Meccan texts and thirty Medinan ones, with 28 mentions related to religious belief or spiritual struggle and 13 mentions related to warfare or physical struggle.

Hadith

There are also many hadiths (records of the teachings, deeds and sayings of the Islamic prophet Muhammad) about jihad, typically under the headings of kitab al-jihad (book of jihad) or faza’il al-jihad (virtues of jihad) in hadith collections or as the subject of independent works. Of the 199 hadith references to jihad in the Bukhari collection of hadith, all assume that jihad means warfare.

Among reported sayings of the Islamic prophet Muhammad involving jihad are:

“The best Jihad is the word of Justice in front of the oppressive sultan.”

— cited by Ibn Nuhaas and narrated by Ibn Habbaan

and

“The Messenger of Allah was asked about the best jihad. He said: ‘The best jihad is the one in which your horse is slain and your blood is spilled.’”

— cited by Ibn Nuhaas and narrated by Ibn Habbaan

Ibn Nuhaas also cited a hadith[citation needed] from Musnad Ahmad ibn Hanbal, where Muhammad states that the highest kind of jihad is “The person who is killed whilst spilling the last of his blood” (Ahmed 4/144).

According to another hadith, supporting one’s parents is also an example of jihad. It has also been reported that Muhammad considered performing hajj well to be the best jihad for Muslim women.

The hadith emphasize jihad as one of the means to Paradise. All sins (except debt) would be forgiven for the one dies in it. Participation in jihad had to be voluntary and intention must be pure, for jihad is only waged for the sake of God not for material wealth. On the contrary, jihad required man to put both his life and wealth at risk. Jihad is ranked as one of the highest good deeds; according to one hadith it is the third best deed after prayer and being good to one’s parents. One hadith exempts military jihad on men whose parents are alive, as serving one’s parents is considered a superior jihad.

Greater And Lesser Jihad

Jihad has traditionally been divided into “greater jihad” (inner struggle against sinful behavior) and “lesser jihad” (military sense). Early Islamic thought considered non-violent interpretations of jihad, especially for those Muslims who could not partake in warfare in distant lands. Most classical writings use the term jihad in the military sense. The tradition differentiating between the “greater and lesser jihad” is not included in any of the authoritative compilations of Hadith. In consequence, some Islamists dismiss it as not authentic.

The most commonly cited hadith for “greater jihad” is:

“A number of fighters came to Muhammad and he said, ‘You have come from the ‘lesser jihad’ to the ‘greater jihad.’ The fighters asked ‘what is the greater jihad?’ Muhammad replied, ‘It is the struggle against one’s passions.’”

This was also cited in The History of Baghdad by Al-Khatib al-Baghdadi, an 11th-century Islamic scholar. This reference gave rise to the distinguishing of two forms of jihad: “greater” and “lesser.” Some Islamic scholars, such as Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani, consider the hadith to have a weak chain of transmission.

The concept has had “enormous influence” in Islamic mysticism (Sufism).

Ibn Hazm, lists four kinds of jihad fi sabilillah (struggle in the cause of God):

• Jihad of the heart (jihad bil qalb/nafs) is concerned with combatting the devil and in the attempt to escape his persuasion to evil. This type of Jihad was regarded as the greater jihad (al-jihad al-akbar).
• Jihad by the tongue (jihad bil lisan) (also Jihad by the word, jihad al-qalam) is concerned with speaking the truth and spreading the word of Islam with one’s tongue.
• Jihad by the hand (jihad bil yad) refers to choosing to do what is right and to combat injustice and what is wrong with action.
• Jihad by the sword (jihad bis saif) refers to qital fi sabilillah (armed fighting in the A related hadith tradition that has “found its way into popular Muslim literature,” and way of God, or holy war), the most common usage by Salafi Muslims and offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood.

A related hadith tradition that has “found its way into popular Muslim literature,” and which has been said to “embody the Muslim mindset” of the Islamoc Golden Age (the period from the mid-8th century to mid-13th century following the relocation of the Abbasid capital from Damascus to Baghdad is: “The ink of the scholar is more holy than the blood of the martyr.“

The belief in the veracity of this hadith was a contributing factor in the efforts by successive caliphs to subsidize translations of “Greek, Hebrew and Syriac science and philosophy texts,” and the saying continues to be heavily emphasised to this day in certain Islamic traditions advocating intellectualism over violence, for example in Timbuktu, where it is central to one of two key lessons in the work Tuhfat al-fudala by the 16th-century Berber scholar Ahmed Baba. In general, however, fewer people today are aware of the hadith, which suffers from “a general lack of knowledge,” according to Akbar Ahmed.

According to classical Islamic scholars like Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Jihad is against four types of enemies: the lower self (nafs), Satan, the unbelievers, and the hypocrites. The first two types of Jihad are purely peaceful spiritual struggles. According to Ibn Qayyim “Jihad against the lower self precedes jihad against external enemies.” Confirming the central importance of the spiritual aspect of Jihad, Ibn Taymiyyah writes:

“Jihad against the lower self and whims is the foundation of jihad against the unbelievers and hypocrites, for a Muslim cannot wage jihad against them unless he has waged jihad against himself and his desires first, before he goes out against them.”

Engaging in the greater jihad did not preclude engaging in the lesser jihad. Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani recommended his followers to pursue both the greater and the lesser jihads.

At least one important contemporary Twelver Shia figure, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian Revolution and the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, wrote a treatise on the “Greater Jihad” (i.e., internal/personal struggle against sin).

Defensive And Offensive Jihad

Classical scholars discussed justifications for jihad, including waging it defensively vs offensively. However, classical jurists paid more attention to conduct of war jus in bello (see next section) than justification of war jus ad bellum. The decision of when to wage war was often viewed viewed as a political decision best left to political authorities.

Two justifications for jihad were given: defensive war against external aggression, or an offensive or preemptive attack against an enemy state. According to the majority of jurists, the casus belli (justifications for war) are restricted to aggression against Muslims, and fitna — persecution of Muslims because of their religious belief. They hold that unbelief in itself is not a justification for war. These jurists therefore maintain that only combatants are to be fought; noncombatants such as women, children, clergy, the aged, the insane, farmers, serfs, the blind, and so on are not to be killed in war. Thus, the Hanafī Ibn Najīm states: “the reason for jihād in our [the Hanafīs] view is kawnuhum harbā ‛alaynā [literally, their being at war against us].” The Hanafī jurists al-Shaybānī state that “although kufr [unbelief in Allah] is one of the greatest sins, it is between the individual and his God the Almighty and the punishment for this sin is to be postponed to the dār al-jazā’, (the abode of reckoning, the Hereafter),” and al-Sarakhsī says something similar. Offensive jihad involved forays into enemy territory either for conquest, and thus enlarging the Muslim political order, or to dissuade the enemy from attacking Muslim lands.

Shi’a and Sunni theories of jihad are similar, except that Shi’as consider offensive jihad to be valid only under the leadership of the Mahdi, who is currently believed to be in occultation but will return at some point in the future. However, defensive jihad is permissible in Shi’a Islam before the Mahdi’s return. In fact, Shi’a scholars emphasized it was a religious duty for Shi’a to defend all Muslims (including Sunni Muslims) from outside invaders.

They might be our enemies but they are human beings. They consist of civil population comprising of women and children; how can one kill, loot and plunder them?

— Ali ibn Abi Talib, Najh Al-Balagha

Rules Of Warfare

Rules prohibit attacking or molesting non-combatants, which include women, children under the age of Puberty, elderly men, people with disabilities and those who are sick. Diplomats, merchants and peasants are similarly immune from being attacked. Monks are presumed to be non-combatants and thus have immunity too; similarly places of worship should not be attacked. Even if the enemy disregarded the immunity of noncombatants, Muslims could not respond in kind. However, these categories lose their immunity if they participate in fighting, planning or supplying the enemy. Some jurists argued that immunity was more related to noncombatant status than being in a certain demographic class. For example, Muhaqqiq al-Hilli opined that only old men are only immune from being killed if they neither fight, nor take a role in military decision making.

Up until the Crusades, Muslim jurists disallowed the use of mangonels because the weapon killed indiscriminately with the potential of harming noncombatants. But during Crusades this ruling was reversed out of military need. Jurists also grappled with the question of attacking an enemy that used women, children or Muslims as human shields. Most jurists held that it was permissible to attack the enemy in cases of military necessity, but steps should be taken to direct at the attack towards the combatants and avoiding the human shield. Abu Hanifa argued that if Muslims stopped combat for fear of killing noncombatants, then such a rule would make fighting impossible, as every city had civilians. Mutilating the dead bodies of the enemy is prohibited.

There are two conflicting rulings on destruction of enemy property. In one military battle, Prophet Muhammad ordered the destruction of an enemy’s palm trees as a means of ending a siege without bloodshed. By contrast, Abu Bakr prohibited destruction of trees, buildings and livestock. Most jurists did not allow unnecessary destruction of enemy property, but allowed it in cases of military necessity, such as destroying buildings in which the enemy is taking shelter. Some jurists also allowed destruction if it would weaken the enemy or win the war. Many jurists cautioned against “unnecessary devastation“, not just out of humanitarian concerns, but practical ones: it is more useful to capture an enemy’s property than to destroy it. Islamic scholars prohibited killing animals, unless due to military necessity (such as killing horses in battle). This is because, unlike other words you 9enemy property, animals are capable of feeling pain.

In The Beginning

In pre-Islamic Arabia, Bedouins conducted raids against enemy tribes and settlements to collect spoils. According to some scholars (such as James Turner Johnson), while Islamic leaders “instilled into the hearts of the warriors the belief” in jihad “holy war” and ghaza (raids), the “fundamental structure” of this bedouin warfare “remained, … raiding to collect booty.”According to Jonathan Berkey, the Qur’an’s statements in support of jihad may have originally been directed against Muhammad’s local enemies, the pagans of Mecca or the Jews of Medina, but these same statements could be redirected once new enemies appeared. According to another scholar (Majid Khadduri), it was the shift in focus to the conquest and spoils collecting of non-Bedouin unbelievers and away from traditional inter-bedouin tribal raids, that may have made it possible for Islam not only to expand but to avoid self-destruction.

Classical

The primary aim of jihad as warfare is not the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam by force, but rather the expansion and defense of the Islamic state. In theory, jihad was to continue until “all mankind either embraced Islam or submitted to the authority of the Muslim state.” There could be truces before this was achieved, but no permanent peace. One who died “on the path of God” was a martyr (shahid), whose sins were remitted and who was secured “immediate entry to paradise.”

According with Bernard Lewis, “from an early date Muslim law laid down” jihad in the military sense as “one of the principal obligations” of both “the head of the Muslim state,” who declared the jihad, and the Muslim community. According to legal historian Sadakat Kadri, Islamic jurists first developed classical doctrine of jihad “towards the end of the eighth century,”’ using the doctrine of naskh (that God gradually improved His revelations over the course of Muhammed’s mission) they subordinated verses in the Qur’an emphasizing harmony to more the more “confrontational” verses of Muhammad’s later years and linked verses on exertion (jihad) to those of fighting (qital). Muslims jurists of the eighth century developed a paradigm of international relations that divides the world into three conceptual divisions, dar al-Islam/dar al-‛adl/dar al-salam (house of Islam/house of justice/house of peace), dar al-harb/dar al-jawr (house of war/house of injustice, oppression), and dar al-sulh/dar al-‛ahd/dār al-muwada‛ah (house of peace/house of covenant/house of reconciliation). The second/eighth century jurist Sufyan al-Thawri (d. 161/778) headed what Khadduri calls a pacifist school, which maintained that jihad was only a defensive war. He also states that the jurists who held this position, among whom he refers to Hanafi jurists al-Awza‛i (d. 157/774) and Malik ibn Anas (d. 179/795), and other early jurists, “stressed that tolerance should be shown unbelievers, especially scripturaries and advised the Imam to prosecute war only when the inhabitants of the dar al-harb came into conflict with Islam.” The duty of Jihad was a collective one (fard al-kifaya). It was to be directed only by the caliph who might delayed it when convenient, negotiating truces for up to ten years at a time. Within classical Islamic jurisprudence — the development of which is to be dated into — the first few centuries after the prophet’s death — jihad consisted of wars against unbelievers, apostates, and was the only form of warfare permissible. (Another source — Bernard Lewis— states that fighting rebels and bandits was legitimate though not a form of jihad, and that while the classical perception and presentation of the jihad was warfare in the field against a foreign enemy, internal jihad “against an infidel renegade, or otherwise illegitimate regime was not unknown.”)

However, some argue martyrdom is never automatic because it is within God’s exclusive province to judge who is worthy of that designation.

Classical manuals of Islamic jurisprudence often contained a section called Book of Jihad, with rules governing the conduct of war covered at great length. Such rules include treatment of nonbelligerents, women, children (also cultivated or residential areas) and division of spoils. Such rules offered protection for civilians. Spoils include Ghanimah (spoils obtained by actual fighting), and fai (obtained without fighting i.e. when the enemy surrenders or flees).

The first documentation of the law of jihad was written by ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Awza’i and Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani. (It grew out of debates that surfaced following Muhammad’s death. Although some Islamic scholars have differed on the implementation of Jihad, there is consensus amongst them that the concept of jihad will always include armed struggle against persecution and oppression.

Both Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim asserted that Muhammad never initiated any hostilities and that all the wars he engaged in were primarily defensive. He never forced non-Muslims to Islam and upheld the truces with non-Muslims so long as they didn’t violate them. Ibn Taymiyya’s views on Jihad are explained in his treatise titled Qāʿidah mukhtaṣarah fī qitāl al-kuffār wa muhādanatuhum wa taḥrīm qatlahum li mujarrad kufrihim. (An abridged rule on fighting the unbelievers and making truces with them, and the prohibition of killing them merely because of their unbelief) According to Ibn Taymiyya, every human blood is inviolable by default, except “by right of justice.” Although Ibn Taymiyya authorised offensive Jihad ( Jihad al-Talab) against enemies who threaten Muslims or obstruct their citizens from freely accepting Islam, unbelief (Kufr) by itself is not a justification for violence, whether against individuals or states. According to Ibn Taymīyah, jihad is a legitimate reaction to military aggression by unbelievers and not merely due to religious differences. Ibn Taymiyya writes:

“As for the transgressor who does not fight, there are no texts in which Allah commands him to be fought. Rather, the unbelievers are only fought on the condition that they wage war, as is practiced by the majority of scholars and is evident in the Book and Sunnah.”

As important as jihad was, it has not been considered one of the “pillars of Islam.” According to one scholar (Majid Khadduri, this is because the five pillars are individual obligations, but jihad is a “collective obligation” of the whole Muslim community meant to be carried out by the Islamic state. This was the belief of “all jurists, with almost no exception,” but did not apply to defense of the Muslim community from a sudden attack, in which case jihad was and “individual obligation” of all believers, including women and children.

Scholars had previously assumed it was the responsibility of a centralized government to organize jihad. But this changed as the authority of the Abbasid caliph weakened. Al-Mawardi allowed local governors to wage jihad on the caliph’s behalf. This decentralization of jihad became especially pressing after the Crusades. Ali ibn Tahir al-Sulami argued that all Muslims were responsible for waging wars of self-defense. Al-Sulami encouraged Muslim rulers from distant lands to assist those Muslims being invaded.

Classical Shia doctrine maintained defensive jihad was always permissible, but offensive jihad required the presence of the Imam. An exception to this, during medieval times, was when the first Fatimid caliph Abdallah al-Mahdi Billah claimed to be the representative of the Imam and claimed the right to launch offensive jihad.

After the Mongol invasions, Shia scholar Muhaqqiq al-Hilli made defensive war not just permissible but praiseworthy, even obligatory. If a Muslim could not take part in the defense then he should, at least, send material support. This remained the case even if the Muslims were ruled by an unjust ruler.

Early Muslim Conquests

Age Of The Caliphs

In the early era that inspired classical Islam (Rashidun Caliphate) and lasted less than a century, jihad spread the realm of Islam to include millions of subjects, and an area extending “from the borders of India and China to the Pyrenees and the Atlantic.” The role of religion in these early conquests is debated. Medieval Arabic authors believed the conquests were commanded by God, and presented them as orderly and disciplined, under the command of the caliph. Many modern historians question whether hunger and desertification, rather than jihad, was a motivating force in the conquests. The famous historian William Montgomery Watt argued that “Most of the participants in the [early Islamic] expeditions probably thought of nothing more than booty … There was no thought of spreading the religion of Islam.” Similarly, Edward J. Jurji argues that the motivations of the Arab conquests were certainly not “for the propagation of Islam … Military advantage, economic desires, [and] the attempt to strengthen the hand of the state and enhance its sovereignty … are some of the determining factors.” Some recent explanations cite both material and religious causes in the conquests.

Post-Classical Usage

According to some authors, the more spiritual definitions of jihad developed sometime after the 150 years of jihad wars and Muslim territorial expansion, and particularly after the Mongol invaders sacked Baghdad and overthrew the Abbasid Caliphate. The historian Hamilton Gibb states that “in the historic [Muslim] Community the concept of jihad had gradually weakened and at length it had been largely reinterpreted in terms of Sufi ethics.” Johnson notes that “despite the theoretical importance of the idea of jihad in classical Islamic juristic thought”, by the time of the Abbasids, the concept was no longer central to statecraft.

Rudolph Peters also wrote that with the stagnation of Islamic expansionism, the concept of jihad became internalized as a moral or spiritual struggle. Earlier classical works on fiqh emphasized jihad as war for God’s religion, Peters found. Later Islamic scholars like Ibn al-Amir al-San’ani, Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Rida, Ubaidullah Sindhi, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Shibli Nomani, etc emphasized the defensive aspect of Jihad, distinguishing between defensive Jihad ( jihad al-daf) and offensive Jihad ( Jihad al-talab or Jihad of choice ). They refuted the notion of consensus on Jihad al-talab being a communal obligation( fard kifaya ). In support of this view, these scholars referred to the works of classical scholars such as Al-Jassas, Ibn Taymiyyah, etc. According to Ibn Taymiyya, the reason for Jihad against non-Muslims is not their disbelief, but the threat they pose to Muslimsggggggg. Citing Ibn Taymiyya, scholars like Rashid Rida, Al San’ani, Qaradawi,etc argues that unbelievers need not be fought unless they pose a threat to Muslims. Thus, Jihad is obligatory only as a defensive warfare to respond to aggression or “perfidy” against the Muslim community, and that the “normal and desired state” between Islamic and non-Islamic territories was one of “peaceful coexistence.” This was similar to the Western concept of a “Just war”. Similarly the 18th-century Islamic scholar Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab defined Jihad as a defensive military action to protect the Muslim community, and emphasized its defensive aspect in synchrony with later 20th century Islamic writers. Today, some Muslim authors only recognize wars fought for the purpose of territorial defense as well as wars fought for the defense of religious freedom as legitimate.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s hallmark themes included the permissibility of overthrowing a ruler who is classified as an unbeliever due to a failure to adhere to Islamic law, the absolute division of the world into dar al-kufr and dar al-Islam, the labeling of anyone not adhering to one’s particular interpretation of Islam as an unbeliever, and the call for blanket warfare against Non-Muslims, particularly Jews and Christians.[136]

Ibn Taymiyyah recognized “the possibility of a jihad against heretical and deviant Muslims within dar al-Islam. He identified as heretical and deviant Muslims anyone who propagated innovations (bida’) contrary to the Quran and Sunna … legitimated jihad against anyone who refused to abide by Islamic law or revolted against the true Muslim authorities.” He used a very “broad definition” of what constituted aggression or rebellion against Muslims, which would make jihad “not only permissible but necessary.” Ibn Taymiyyah also paid careful and lengthy attention to the questions of martyrdom and the benefits of jihad: ‘It is in jihad that one can live and die in ultimate happiness, both in this world and in the Hereafter. Abandoning it means losing entirely or partially both kinds of happiness.`

Bernard Lewis states that while most Islamic theologians in the classical period (750–1258 CE) understood jihad to be a military endeavor, after Islamic conquest stagnated and the caliphate broke up into smaller states the “irresistible and permanent jihad came to an end.” As jihad became unfeasible it was “postponed from historic to messianic time.” Even when the Ottoman Empire carried on a new holy war of expansion in the seventeenth century, “the war was not universally pursued.” They made no attempt to recover Spain or Sicily.

By the 1500s, it had become accepted that the permanent state of relations between dar al-Islam and dar al-harb was that of peace.

Shah Ismail of the Safavid dynasty tried to claim the right to wage offensive jihad, particularly against the Ottomans. However, Shi’a ulama did not permit that, maintaining the classical position that the true Imam could wage such a war. During the Qajar period, Shi’a ulama adopted the position that the Shah was responsible for national security. They authorized the Perso-Russian wars in the 19th century as jihad.

In the 18th century, the Durrani Empire under the reigns of Ahmad Shah Durrani and his son and successor, Timur Shah Durrani had issued multiple jihads against Sikh Misls in the Punjab region, often to consolidate territory and continue Afghan rule in the region, efforts under Ahmad Shah failed, while Timur Shah had succeeded.

Colonialism And Modernism

When Europeans began the colonization of the Muslim world, jihad was one of the first responses by local Muslims. Emir Abdelkader organized a jihad in Algeria against French domination, tapping into existing Sufi networks. Other wars against colonialist powers were often declared to be jihad: the Senussi religious order declared jihad against Italian control of Libya in 1912, and the “Mahdi” in the Sudan declared jihad against both the British and the Egyptians in 1881.

Rashid Rida and Muhammad Abduh argued that peaceful coexistence should be the normal state between Muslim and non-Muslim states, citing verses in the Qur’an that allowed war only in self-defense. However, this view still left open jihad against colonialism, which was seen as an attack on Muslims.

Sayyid Ahmad Khan also argued jihad was limited to cases of oppression, and since the British Raj allowed freedom of religion, there was no need to wage jihad against the British. Instead, Khan formulated jihad as recovering past Muslim scientific progress to modernize the Muslim world.

A concept that played a role in anti-colonial jihad (or lack thereof) was the belief in Mahdi. According to Islamic eschatology, a messianic figure named Mahdi will appear and restore justice on earth. Such a belief sometimes discouraged Muslims from conducting jihad against the colonial powers, instead inducing them to passively wait for the messiah to come. Such messages were circulated in Algeria to undermine Emir Abdelkader’s jihad against the French. On the other hand, this belief could be a powerful mobilizing force in cases when someone would proclaim himself Mahdi. Such mahdist rebellions happened in India (1810), Egypt (1865) and Sudan (1881).

With the Islamic revival, a new “fundamentalist” movement arose, with some different interpretations of Islam, which often placed an increased emphasis on jihad. The Wahhabi movement which spread across the Arabian peninsula starting in the 18th century, emphasized jihad as armed struggle. The so-called Fulbe jihad states and a few other jihad states in West Africa were established by a series of offensive wars in the 19th century. None of these jihad movements were victorious. The most powerful, the Sokoto Caliphate, lasted about a century until being incorporated into Colonial Nigeria in 1903.

When the Ottoman caliph called for a “Great Jihad” by all Muslims against Allied powers during World War I, there were hopes and fears that non-Turkish Muslims would side with Ottoman Turkey, but the appeal did not “unite the Muslim world” and Muslims did not turn on their non-Muslim commanders in the Allied forces. (The war led to the end of the caliphate as the Ottoman Empire entered on the side of the war’s losers and surrendered by agreeing to “viciously punitive” conditions. These were overturned by the popular war hero Mustafa Kemal, who was also a secularist and later abolished the caliphate.)

Prior to the Iranian revolution in 1922, the Shi’ite cleric Mehdi Al-Khalissi issued a fatwa calling upon Iraqis not to participate in the Iraqi elections, as the Iraqi government was established by foreign powers. He later played a role in the Iraqi revolt of 1920. Between 1918 and 1919 in the Shi’a holy city of Najaf the League of the Islamic Awakening was established by several religious scholars, tribal chiefs, and landlords assassinated a British officer in the hopes of sparking a similar rebellion in Karbala which is also regarded as sacred for Shi’as.

During the Iraqi revolt of 1920, Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Shirazi the father of Mohammad al-Husayni al-Shirazi and grandfather of Sadiq Hussaini Shirazi, declared British rule impermissible and called for a jihad against European occupations in the Middle East.

Post-Colonialism

Islamism has played an increasingly role in the Muslim world in the 20th century, especially following the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s. One of the first Islamist groups, the Muslim Brotherhood, emphasized physical struggle and martyrdom in its creed: “Allah is our objective; the Qur’an is our constitution; the Prophet is our leader; struggle (jihad) is our way; and death for the sake of Allah is the highest of our aspirations.” Hassan al-Banna emphasized jihad of the sword, and called on Egyptians to prepare for jihad against the British Empire, (making him the first influential scholar since the 1857 India uprising to call for jihad of the sword). The group called for jihad against Israel in the 1940s, and its Palestinian branch, Hamas, called for jihad against Israel when the First Intifada started.

Modern Muslim thought had been focused on when to go to war (jus ad bellum), not paying much attention on conduct during war (jus in bello). This was because most Muslim theorists viewed international humanitarian law as consistent with Islamic requirements. However, recently Muslims have once again started discussing conduct during war in response to certain terrorist groups targeting civilians.

According to Rudolph F. Peters and Natana J. DeLong-Bas, the new “fundamentalist” movement brought a reinterpretation of Islam and their own writings on jihad. These writings tended to be less interested and involved with legal arguments, what the different of schools of Islamic law had to say, or in solutions for all potential situations. “They emphasize more the moral justifications and the underlying ethical values of the rules, than the detailed elaboration of those rules.” They also tended to ignore the distinction between Greater and Lesser jihad because it distracted Muslims “from the development of the combative spirit they believe is required to rid the Islamic world of Western influences.”

Contemporary Islamic fundamentalists were often influenced by medieval Islamic jurist Ibn Taymiyyah’s, and Egyptian journalist Sayyid Qutb’s, ideas on jihad.

The highly influential Muslim Brotherhood leader, Sayyid Qutb, preached in his book Milestones that jihad, is mot a temporary phase but a permanent war … Jihad for freedom cannot cease until the Satanic forces are put to an end and the religion is purified for Allah in toto. Qutb focused on martyrdom and jihad, but he added the theme of the treachery and enmity towards Islam of Christians and especially Jews. If non-Muslims were waging a “war against Islam,” jihad against them was not offensive but defensive. He also insisted that Christians and Jews were mushrikeen (not monotheists) because (he alleged) gave their priests or rabbis “authority to make laws, obeying laws which were made by them [and] not permitted by God” and “obedience to laws and judgments is a sort of worship.”

Later ideologue, Muhammad abd-al-Salam Faraj, departed from some of Qutb’s teachings on jihad. While Qutb felt that jihad was a proclamation of “liberation for humanity” (in which humanity has the free choice between Islam and unbelief), Faraj saw jihad as a mean of conquering the world and reestablishing the caliphate. Faraj legitimized lying, attacking by night (even if it leads to accidentally killing innocents), and destroying trees of the infidel. His ideas influenced Egyptian Islamist extremist groups, and Ayman al-Zawahiri, later the No. 2 person in al-Qaeda.

Many Muslims (including scholars like al-Qaradawi and Sayyid Tantawi) denounced Islamic terrorist attacks against civilians, seeing them as contrary to rules of jihad that prohibit targeting noncombatants.

During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, despite being a predominantly Sunni nation, Afghanistan’s Shiite population took arms against the Communist government and allied Soviet forces like the nation’s Sunnis and were collectively referred to as the Afghan Mujahideen. Shiite Jihadists in Afghanistan were known as the Tehran Eight and received support from the Iranian government in fighting against the Communist Afghan government and allied Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

Abdullah Azzam

This section may lend undue weight to certain ideas, incidents, or controversies. Please help to create a more balanced presentation. Discuss and resolve this issue before removing this message. (August 2021).

In the 1980s Abdullah Azzam advocated waging jihad against the “unbelievers.” Azzam issued a fatwa calling for jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, declaring it an individual obligation for all able bodied Muslims because it was a defensive jihad to repel invaders. His fatwa was endorsed by a number of clerics including leading Saudi clerics such as Sheikh Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz.[180]

Azzam claimed that “anyone who looks into the state of Muslims today will find that their great misfortune is their abandonment of Jihad”, and he also warned that “without Jihad, shirk (joining partners with Allah) will spread and become dominant”.[181] Jihad was so important that to “repel” the unbelievers was “the most important obligation after Iman [faith]”.[181]

Azzam also argued for a broader interpretation of who it was permissible to kill in jihad, an interpretation that some think may have influenced some of his students, including Osama bin Laden.[182]

A charismatic speaker, Azzam traveled to dozens of cities in Europe and North American to encourage support for jihad in Afghanistan. He inspired young Muslims with stories of miraculous deeds during jihad—mujahideen who defeated vast columns of Soviet troops virtually single-handed, who had been run over by tanks but survived, who were shot but unscathed by bullets. Angels were witnessed riding into battle on horseback, and falling bombs were intercepted by birds, which raced ahead of the jets to form a protective canopy over the warriors.[183] In Afghanistan he set up a “services office” for foreign fighters and with support from his former student Osama bin Laden and Saudi charities, foreign mujahideed or would-be mujahideen were provided for. Between 1982 and 1992 an estimated 35,000 individual Muslim volunteers went to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets and their Afghan regime. Thousands more attended frontier schools teeming with former and future fighters.[184] Saudi Arabia and the other conservative Gulf monarchies also provided considerable financial support to the jihad—$600 million a year by 1982.[185] CIA also funded Azzam’s Maktab al-Khidamat[186] and others via Operation Cyclone./\

Azzam saw Afghanistan as the beginning of jihad to repel unbelievers from many countries—the southern Soviet Republics of Central Asia, Bosnia, the Philippines, Kashmir, Somalia, Eritrea, Spain, and especially his home country of Palestine.[187] The defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan is said to have “amplified the jihadist tendency from a fringe phenomenon to a major force in the Muslim world.”[184]

Having tasted victory in Afghanistan, many of the thousands of fighters returned to their home country such as Egypt, Algeria, Kashmir or to places like Bosnia to continue jihad. Not all the former fighters agreed with Azzam’s chioice of targets (Azzam was assassinated in November 1989) but former Afghan fighters led or participated in serious insurgencies in Egypt, Algeria, Kashmir, Somalia in the 1990s and later creating a “transnational jihadist stream.”[188]

In February 1998, Osama bin Laden put a “Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders” in the Al-Quds al-Arabi newspaper.[189] On 11 September 2001, four passenger planes were hijacked in the United States and crashed, destroying the World Trade Center and damaging the Pentagon.

Shi’a
In Shia Islam, jihad is one of the ten Practices of the Religion[22] (though not one of the five pillars). Traditionally, Twelver Shi’a doctrine has differed from that of Sunni Islam on the concept of jihad, with jihad being “seen as a lesser priority” in Shia theology and “armed activism” by Shias being “limited to a person’s immediate geography”.[190]

Because of their history of being oppressed, Shias also associated jihad with certain passionate features, notably in the remembrance of Ashura. Mahmoud M. Ayoub says:

In Islamic tradition jihad or the struggle in the way of God, whether as armed struggle, or any form of opposition of the wrong, is generally regarded as one of the essential requirements of a person’s faith as a Muslim. Shi’î tradition carried this requirement a step further, making jihad one of the pillars or foundations (arkan) of religion. If, therefore, Husayn’s struggle against the Umayyad regime must be regarded as an act of jihad, then, In the mind of devotees, the participation of the community in his suffering and its ascent to the truth of his message must also be regarded as an extension of the holy struggle of the Imam himself. The hadith from which we took the title of this chapter states this point very clearly. Ja’far al-Sadiq is said to have declared to al-Mufaddal, one of his closest disciples, ‘The sigh of the sorrowful for the wrong done us is an act of praise (tasbih) [of God], his sorrow for us is an act of worship, and his keeping of our secret is a struggle (jihad) in the way of God’; the Imâm then added, ‘This hadith should be inscribed in letters of gold’.[191]
and

Hence, the concept of jihad (holy struggle) gained a deeper and more personal meaning. Whether through weeping, the composition and recitation of poetry, showing compassion and doing good to the poor or carrying arms, the Shi’i Muslim saw himself helping the Imam in his struggle against the wrong (zulm) and gaining for himself the same merit (thawab) of those who actually fought and died for him. The ta’ziyah, in its broader sense the sharing of the entire life of the suffering family of Muhammad, has become for the Shi’i community the true meaning of compassion.[192]
In the Syrian civil war, Shia and Sunni fighters waged jihad against each other.[193] In Yemen, the Houthi Movement has used appeals to jihad as part of their ideology as well as their recruitment.[194]

Evolution of the term in Islamic jurisprudence
Some observers[195] have noted the evolution in the rules of jihad—from the original “classical” doctrine to that of 21st century Salafi jihadism. According to the legal historian Sadarat Kadri,[195] during the last couple of centuries, incremental changes in Islamic legal doctrine (developed by Islamists who otherwise condemn any bid‘ah (innovation) in religion), have “normalized” what was once “unthinkable”.[195] “The very idea that Muslims might blow themselves up for God was unheard of before 1983, and it was not until the early 1990s that anyone anywhere had tried to justify killing innocent Muslims who were not on a battlefield.”[196]

The first or the “classical” doctrine of jihad which was developed towards the end of the 8th century, emphasized the jihad of the sword (jihad bil-saif) rather than the “jihad of the heart”,[197] but it contained many legal restrictions which were developed from interpretations of both the Quran and the Hadith, such as detailed rules involving “the initiation, the conduct, the termination” of jihad, the treatment of prisoners, the distribution of booty, etc. Unless there was a sudden attack on the Muslim community, jihad was not a “personal obligation” (fard ayn); instead it was a “collective one” (fard al-kifaya),[121] which had to be discharged “in the way of God” (fi sabil Allah),[198] and it could only be directed by the caliph, “whose discretion over its conduct was all but absolute.”[108] (This was designed in part to avoid incidents like the Kharijia’s jihad against and killing of Caliph Ali, since they deemed that he was no longer a Muslim). Martyrdom resulting from an attack on the enemy with no concern for your own safety was praiseworthy, but dying by your own hand (as opposed to the enemy’s) merited a special place in Hell.[199] The category of jihad which is considered to be a collective obligation is sometimes simplified as “offensive jihad” in Western texts.[200]

Islamic theologian Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir has been identified as the key theorist and ideologue behind modern jihadist violence.[201] His theological and legal justifications influenced Abu Musab al-Zarqawi of al-Qaeda as well as several jihadi terrorist groups, including ISIS.[201] Zarqawi used a manuscript of al-Muhajir’s ideas at AQI training camps that were later deployed by ISIS, referred to as The Jurisprudence of Jihad or The Jurisprudence of Blood.[201][202][203]

The book has been described as rationalising “the murder of non-combatants” by The Guardian’s Mark Towsend, citing Salah al-Ansari of Quilliam, who notes: “There is a startling lack of study and concern regarding this abhorrent and dangerous text [The Jurisprudence of Blood] in almost all Western and Arab scholarship”.[202] Charlie Winter of The Atlantic describes it as a “theological playbook used to justify the group’s abhorrent acts”.[201] He states:

Ranging from ruminations on the merits of beheading, torturing, or burning prisoners to thoughts on assassination, siege warfare, and the use of biological weapons, Muhajir’s intellectual legacy is a crucial component of the literary corpus of ISIS—and, indeed, whatever comes after it—a way to render practically anything permissible, provided, that is, it can be spun as beneficial to the jihad. […] According to Muhajir, committing suicide to kill people is not only a theologically sound act, but a commendable one, too, something to be cherished and celebrated regardless of its outcome. […] neither Zarqawi nor his inheritors have looked back, liberally using Muhajir’s work to normalize the use of suicide tactics in the time since, such that they have become the single most important military and terrorist method—defensive or offensive—used by ISIS today. The way that Muhajir theorized it was simple—he offered up a theological fix that allows any who desire it to sidestep the Koranic injunctions against suicide.[201]
Psychologist Chris E. Stout also discusses the al Muhajir-inspired text in his book, Terrorism, Political Violence, and Extremism. He assesses that jihadists regard their actions as being “for the greater good”; that they are in a “weakened in the earth” situation that renders terrorism a valid means of solution.[203]

Current usage
The term ‘jihad’ has accrued both violent and non-violent meanings. According to John Esposito, it can simply mean striving to live a moral and virtuous life, spreading and defending Islam as well as fighting injustice and oppression, among other things.[204] The relative importance of these two forms of jihad is a matter of controversy. Rudoph Peters writes that, in the contemporary world, traditionalist Muslims understand jihad from classical works on fiqh; modernist Muslims regard jihad as a just war in international law and emphasize its defensive aspects; and fundamentalists view it as an expansion of Islam and realization of Islamic ideals.[133] David Cook writes that Muslims have understood jihad in a military sense, both in classical texts and in contemporary ones. For Cook the idea that jihad is primarily non-violent comes primarily from Sufi texts and the Western scholars who study them, or from Muslim apologists.[205] Gallup has stated that its surveys show that the concept of jihad among Muslims “is considerably more nuanced than the single sense in which Western commentators invariably invoke the term.”[20]

Muslim public opinion
A poll by Gallup asked Muslims in eight countries what jihad meant to them. In Lebanon, Kuwait, Jordan, and Morocco, the most frequent response was to “duty toward God”, a “divine duty”, or a “worship of God”, with no militaristic connotations. In Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Indonesia, many of the responses includes “sacrificing one’s life for the sake of Islam/God/a just cause” or “fighting against the opponents of Islam”.[20] Other common meanings of “jihad” in the Muslim world include “a commitment to hard work”, “promoting peace”, and “living the principles of Islam”.[20][206] The terminology is also applied to the fight for women’s liberation.[207]

Other spiritual, social, economic struggles
Shia Muslim scholar Mahmoud M. Ayoud states that “The goal of true jihad is to attain a harmony between Islam (submission), iman (faith), and ihsan (righteous living).” Jihad is a process encompassing both individual and social reform, this is called jihad fi sabil allah (“struggle in the way of God”), and can be undertaken by the means of the Quran (jihad bi-al-qur’an).[208] According to Ayoud the greatest Jihad is the struggle of every Muslim against the social, moral, and political evils. However, depending on social and political circumstances, Jihad may be regarded as a sixth fundamental obligation (farid) incumbent on the entire Muslim community (ummah) when their integrity is in danger, in this case jihad becomes an “absolute obligation” (fard ‘ayn), or when social and religious reform is gravely hampered. Otherwise it is a “limited obligation” (fard kifayah), incumbent upon those who are directly involved. These rules apply to armed struggle or “jihad of the sword”.[208]

In modern times, Pakistani scholar and professor Fazlur Rahman Malik has used the term to describe the struggle to establish a “just moral-social order”,[209] while President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia has used it to describe the struggle for economic development in that country.[210]

According to the BBC, a third meaning of jihad is the struggle to build a good society.[211] In a commentary of the hadith Sahih Muslim, entitled al-Minhaj, the medieval Islamic scholar Yahya ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi stated that “one of the collective duties of the community as a whole (fard kifaya) is to lodge a valid protest, to solve problems of religion, to have knowledge of Divine Law, to command what is right and forbid wrong conduct”.[212]

Scholar Natana J. Delong-Bas lists a number of types of “jihad” that have been proposed by Muslims

educational jihad (jihad al-tarbiyyah);
missionary jihad or calling the people to Islam (jihad al-da’wah)[213]
Other “types” mentioned include

“Intellectual” Jihad (very similar to missionary jihad).[214]
“Economic” Jihad (good doing involving money such as spending within one’s means, helping the “poor and the downtrodden”)[214] President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, used jihad to describe the struggle for economic development in Tunisia.[60] Iran has a Ministry of Jihad for Agriculture.[215]
Jihad Al-Nikah, or sexual jihad, “refers to women joining the jihad by offering sex to fighters to boost their morale”.[216] The term originated from a fatwa believed to have been fabricated by the Syrian government to discredit its opponents, and the prevalence of this phenomenon has been disputed.[217][218]
Usage by some non-Muslims
The United States Department of Justice has used its own ad hoc definitions of jihad in indictments of individuals involved in terrorist activities:
“As used in this First Superseding Indictment, ‘Jihad’ is the Arabic word meaning ‘holy war’. In this context, jihad refers to the use of violence, including paramilitary action against persons, governments deemed to be enemies of the fundamentalist version of Islam.”[219]
“As used in this Superseding Indictment, ‘violent jihad’ or ‘jihad’ include planning, preparing for, and engaging in, acts of physical violence, including murder, maiming, kidnapping, and hostage-taking.”[220] in the indictment against several individuals including José Padilla.
“Fighting and warfare might sometimes be necessary, but it was only a minor part of the whole jihad or struggle,” according to Karen Armstrong.[221]
“Jihad is a propagandistic device which, as need be, resorts to armed struggle—two ingredients common to many ideological movements,” according to Maxime Rodinson.[222]
Academic Benjamin R. Barber used the term Jihad to point out the resistant movement by fundamentalist ethnic groups who want to protect their traditions, heritage and identity from globalization (which he refers to as ‘McWorld’).[223]
Views of other groups
Ahmadiyya
Main article: Ahmadiyya view on Jihad
In Ahmadiyya Islam, jihad is primarily one’s personal inner struggle and should not be used violently for political motives. Violence is the last option only to be used to protect religion and one’s own life in extreme situations of persecution.[224]

Quranist
Quranists do not believe that the word jihad means holy war. They believe it means to struggle, or to strive. They believe it can incorporate both military and non-military aspects. When it refers to the military aspect, it is understood primarily as defensive warfare.[225][226]
Kmi

jihad, (Arabic: “struggle” or “effort”) also spelled jehad, in Islam, a meritorious struggle or effort. The exact meaning of the term jihād depends on context; it has often been erroneously translated in the West as “holy war.” Jihad, particularly in the religious and ethical realm, primarily refers to the human struggle to promote what is right and to prevent what is wrong.

In the Qurʾān, jihād is a term with multiple meanings. During the Meccan period (c. 610–622 CE), when the Prophet Muhammad received revelations of the Qurʾān at Mecca, the emphasis was on the internal dimension of jihad, termed ṣabr, which refers to the practice of “patient forbearance” by Muslims in the face of life’s vicissitudes and toward those who wish them harm. The Qurʾān also speaks of carrying out jihad by means of the Qurʾān against the pagan Meccans during the Meccan period (25:52), implying a verbal and discursive struggle against those who reject the message of Islam. In the Medinan period (622–632), during which Muhammad received Qurʾānic revelations at Medina, a new dimension of jihad emerged: fighting in self-defense against the aggression of the Meccan persecutors, termed qitāl. In the later literature—comprising Hadith, the record of the sayings and actions of the Prophet; mystical commentaries on the Qurʾān; and more general mystical and edifying writings—these two main dimensions of jihad, ṣabr and qitāl, were renamed jihād al-nafs (the internal, spiritual struggle against the lower self) and jihād al-sayf (the physical combat with the sword), respectively. They were also respectively called al-jihād al-akbar (the greater jihad) and al-jihād al-aṣghar (the lesser jihad).

In these kinds of extra-Qurʾānic literature, the different ways of promoting what is good and preventing what is wrong are included under the broad rubric of al-jihād fī sabīl Allāh, “striving in the path of God.” A well-known Hadith therefore refers to four primary ways in which jihad can be carried out: by the heart, the tongue, the hand (physical action short of armed combat), and the sword.

In their articulation of international law, classical Muslim jurists were primarily concerned with issues of state security and military defense of Islamic realms, and, accordingly, they focused primarily on jihad as a military duty, which became the predominant meaning in legal and official literature. It should be noted that the Qurʾān (2:190) explicitly forbids the initiation of war and permits fighting only against actual aggressors (60:7–8; 4:90). Submitting to political realism, however, many premodern Muslim jurists went on to permit wars of expansion in order to extend Muslim rule over non-Muslim realms. Some even came to regard the refusal of non-Muslims to accept Islam as an act of aggression in itself, which could invite military retaliation on the part of the Muslim ruler. The jurists gave special consideration to those who professed belief in a divine revelation—Christians and Jews in particular, who are described as “People of the Book” in the Qurʾān and are therefore regarded as communities to be protected by the Muslim ruler. They could either embrace Islam or at least submit themselves to Islamic rule and pay a special tax (jizyah). If both options were rejected, they were to be fought, unless there were treaties between such communities and Muslim authorities. Over time, other religious groups, including Zoroastrians, Hindus, and Buddhists, also came to be considered “protected communities” and were given rights similar to those of Christians and Jews. The military jihad could be proclaimed only by the legitimate leader of the Muslim polity, usually the caliph. Furthermore, the jurists forbade attacks on civilians and destruction of property, citing statements by the Prophet Muhammad.

Throughout Islamic history, wars against non-Muslims, even when motivated by political and secular concerns, were termed jihads to grant them religious legitimacy. This was a trend that started during the Umayyad period (661–750 CE). In modern times this was also true of the 18th and 19th centuries in Muslim Africa south of the Sahara, where religio-political conquests were seen as jihads, most notably the jihad of Usman dan Fodio, which established the Sokoto caliphate (1804) in what is now northern Nigeria. The Afghan wars of the late 20th and early 21st centuries (see Afghan War; Afghanistan War) were also viewed by many participants as jihads, first against the Soviet Union and Afghanistan’s Marxist government and later against the United States. During and since that time, Islamist extremists have used the rubric of jihad to justify violent attacks against Muslims whom they accuse of apostasy. In contrast to such extremists, a number of modern and contemporary Muslim thinkers insist on a holistic reading of the Qurʾān, assigning great importance to the Qurʾān’s restriction of military activity to self-defense in response to external aggression. This reading further leads them to discount many classical rulings on warfare by premodern Muslim jurists as historically contingent and inapplicable in the modern period.

Egyptian Islamic Jihad

Egyptian Extremist Organization

Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), also called al-Jihad, Egyptian extremist organization that originated in the late 1970s and developed into a powerful force in the 1980s and 1990s. Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) allied with the al-Qaeda network in the late 1990s, and the two groups merged in 2001.

EIJ coalesced out of a variety of smaller militant groups in the late 1970s under the leadership of Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj. His treatise Al-Farīḍah al-ghāʾibah (1981; The Neglected Duty), which urged Muslims to use violence for the purpose of creating an Islamic state, became the group’s ideological platform. On October 6, 1981, EIJ members disguised as soldiers assassinated Egyptian Pres. Anwar Sadat, shooting him in front of Egyptian television cameras during a military parade. A crackdown followed that saw most of the organization’s leaders imprisoned. During that period, fractures within EIJ worsened, and the group’s Upper Egyptian wing broke away to form an independent organization, al-Jamāʿah al-Islāmiyyah (“the Islamic Group”), under the leadership of Omar Abdel Rahman.

In the 1980s many members of EIJ left Egypt to participate in the Afghan guerrilla war against the occupation that followed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It was in Peshawar, Pakistan, that EIJ’s leaders Sayyid Imam al-Sharif and Ayman al-Zawahiri became acquainted with the Saudi financier and organizer Osama bin Laden, who founded the al-Qaeda network in the late 1980s.

Soon after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, Sharif, Zawahiri, and other EIJ leaders joined bin Laden in Khartoum, where he was hosted by Sudan’s government. Ties between EIJ and al-Qaeda continued to deepen. Veterans of EIJ came to constitute a large portion of al-Qaeda’s senior leadership, while EIJ relied on al-Qaeda for the planning and execution of its armed operations against the Egyptian government. EIJ claimed responsibility for foiled assassination attempts on Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfi in August 1993 and Prime Minister Atef Sedky in November 1993. Those attacks, along with EIJ’s failed attempt to assassinate Egyptian Pres. Hosni Mubarak during a visit to Ethiopia in June 1995, provoked a crushing repression of the group inside Egypt, forcing the group to find targets abroad. EIJ’s deadliest attack was its bombing of Egypt’s embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, in November 1995, which killed 17 people. However, EIJ was largely overshadowed by al-Jamāʿah al-Islāmiyyah, which waged a far-bloodier campaign inside Egypt, killing numerous officials, civilians, and foreign tourists.

EIJ and al-Qaeda announced a formal alliance in 1998, and the two groups merged fully in 2001. Zawahiri became Osama bin Laden’s deputy and was affiliated with the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001.

In mid-2007, as part of a “deradicalization” program, Egypt released more than 130 jailed members of EIJ in exchange for their renouncing violence. That year also saw a series of publications by Sayyid Imam al-Sharif renouncing terrorism as un-Islamic. Sharif’s writings drew a lengthy rebuttal from Zawahiri.

Taqiyyah, in Islam, the practice of concealing one’s belief and foregoing ordinary religious duties when under threat of death or injury. Derived from the Arabic word waqa (“to shield oneself”), taqiyyah defies easy translation. English renderings such as “precautionary dissimulation” or “prudent fear” partly convey the term’s meaning of self-protection in the face of danger to oneself or, by extension and depending upon the circumstances, to one’s fellow Muslims. Thus, taqiyyah may be used for either the protection of an individual or the protection of a community. Moreover, it is not used or even interpreted in the same way by every sect of Islam. Taqiyyah has been employed by the Shīʿites, the largest minority sect of Islam, because of their historical persecution and political defeats not only by non-Muslims but also at the hands of the majority Sunni sect.

Scriptural authority for taqiyyah is derived from two statements in the Qurʾān, the holy book of Islam. The 28th verse of the third sura (chapter) says that, out of fear of Allah, believers should not show preference in friendship to unbelievers “unless to safeguard yourselves against them.” The 16th sura was revealed (according to tradition) to ease the conscience of ʿAmmār ibn Yāsir, a devout follower of the Prophet Muhammad, who renounced his faith under torture and threat of death. Verse 106 of this sura proclaims that if a Muslim who is forced to deny his religion is nevertheless a true believer who feels “the peace of faith” in his heart, he will not suffer great punishment (16:106). The meaning of these verses is not clear even in the context of the sura in which they appear. Thus, even among Islamic scholars who agree that the verses provide Qurʾānic sanction for taqiyyah, there is considerable disagreement about how the verses do this and about what taqiyyah permits in practice.

The Hadith (record of the traditional sayings or accounts of Muhammad) has also been cited as providing theological warrant for taqiyyah. One hadith in particular mentions that Muhammad waited 13 years, until he could “gain a sufficient number of loyal supporters,” before combatting his powerful polytheistic enemies in Mecca. A similar story relates how ʿAlī, the fourth caliph (ruler of the Muslim community) and Muhammad’s son-in-law, followed Muhammad’s advice to refrain from fighting until he had “the support of forty men.” Some scholars interpret these legends as examples of taqiyyah. By avoiding combat against enemies of Islam until they could muster sufficient military force and moral support, ʿAlī and Muhammad preserved not only their own lives but their divinely appointed mission to spread the faith.

Neither the Qurʾān nor the Hadith decrees points of doctrine or prescribes guidelines for behaviour when using taqiyyah. The circumstances in which it may be used and the extent to which it is obligatory have been widely disputed by Islamic scholars. According to scholarly and judicial consensus, it is not justified by the threat of flogging, temporary imprisonment, or other relatively tolerable punishments. The danger to the believer must be unavoidable. Also, while taqiyyah may involve disguising or suppressing one’s religious identity, it is not a license for a shallow profession of faith. Oaths taken with mental reservation, for example, are justified on the basis that God accepts what one believes inwardly. Consideration of community rather than private welfare is stressed in most cases.

Aḥmad Grāñ

Somalian Muslim Leader

Aḥmad Grāñ, also called Aḥmad the Left-handed, real name Aḥmad Ibn Ibrāhīm al-Ghāzī, (born c. 1506—died 1543), leader of a Muslim movement that all but subjugated Ethiopia. At the height of his conquest, he held more than three-quarters of the kingdom, and, according to the chronicles, the majorityy of men in these conquered areas had converted to Islam.

Once Aḥmad Grāñ had gained control of the Muslim Somali state of Adal (Adel), where he installed his brother as a puppet king, he launched a jihad (Islamic holy war) against Christian Ethiopia. He created an army out of the masses of heterogeneous and nomadic Somalis who had joined him, motivated by religion and the prospects of wealth. He also made skillful use of firearms, introduced by the Turks, and employed a small body of Turkish troops.

Although Aḥmad Grāñ defeated an Ethiopian army in Adal in 1526–27, it was not until 1531 that he felt ready for a large-scale invasion. By 1535 he had conquered the southern and central areas of the state and had even invaded the northern highlands, leaving a trail of devastation behind him. The Ethiopian king and a few followers retreated and begged for Portuguese aid. But when a small Portuguese force tried to relieve them in 1541, they were first delayed and later soundly defeated by Aḥmad Grāñ, who had meanwhile been able to obtain Turkish reinforcements. The few remaining Portuguese, however, with the new Ethiopian ruler, Galawdewos (Claudius), were soon able to rearm themselves and rally a large number of Ethiopians. Aḥmad Grāñ, who had sent most of his Turkish troops back, was killed in the crucial battle that followed, and Galawdewos was able to regain his kingdom in 1543, though the conversion to Islam and reconversion of most of his subjects may have left a spiritual crisis less easily resolved.

ʿUmar Tal
Tukulor leader

Print
Cite
Share
Feedback
Alternate titles: ʿUmar ibn Saʿīd Tal, al-Ḥājj ʿUmar ibn Saʿīd Tal, el-Hadj Omar ibn Saʿīd Tal
By Jean Claude Froelich • Edit History
Born: c.1797 Senegal
Died: February 12, 1864 Mali
See all related content →
Summary
Read a brief summary of this topic
ʿUmar Tal, in full al-Ḥājj (“the Pilgrim”) ʿUmar ibn Saʿīd Tal, also spelled el-Hadj Omar ibn Saʿīd Tal, (born c. 1797, Halvar, Fouta-Toro [now in Senegal]—died Feb. 12, 1864, near Hamdalahi, Tukulor empire [now in Mali]), West African Tukulor leader who, after launching a jihad (holy war) in 1854, established a Muslim realm, the Tukulor empire, between the upper Senegal and Niger rivers (in what is now upper Guinea, eastern Senegal, and western and central Mali). The empire survived until the 1890s under his son, Aḥmadu Seku.
Early life and pilgrimage to Mecca.

ʿUmar Tal was born in the upper valley of the Sénégal River, in the land of the Tukulor people. His father was an educated Muslim who instructed students in the Qurʾān, and ʿUmar, a mystic, perfected his studies in Arabic and the Qurʾān with Moorish scholars who initiated him into the Tijānī brotherhood.

At the age of 23, ʿUmar set out on the pilgrimage to Mecca. He was already well known for his piety and erudition and was received with honour in the countries through which he traveled. Muhammad Bello, emir of Sokoto in Nigeria, offered him his daughter Maryam in marriage. Enriched by this princely alliance, ʿUmar had become an important personage when he reached Mecca about 1827. He visited the tomb of the Prophet in Medina, returned to Mecca, and then settled for a while in Cairo. On a visit to Jerusalem he succeeded in curing a son of Ibrahim Pasha, the viceroy of Egypt. In Mecca, finally, he was designated caliph for black Africa by the head of the Tijānī brotherhood.

Armed with his prestige as a scholar, mystic, and miracle worker, ʿUmar returned to the interior of Africa in 1833. Trained for political leadership by his father-in-law, Muhammad Bello, the emir of Sokoto, with whom he again spent several years, and his position strengthened by the title of caliph, ʿUmar now decided to obey the voice of God and to convert the pagan Africans to Islām. By now he not only was looked upon as a miracle worker but also had acquired a bodyguard of followers and of devoted Hausa slaves.

Upon the death of Bello, he departed for his native country, hoping to conquer the Fouta region with the assistance of the French, in exchange for a trade treaty, an agreement the French declined because of ʿUmar’s growing strength. ʿUmar realized that faith without force would be ineffective and made careful preparations for his task. In northeastern Guinea, where he first established himself, he wrote down his teachings in a book called Kitāb rimāḥ ḥizb ar-raḥīm (“Book of the Spears of the Party of God”). Deriving his inspiration from Ṣūfism—a mystic Islāmic doctrine—he defined the Tijānī “way” as the best one for saving one’s soul and for approaching God. He recommended meditation, self-denial, and blind obedience to the sheikh. He gained many followers in Guinea, but, when in 1845 he went to preach in his own country, he met with little success.
Military achievements.

Having built up an army, ʿUmar decided to use force. In March 1854 he issued an order for a jihad to sweep away the pagans and bring back the Muslims who had strayed from the fold. Starting out with about 10,000 men who lived off the land, he spread terror in order to force the pagan chieftains to submit. In 1855 he defeated the Bambara pagans of Mali, adding to his empire. He forcibly converted them, yet these conversions proved to be ineffectual. To defend his authority ʿUmar had 300 hostages executed, but revolt broke out again as soon as his armies were removed.

After an unsuccessful attack on a French fort that had refused to supply him weapons, ʿUmar again set off toward the east, but he had great difficulty subsisting in a land already ravaged. His men deserted, and his companions began to doubt his mission.

Having been unable to decisively conquer his adversaries, ʿUmar was to spend the next 10 years trying to contain his empire. Repressing new revolts, he was led eastward by the resistance he stirred up. In 1860 he signed a treaty with the French general Louis Faidherbe, governor of Senegal, accepting the Sénégal River as a common boundary.

ʿUmar perennially had to defend his conquests and foil hostile coalitions without giving up the principle of the jihad. This proved difficult, however, when he was confronted by the Fulani people of the Masina, who were Muslims, followers of the Qādirī brotherhood. When ʿUmar attacked the Fulani, he no longer represented the “wrath of God”—he was a conqueror; his mission turned into a fratricidal war. Both armies prayed to the same God before the battle. ʿUmar, recognizing the danger to his divine mission, proposed a duel with Aḥmadu III, the leader of the Fulani army. But the latter refused the judgment of God. ʿUmar won the battle, and Aḥmadu was captured and beheaded.

In 1863 ʿUmar took possession of the city of Timbuktu, but, defeated by the nomadic Tuaregs, he had to beat a retreat. In a subsequent battle, attacked by the Tuaregs, the Moors, and the Fulani, his army was destroyed. He withdrew to the city of Hamdalahi, where he was besieged. He escaped and took refuge in a cave but was killed when the cave was blown up with gunpowder.

Al-Ḥājj ʿUmar Tal’s empire lasted 50 years, from 1848 to 1897, when it was annexed by the French. Few of the Mali people still remember it, except the descendants of the Tijānī initiates or the Fulani and Bambaras, who suffered the conqueror’s cruelties. In order to enhance his own position, General Faidherbe described ʿUmar in his reports as the symbol of resistance to French penetration, at the same time recognizing his virtues and his courage. In fact, ʿUmar was not anxious to oppose the French. He had sought their neutrality and had hoped to buy arms from them, but they had other sources and feared his power. The mosque of Dinguiraye in Guinea is all that remains of ʿUmar’s empire.
Legacy

ʿUmar Tal lived, fought, and died more like a 7th-century warrior than a 19th-century political leader. He was a mystic, and his life resembled those of the early followers of the Prophet Muḥammad, who fought in the name of God and converted by fire and the sword. Senegalese poets, singing of ʿUmar’s life, have compared it with the Prophet’s. Some have glorified him and lauded his victories, citing the thousands he killed and the thousands he sold into slavery as proof of the divine character of his mission; others to this day hate him for having shed Muslim blood.

Usman dan Fodio
Fulani leader

Print
Cite
Share
Feedback
Alternate titles: ʿUthmān ibn Fūdī, Usuman dan Fodio, Uthman dan Fodio
By Thomas Hodgkin • Edit History
Born: December 1754 Gobir Nigeria
Died: 1817 (aged 62) Sokoto Nigeria
See all related content →
Summary
Read a brief summary of this topic
Usman dan Fodio, Usman also spelled Uthman or Usuman, Arabic ʿUthmān Ibn Fūdī, (born December 1754, Maratta, Gobir, Hausaland [now in Nigeria]—died 1817, Sokoto, Fulani empire), Fulani mystic, philosopher, and revolutionary reformer who, in a jihad (holy war) between 1804 and 1808, created a new Muslim state, the Fulani empire, in what is now northern Nigeria.
Early years

Usman was born in the Hausa state of Gobir, in what is now northwestern Nigeria. His father, Muhammad Fodiye, was a scholar from the Toronkawa clan, which had emigrated from Futa-Toro in Senegal about the 15th century. While he was still young, Usman moved south with his family to Degel, where he studied the Qurʾān with his father. Subsequently he moved on to other scholar relatives, traveling from teacher to teacher in the traditional way and reading extensively in the Islamic sciences. One powerful intellectual and religious influence at this time was his teacher in the southern Saharan city of Agadez, Jibrīl ibn ʿUmar, a radical figure whom Usman both respected and criticized and by whom he was admitted to the Qādirī and other Ṣūfī orders.

About 1774–75 Usman began his active life as a teacher, and for the next 12 years he combined study with peripatetic teaching and preaching in Kebbi and Gobir, followed by a further five years in Zamfara. During this latter period, though committed in principle to avoiding the courts of kings, he visited Bawa, the sultan of Gobir, from whom he won important concessions for the local Muslim community (including his own freedom to propagate Islam); he also appears to have taught the future sultan Yunfa.
Growing leadership

Throughout the 1780s and ’90s Usman’s reputation increased, as did the size and importance of the community that looked to him for religious and political leadership. Particularly closely associated with him were his younger brother, Abdullahi, who was one of his first pupils, and his son, Muhammad Bello, both distinguished teachers and writers. But his own scholarly clan was slow to come over to him. Significant support appears to have come from the Hausa peasantry. Their economic and social grievances and experience of oppression under the existing dynasties stimulated millenarian hopes and led them to identify him with the Mahdī (“Divinely Guided One”), a legendary Muslim redeemer whose appearance was expected at that time. Although he rejected this identification, he did share and encourage their expectations.

During the 1790s, when Usman seems to have lived continuously at Degel, a division developed between his substantial community and the Gobir ruling dynasty. About 1797–98 Sultan Nafata, who was aware that Usman had permitted his community to be armed and who no doubt feared that it was acquiring the characteristics of a state within the state, reversed the liberal policy he had adopted toward him 10 years earlier and issued his historic proclamation forbidding any but the Shaykh, as Usman had come to be called, to preach, forbidding the conversion of sons from the religion of their fathers, and proscribing the use of turbans and veils.

In 1802 Yunfa succeeded Nafata as sultan, but, whatever his previous ties with the Shaykh may have been, he did not improve the status of Usman’s community. The breakdown, when it eventually occurred, turned on a confused incident in which some of the Shaykh’s supporters forcibly freed Muslim prisoners taken by a Gobir military expedition. Usman, who seems to have wished to avoid a final breach, nevertheless agreed that Degel was threatened. Like the Prophet Muhammad, whose biography he frequently noted as having close parallels with his own, the Shaykh carried out a hijrah (migration) to Gudu, 30 miles (48 km) to the northwest, in February 1804. Despite his own apparent reluctance, he was elected imam (leader) of the community, and the new caliphate was formally established.
The jihad

During the next five years the Shaykh’s primary interests were necessarily the conduct of the jihad and the organization of the caliphate. He did not himself take part in military expeditions, but he appointed commanders, encouraged the army, handled diplomatic questions, and wrote widely on problems relating to the jihad and its theoretical justification. On this his basic position was clear and rigorous: the sultan of Gobir had attacked the Muslims; therefore he was an unbeliever and as such must be fought; and anyone helping an unbeliever was also an unbeliever. (This last proposition was later used to justify the conflict with Bornu.)

As regards the structure of the caliphate, the Shaykh attempted to establish an essentially simple, nonexploitative system. His views are stated in his important treatise Bayān wujūb al-hijra (November 1806) and elsewhere: the central bureaucracy should be limited to a loyal and honest vizier, judges, a chief of police, and a collector of taxes; and local administration should be in the hands of governors (emirs) selected from the scholarly class for their learning, piety, integrity, and sense of justice.

Initially the military situation was far from favourable. Food supplies were a continuing problem; the requisitioning of local food antagonized the peasantry; increasing dependence on the great Fulani clan leaders, who alone could put substantial forces into the field, alienated the non-Fulani. At the Battle of Tsuntua in December 1804, the Shaykh’s forces suffered a major defeat and were said to have lost 2,000 men, of whom 200 knew the Qurʾān by heart. But, after a successful campaign against Kebbi in the spring of 1805, they established a permanent base at Gwandu in the west. By 1805–06 the Shaykh’s caliphal authority was recognized by leaders of the Muslim communities in Katsina, Kano, Daura, and Zamfara. When Alkalawa, the Gobir capital, finally fell at the fourth assault on October 1808, the main military objectives of the jihad had been achieved.
Later life of Usman dan Fodio

Although the jihad had succeeded, Usman believed the original objectives of the reforming movement had been largely forgotten. This no doubt encouraged his withdrawal into private life. In 1809–10 Bello moved to Sokoto, making it his headquarters, and built a home for his father nearby at Sifawa, where he lived in his customary simple style, surrounded by 300 students. In 1812 the administration of the caliphate was reorganized, the Shaykh’s two principal viziers, Abdullahi and Bello, taking responsibility for the western and eastern sectors, respectively. The Shaykh, though remaining formally caliph, was thus left free to return to his main preoccupations, teaching and writing.

His five years at Sifawa were a productive period, to judge from the number of dated works that survive, most of them dealing with the practical problems of the community, including the series of books addressed to “the Brethren” (al-Ikhwān), arising out of the dispute with Bornu and its principal administrator and ideologist, Muḥammad al-Kanemi. At his weekly meetings on Thursday nights, he criticized aspects of the post-jihad caliphate (as indeed did Abdullahi and Bello), especially the tendency of the new bureaucracy and its hangers-on to become another oppressive ruling class. Around 1815 he moved to Sokoto, when Bello built him a house in the western suburbs, and where he died, aged 62, in 1817.
Legacy

Usman was the most important reforming leader of the western Sudan region in the early 19th century. His importance lies partly in the new stimulus that he, as a mujaddid, or renewer of the faith, gave to Islam throughout the region; and partly in his work as a teacher and intellectual. In the latter roles he was the focus of a network of students and the author of a large corpus of writings in Arabic and Fulani that covered most of the Islamic sciences and enjoyed—and still enjoy—wide circulation and influence. Lastly, Usman’s importance lies in his activities as founder of a jamāʿa, or Islamic community, the Sokoto caliphate, which brought the Hausa states and some neighbouring territories under a single central administration for the first time in history.

ṭahāra
Islam
Print
Cite
Share
Feedback
By The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica • Edit History
ṭahāra, (Arabic: “purity”) system of ritual purity in Islam. This system is based on two premises: the first is that humans lapse from a state appropriate to ritual activity as a result of certain bodily acts, such as defecation, sexual intercourse, or menstruation. Second, there are certain substances, such as pork or blood, that are either unclean by nature or have the effect of defiling a space, person, or object, rendering it unfit for ritual use. In both cases, the unfitness of the thing or person can be remedied by the ritual application of water or of a simulacrum (sand, clean rock, etc.).

All things and places are presumed to be ritually acceptable or neutral unless Scripture—either Qurʾān or Hadith—indicates otherwise. Items that are always defiling are called najas and include swine, blood, dog saliva, and wine. All najas should be avoided when possible, and if clothing or dishes come in contact with these items they should be washed with water until there is no smell, sight, or other evidence of the proscribed item. Pork or carrion should never be eaten and neither should carrion eaters such as vultures or dogs; products such as feces or hides from these animals should also be avoided.

There are two ritually disabling states into which humans fall—affected (muḥdath) and precluded (junub). Acts that are “affects” are called ḥadath, and these include defecation, urination, breaking wind, touching a person of the opposite sex (with desire, for most schools of Islamic jurisprudence), or touching one’s own genitals. For most jurists, unconsciousness or sleeping in a prone position make it probable that one has at least broken wind and so is affected. Likewise, violent laughter, coughing, or anger, according to many jurists, ought to occasion ritual purification, if they do not actually require it. Until the affected person undoes this state, he or she cannot perform ritual worship (ṣalāt), circumambulate the Kaʿbah, or handle the Qurʾān.

The ritual purification for being affected is called ablution (wuḍūʾ). It consists of (1) intending to perform the wuḍūʾ, (2) washing the hands to the wrists three times, (3) rinsing out the mouth and snuffing water into the nostrils three times, and (4) washing the face from the hairline to the neck, the chin, and the openings of the nostrils. (5) The beard (if there is one) is then combed with wet fingers, and (6) the hands and arms are washed up to the elbows three times. (7) The head—from the forehead to the nape of the neck, including the ears—is then rubbed with both hands, and (8) the feet, particularly the tops and including the ankles, are rubbed. Finally, (9) the Muslim says, “I bear witness that there is no God but God, the unique, who has no partner. I bear witness that Muhammad is his servant and his Messenger.”

The other state of impurity, which is sometimes called the major impurity, is referred to in ritual texts as preclusion (janābah). It arises from sexual intercourse, seminal emission, menstruation, and childbirth. A person in a state of preclusion is ritually disabled like the affected person, but in addition he or she may not recite the Qurʾān, perform ritual recollections (dhikr) of God, or fast for Ramadan. This disability is reversed by—according to most schools—adding the pouring of water over the entire body to the rituals of ablution. This lustration (ghusl) is the reason why bathhouses are found throughout Islamdom, since every act of sexual intercourse, every menstruation, and every childbirth requires lustration before the Muslim can resume his or her ritual life. Only women are ritually disabled in this major way by acts they cannot control, and only women cannot immediately lustrate themselves into a state of ritual capability.

Unlike in many other ritual communities, however, in Sunni law a ritually disabled person does not, by touch, conversation, or other contact, have the power to disable another person ritually. Shīʿism differs from Sunni law precisely on this issue of the contamination through ritually disabled persons and impure substances. For Imami Shīʿites, women who are menstruating can render a man in need of ablution by contact with her. Indeed, according to some legists, the very sweat of a menstruating woman, passing through her clothing, can ritually disable a man. Also, prayer in an area contaminated by an impure substance or person is invalid. In addition, Christians, Jews, and other non-Muslims have been seen in much of Shīʿite legal theory as ritually contaminating. According to some, food cooked by non-Muslims cannot be eaten, water being drunk by non-Muslims and the cup that contains it are ritually impure, and (as one of the distinctive features of Shīʿite law) Christians and Jews cannot be acceptable butchers, as they may be for Sunnis.

The penalties for transgressions of the rules of purity are generally mild. Muslims who have intercourse when the woman is menstruating must make a small donation to charity. Impure foods eaten inadvertently require no penance. Prayer or other rituals deliberately offered in a state of ritual impurity are simply invalid, causing one to suffer the double fault of disobeying God and failing validly to perform one’s ritual obligations.

One of the most striking features of the Islamic legal (fiqh) literature on purity (as on most things) is the nearly complete absence of any justification for ritual rules. Why God ordained washing in a certain way as a precondition of prayer or excluded menstruating women from ritual was not explained by the legists. The arbitrariness of these rules—from a human point of view—was recognized in legal and theological discourse. The Sufi tradition, by contrast, did not shy from venturing such explanations, and works like Abū Ṭālīb al-Makkī’s Qut al-qulub and al-Ghazālī’s Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn are filled with explanations of the reasons or symbolism behind the rituals of purity. In Sufism, they were particularly prone to see in the rituals of ablution and lustration figures of moral or spiritual purity. The cleansing of the body and the cleansing of the heart were conflated by Sufi legists, so that these rituals took on a deeper significance and acquired many layers of meaning.

In modern times the justification of ritual as obedience has seemed embarrassing to apologists, and from the 19th century both liberals and Islamists have labored to find the real point of these rituals. Most have assimilated ritual purity to “cleanliness” or “hygiene” and have seen in the rules for ablution a wise anticipation by God and his Prophet of the insights of modern scientists such as Louis Pasteur and Joseph Lister.
This article was most recently revised and updated by Noah Tesch.
Sayyid Maxamed Cabdulle Xasan
Introduction
Fast Facts
Facts & Related Content
More
More Articles On This Topic
Contributors
Article History

Home
Lifestyles & Social Issues
Social Movements & Trends
Sayyid Maxamed Cabdulle Xasan
Somalian leader
Print
Cite
Share
Feedback
Alternate titles: Mohammed Abdullah Hassan, Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allāh Hạsan
By The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica • Last Updated: Apr 3, 2022 • Edit History
Born: April 7, 1864 Somalia
Died: December 21, 1920 (aged 56) Ethiopia
See all related content →
Sayyid Maxamed Cabdulle Xasan, also spelled Mohammed Abdullah Hassan, (born April 7, 1864, Dulbahante area, British Somaliland [now Doli Bahanta, Somalia]—died Dec. 21, 1920, Imi, Ethiopia), Somali religious and nationalist leader (called the “Mad Mullah” by the British) who for 20 years led armed resistance to the British, Italian, and Ethiopian colonial forces in Somaliland. Because of his active resistance to the British and his vision of a Somalia united in a Muslim brotherhood transcending clan divisions, Sayyid Maxamed is seen as a forerunner of modern Somali nationalism. He also is revered for his skill as an oral poet.

Maxamed’s father belonged to a clan from the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, but he was raised among his mother’s Dulbahante clan. At a young age he showed great learning in the Qurʾān, and, during a pilgrimage to Mecca in 1894, he joined the Ṣaliḥīyah, a militant, reformist, and puritanical Ṣūfī order. Soon after his return to Somaliland, he began urging the expulsion of the English “infidels” and their missionaries and a strict observance by all Somalis of the Islamic faith. Through his stirring oratory and didactic verse (some of his poems are considered classics in Somalia), Maxamed attracted a fanatical group of followers who became known as dervishes. In 1899 he declared a holy war (jihad) on the colonial powers and their Somali collaborators. Between 1900 and 1904, four major British, Ethiopian, and Italian expeditions were made against Maxamed. By 1905 he was forced to conclude a truce, under which he and his followers constructed a small theocratic state in the Italian protectorate. In 1908 he began his holy war again, winning a major victory at Dulmadobe in 1913. Early in 1920, however, the dervish stronghold at Taalex (Taleh) was bombed, and Maxamed escaped to the Ogaden, where he died of influenza. With his death the dervish rebellion ceased.
purdah
Introduction
Fast Facts
Related Content
More
More Articles On This Topic
Contributors
Article History

Home
Philosophy & Religion
Religious Beliefs
purdah
Islamic custom
Print
Cite
Share
Feedback
Alternate titles: parda, pardah, veiling
By The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica • Edit History
purdah, also spelled Pardah, Hindi Parda (“screen,” or “veil”), practice that was inaugurated by Muslims and later adopted by various Hindus, especially in India, and that involves the seclusion of women from public observation by means of concealing clothing (including the veil) and by the use of high-walled enclosures, screens, and curtains within the home.

The practice of purdah is said to have originated in the Persian culture and to have been acquired by the Muslims during the Arab conquest of what is now Iraq in the 7th century AD. Muslim domination of northern India in turn influenced the practice of Hinduism, and purdah became usual among the Hindu upper classes of northern India. During the British hegemony in India, purdah observance was strictly adhered to and widespread among the highly conscious Muslim minority. Since then, purdah has largely disappeared in Hindu practice, though the seclusion and veiling of women is practiced to a greater or lesser degree in many Islāmic countries. See also harem.

Jihad

351 – 001

https://discerning-Islam.org

Last Updated:    06/2022&&

See COPYRIGHT information below.

About Post Author

Editorial Team

discerning.islam@outlook.com

https://discerning-islam.org

Happy

0 0 %

Sad

0 0 %

Excited

0 0 %

Sleepy

0 0 %

Angry

0 0 %

Surprise

0 0 %