105 - 002 - Sunni Islam - Discerning Islam

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Sunni Islam

After the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632, strong differences arose over the method of choosing the leader of the Muslim community. These disagreements ultimately resulted in the division of Muslims into two major groups—Sunni and Shi’i. Sunnis, who represent about 85 percent of the world’s 1.8 billion Muslims, reject the views of Shi’is and members of other Islamic sects on the issue of religious authority after Muhammad’s death.

Core Beliefs

The term sunni comes from the word sunnah, which literally means “the trodden path” and refers to Islamic customs based on the exemplary behavior of Muhammad. In addition to the sunnah, which serves as an important source of guidance for all Muslims, Sunnis rely on ijma (the consensus, or agreement, of legal and religious scholars). The concept of consensus reflects the emphasis in Sunni Islam on community and its collective wisdom, instructed by the Qur’an and sunnah.

Sunni Islam encompasses diverse points of view based on historical setting, location, and culture as well as the ideas of various theological and legal schools. Nevertheless, Sunni Muslims share certain distinctive beliefs. They reject the claim of Shi’i Muslims that Muhammad designated Ali ibn Abi Talib, his son-in-law and cousin, as his successor and that only Ali’s descendants have the legitimate right to lead the Islamic community. Sunnis assert that the Prophet did not name a successor. They accept the authority of the first four caliphs after Muhammad. Known as the Rashidun, or “rightly guided,” caliphs, these were accepted collectively by the Islamic community.

Early Struggles

Sunni Islam developed as a result of political and religious struggles early in the history of Islam. An army revolt in 656 resulted in the murder of Uthman ibn Affan, the third caliph. Ali ibn Abi Talib became the leader of the Islamic community, but Mu’awiyah, who ruled in Syria and was related to the slain caliph, refused to acknowledge Ali. He demanded that Uthman’s killers be brought to justice. Civil war erupted. Some of Ali’s troops withdrew their loyalty from him, but they also continued to oppose Mu’awiyah. This group became known as Kharijis (seceders). They rejected both Uthman and Ali as legitimate caliphs, a position that led to difficult questions about Muslim belief and law and to the development of various sects within the Islamic community.

In 661 after a Khariji murdered Ali, Mu’awiyah became caliph. His reign marked the beginning of the Ummayad caliphate. During this time, disputes arose within the Islamic community over such issues as the definition of true belief, the status of those who profess Islam but commit a major sin, and whether human beings are truly free to choose their own actions or whether an all-knowing Allah predetermines all actions. These became basic questions for later Sunni thinkers who sought to formulate opinions that conformed to the Qur’an and the sunnah. In 750 the Umayyad caliphate fell to the Abbasids, who were descendants of the Prophet’s uncle al-Abbas. During the Abbasid caliphate (750 – 1258), Sunni Islam became firmly established.

Four different schools of Sunni law emerged during Abbasid rule: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali. In addition to the Qur’an and sunnah, which is based on the hadith, Sunni Muslims sometimes use qiyas (reasoning through analogy) and ijma to form laws. The four schools of law differ in their reliance on qiyas and ijma. Sunnis consider all four schools to be authentic and acceptable to Allah, but most Sunnis generally follow the school that is prevalent locally.

During the early years of the Abbasid caliphate, Sunnis faced two challenges: the growing influence of rationalist thought and the rise to power of the Shi’is. The rationalists used reason as the basis for the establishment of religious truth. They taught that Allah created the Qur’an, meaning that it was not a part of his eternal essence, although it expresses his eternal will. They also held that people have free will to choose between good and evil. These beliefs, promoted by a group known as the Mu’tazilis, alienated traditional Muslims, who maintained that the Qur’an exists eternally and that Allah has absolute power over all people and events. In the early 800s, the caliph al-Ma’mun embraced Mu’tazili teachings and attempted to impose them on his subjects. He and his successors persecuted dissenters, provoking a reaction against rationalism. Within the next century, other schools of Islamic thought, which bridged the gap between a literal interpretation of the Qur’an and one based on reason, became prominent.

In the early 900s, the Shi’is gained considerable prestige and influence. The Fatimid dynasty established a caliphate in North Africa in 910 and took control of Egypt in 969, making it their base of operations. A rival Shi’i dynasty, the Buyids, became the effective rulers of Baghdad in 945. The Sunnis recaptured their power in 1055, however, when the Seljuk Turks conquered Baghdad. The Sunnis also provided military opposition to the Fatimids in Syria and nonviolent opposition through the writings of such prominent Sunni thinkers as Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (died 1111 ). Saladin (died 1193 ), who was Islam’s great defender against the crusaders, destroyed the Fatimid caliphate in 1171 .

Scripture And Law

During the 1700s, reform movements emerged in Sunni Islam, as Muslim scholars looked for ways to renew Islamic thought and life to meet the demands of changing times. These movements gained momentum over the next two centuries with the colonization of Islamic countries by European powers. Islamic reformers such as Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817 – 1898), Muhammad Abduh (1849 – 1905), and Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865 – 1935) published new interpretations of the Qur’an. In the 1940s, Egyptian scholar Amin al-Khuli initiated a new approach to study of the sacred text, treating it as a literary document to be analyzed by literary methods. This approach, however, met with strong opposition from traditional Muslim authorities.

Two Algerian scholars also developed new approaches to the Qur’an. In his book, The Qur’anic Phenomena, Malek Bennabi focuses on understanding the Qur’an as revelation and deals with the issue of a human being—who has personal views, experience, and background—receiving a divine message. Mohammed Arkoun uses modern theories of language and symbolism to interpret the Qur’an. Arkoun’s work differs considerably from the thousands of modern Sunni publications on the Qur’an because it raises new questions about the literary and historical aspects of Islam’s holy book and its interpretation.

In recent years, Sunnis have placed renewed emphasis on the sirah literature, which deals with the biography of Muhammad. Scholars have explored the sociopolitical conditions of the Prophet’s era and the historical causes for the rise of the Islamic state. The reliability of the hadith has also come under scrutiny.

Sunni scholars have also addressed concerns regarding shari’a. Although the writings of medieval jurists continue to be held in high regard, Muslim modernists have noted that their work represents a human attempt to understand divine law. As such, it should be open to review and revision. These reformers advocate a continuous reinterpretation of Islamic texts so that Muslims can develop institutions of education, law, and government suited to modern conditions.

Political Issues

The role of shari’a in matters of constitutional law and the organization of the state has become a central concern for Sunni Muslims. After the Turkish government abolished the caliphate in 1924, controversy arose regarding the proper form of an Islamic government. Egyptian scholar Ali Abd al-Raziq argued that the Qur’an did not bestow special legitimacy on the caliphate and refuted the traditional belief that Islam requires a particular form of state and government. In his writings, Abd al-Raziq made an important distinction between Muhammad the prophet and religious teacher and Muhammad the statesman, insisting that the political character of Islam is separate from its religious character.

Abd al-Raziq’s ideas met with fierce resistance from traditional Muslim authorities. His book on Islam and government was banned, and some Muslim organizations rejected his teachings. The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928, claimed that Islam prescribes a religious social order that can develop only in an Islamic state. Historically, factions within the brotherhood advocated the use of violence, if necessary, to create such a state. Sayyid Abu al-Ala Mawdudi, founder of the Jamaat-i Islami party in South Asia, believed that an Islamic revolution — not necessarily of a violent nature — was necessary to reform existing society according to Islamic ideals. Today the various Islamic states apply shari’a in widely different ways.

In modern times, Sunni Muslims have also attempted to reconcile some prominent Western ideas with Islam. During the early 1900s, the issue of nationalism prompted intense debate. Traditionally, the leaders of the Islamic community supported the struggle for independence from colonial rule but rejected nationalism as a threat to the political unity of all Muslims.

After World War II ended in 1945, the fight against European powers resulted in the founding of new nation-states with Muslim majorities. Sunni thinkers did not object when the leaders of such states established Islamic governments. But when these leaders adopted secular political systems, questions about the compatibility between Islam and democracy emerged. Supporters of democracy argued that the early Muslim concept of shura, an advisory council to the head of state, was a model of democracy. They also asserted that democracy, which insisted on the individual responsibility of its citizens, was a necessity for the development of Muslim societies. Those who supported the idea of an Islamic state argued that the democracy created under Islam is different from the Western model of democracy.

The relationship between socialism and Islam has prompted even more discussion. In 1959 Mustafa al-Sibai , a legal scholar and head of the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, published a book in which he argued that socialism and Islam were compatible. His model of Islamic socialism combined the principles of equality, justice, and responsibility. He claimed that Islamic socialism would eliminate poverty and enable Muslim societies to prosper. Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser and others in the Arab world embraced al-Sibai’s ideas. But not all Islamic thinkers or activists agreed with the concept. Sayyid Qutb, a key figure in the Egyptian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood during Nasser’s regime, condemned the idea of Islamic socialism. He believed that Islam alone provided the solution to the social, economic, national, and moral problems created by capitalism and communism. Sunni thinkers continue to debate whether social change should follow socialist ideals or Islamic ideals.

The Past And The Present

Modern Sunni thought has increasingly concerned itself with questions of history. Muslim scholars consider the effects on the Middle East of various experiences and events. These include European imperialism, World War I and World War II, and the subsequent nonmilitary struggle between the United States and the former Soviet Union known as the Cold War. In addition, scholars explore the impact on the Middle East of the establishment of Israel, rivalries among Muslim countries, and the rapid economic changes resulting from the discovery of oil. Some Muslim authors study the rise and fall of nations and civilizations and explore questions surrounding the future, such as whether the West or Islam will dominate the world. Others consider the place of Islam in the ongoing history of religions and take a scholarly interest in faiths other than Islam.

One of the striking features in contemporary Islamic thought is the growing call for a distinctly Islamic perspective and approach to social needs. Those who support these views regard Islam as a total way of life, encompassing both religious and worldly matters. Although the United Nations has adopted and proclaimed a Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, Muslim leaders have proposed a separate Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights. This growing concern with Islam has led to an increasing concentration on subjects such as jihad, religious tolerance, religious freedom, and the status of women. It has also contributed to a view that the Western world is an enemy of the Muslim world and a threat to Islam.

Yet other ways of thinking about Islam exist. For some Muslims, it is a domain of personal experience and of communal norms and values. For others, it is a realm of creative effort and enlightenment. Modern Sunni scholarship and literature reveals the immense variety among Muslim thinkers and the many interpretations permitted by Islam.

A Distinctly Islamic Document

In 1948 the United Nations adopted a Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In 1981 prominent Muslim thinkers issued a Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights. These documents identify many of the same fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to life, the right to justice, the freedom of religion, and the freedom of speech. But the Muslim declaration articulates its standards in specifically Islamic terms. The document asserts that Allah is the source of all human rights and clearly states that the law on which it is based is shari’a. It acknowledges the sacredness of human life as well as the sanctity of a person’s body after death. According to the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, a Muslim’s right to justice permits him or her to refuse to obey any command that contradicts shari’a. For Muslims, the right to asylum includes sanctuary at a mosque in Mecca.

The Sunnis are the largest branch of the Muslim community, at least 85 percent of the world’s 1.8 billion Muslims. The name is derived from the Sunnah, the exemplary behavior of the Prophet Muhammad . All Muslims are guided by the Sunnah, but Sunnis stress it, as well as consensus (ijma; the full name of Sunnis is Ahl al-Sunnah wa’l-Ijma, people of the Sunnah and consensus). The other branch of Islam, the Shi’is, are guided as well by the wisdom of Muhammad’s descendants, but through his son-in-law, Ali.

Sunni life is guided by four schools of legal thought—Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii, and Hanbali—each of which strives to develop practical applications of revelation and the Prophet’s example.

Although Sunni Islam comprises a variety of theological and legal schools, attitudes, and outlooks conditioned by historical setting, locale, and culture, Sunnis around the world share some common points: acceptance of the legitimacy of the first four successors of Muhammad (Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali), and the belief that other Islamic sects have introduced innovations (bidah), departing from majority belief.

Sunni Islamic institutions developed out of struggles in early Islam over leadership of the Muslim community. Political and religious positions, articulated by scholars, arose out of disputes over the definition of “true” belief, the status of those who profess Islam but commit a great sin, freedom, and determinism. Sunnis tend to reject excessive rationalism or intellectualism, focusing instead on the spirit and intent of the Qur’an.

Reform movements within Sunni Islam began to appear during the eighteenth century in the works of scholars seeking to revive the dynamism of Islamic thought and life in order to meet the demands of the modern world. These movements gained momentum with the imposition of European colonial control throughout the Muslim world. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries witnessed the revival of Qur’anic studies as well as renewed commitment to science and education as the path to independence and development within the context of Islamic values and identity. Sunni thought of the eighteenth through twentieth centuries has also reexamined traditional Islamic law. Many modern reformers believe that fiqh (jurisprudence), as a human interpretation of divine law, should be open to reinterpretation in accordance with present circumstances and community needs. Almost all twentieth-century Muslim countries are debating the role of Islamic law and civil codes in modern society and the implications for constitutional law and the organization of the state. Many Islamic thinkers reject the notion that Islam requires a particular form of state and government, looking instead to Qur’anic principles such as shura (consultation) for guidance. Some believe that religion and the state are intended to be separate entities, while others, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-i Islami, believe that an Islamic state is necessary to the development of an Islamic social order. Many thinkers have studied in the West and are open to dialogue with the West and commitment to a common struggle for the causes of humanity. They have examined the impact of European imperialism, Western neocolonialism, exploitation by socialist-bloc countries, the Cold War, the displacement of Palestinians, the lack of democracy in the Muslim world, and other crisis factors. Most Muslim thinkers today stress the importance of justice, especially social justice, in Islam. A Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights has been propounded, next to that of the United Nations. Increasing attention is also being given to subjects such as women and gender, the family, religious freedom, pluralism, the status of minorities, and religious tolerance. Islam is increasingly emphasized as a total way of life, encompassing both religious and worldly issues. Human beings are seen as Allah’s stewards on earth, and the Muslim community is intended to reflect Allah’s will. In this view, secularism is often rejected as being antithetical to religious values. Instead, Islam is presented as perfectly suited for human society, individually and collectively.

Traditions

Sunni Islam is the largest denomination of Islam. Its name comes from the word Sunnah, referring to the behavior of the Islamic prophet Muhammad. The differences between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims arose from a disagreement over the choice of Muhammad’s successor and subsequently acquired broader political significance, as well as theological and juridical dimensions.

According to Sunni traditions, Muhammad did not clearly designate a successor and the Muslim community acted according to his sunnah in electing his father-in-law Abu Bakr as the first caliph. This contrasts with the Shi’a view, which holds that Muhammad announced at the event of Ghadir Khumm his son-in-law and cousin Ali ibn Abi Talib as his successor. Unlike the first three caliphs, Ali was from the same clan as Muhammad, Banu Hashim, and Shi’a Muslims consider him legitimate, inter alia, by favor of his blood ties to Muhammad, too. Political tensions between Sunnis and Shi’as continued with varying intensity throughout Islamic history and they have been exacerbated in recent times by ethnic conflicts and the rise of Wahhabism.

As of 2009, Sunni Muslims constituted 87–90 percent of the world’s Muslim population. Sunni Islam is the world’s largest religious denomination, followed by Catholicism. Its adherents are referred to in Arabic as ahl as-sunnah wa l-jamāʻah (“the people of the sunnah and the community”) or ahl as-sunnah for short. In English, its doctrines and practices are sometimes called Sunnism, while adherents are known as Sunni Muslims, Sunnis, Sunnites and Ahlus Sunnah. Sunni Islam is sometimes referred to as “orthodox Islam.” However, other scholars of Islam, such as John Burton believe that there’s no such thing as “orthodox Islam.”

The Qur’an, together with hadith (especially those collected in Kutub al-Sittah) and binding juristic consensus form the basis of all traditional jurisprudence within Sunni Islam. Shari’a rulings are derived from these basic sources, in conjunction with analogical reasoning, consideration of public welfare and juristic discretion, using the principles of jurisprudence developed by the traditional legal schools.

In matters of creed, the Sunni tradition upholds the six pillars of iman (faith) and comprises the Ash’ari and Maturidi schools of rationalistic theology as well as the textualist school known as traditionalist theology.

Terminology

Sunni, also commonly referred to as Sunnīism, is a term derived from sunnah meaning “habit,” “usual practice,” “custom,”or “tradition.” The Muslim use of this term refers to the sayings and living habits of the prophet Muhammad. In Arabic, this branch of Islam is referred to as ahl as-sunnah wa l-jamāʻah, “the people of the sunnah and the community,” which is commonly shortened to ahl as-sunnah.

History

One common mistake is to assume that Sunni Islam represents a normative Islam that emerged during the period after Muhammad’s death, and that Sufism and Shi’ism developed out of Sunni Islam. This perception is partly due to the reliance on highly ideological sources that have been accepted as reliable historical works, and also because the vast majority of the population is Sunni. Both Sunnism and Shi’aism are the end products of several centuries of competition between ideologies. Both sects used each other to further cement their own identities and doctrines.

The first four caliphs are known among Sunnis as the Rashidun or “Rightly-Guided Ones.” Sunni recognition includes the aforementioned Abu Bakr as the first, Umar as the second, Uthman as the third, and Ali as the fourth.

The Post Rashidun Period Till The Fall Of The Ottoman Empire

Sunnis recognised different rulers as the caliph, though they did not include anyone in the list of the rightly guided ones or Rashidun after the murder of Ali, until the caliphate was constitutionally abolished in Turkey on 3 March 1924.

The seeds of metamorphosis of caliphate into kingship were sown, as the second caliph Umar had feared, as early as the regime of the third caliph Uthman, who appointed many of his kinsmen from his clan Banu Umayya, including Marwan and Walid bin Uqba on important government positions, becoming the main cause of turmoil resulting in his murder and the ensuing infighting during Ali’s time and rebellion by Muawiya, another of Uthman’s kinsman. This ultimately resulted in the establishment of firm dynastic rule of Banu Umayya after Husain, the younger son of Ali from Fatima, was killed at the battle of karbala. The rise to power of Banu Umayya, the Meccan tribe of elites who had vehemently opposed Muhammad under the leadership of Abu Sufyan, Muawiya’s father, right up to the conquest of Mecca by Muhammad, as his successors with the accession of Uthman to caliphate, replaced the egalitarian society formed as a result of Muhammad’s revolution to a society stratified between haves and have-nots as a result of nepotism, and in the words of El-Hibri through “the use of religious charity revenues (zakat) to subsidize family interests, which Uthman justified as “al-sila” (pious filial support).

Transition Of Caliphate Into Dynastic Monarchy Of Banu Umayya

Ali, during his rather brief regime after Uthman maintained austere life style and tried hard to bring back the egalitarian system and faced continued opposition, and wars one after another by Aisha-Talhah-Zubair, by Muawiya and finally by the Kharjites. After he was murdered his followers immediately elected Hasan ibn Ali his elder supremacy of law over the ruler idealized in Muhammad’s message, but son from Fatima to succeed him. Hasan, however, shortly afterwards signed a treaty with Muawiaya relinquishing power in favor of the latter, with a condition inter alia, that one of the two who will outlive the other will be the caliph, and that this caliph will not appoint a successor but will leave the matter of selection of the caliph to the public. Subsequently, Hasan was poisoned to death and Muawiya enjoyed unchallenged power. Not honouring his treaty with Hasan he however nominated his son Yazid to succeed him. Upon Muawiya’s death, Yazid asked Husain the younger brother of Hasan, Ali’s son and Muhammad’s grandson, to give his allegiance to Yazid, which he plainly refused. His caravan was cordoned by Yazid’s army at Karbala and he was killed with all his male companions – total 72 people, in a day long battle after which Yazid established himself as a sovereign, though strong public uprising erupted after his death against his dynasty to avenge the massacre of Karbala, but Banu Umayya were able to quickly suppress them all and ruled the Muslim world, till they were finally overthrown by Banu Abbas.

Caliphate And The Dynastic Monarchy Of Banu Abbas

The rule of and “caliphate” of Banu Umayya came to an end at the hands of Banu Abbas a branch of Banu Hashim, the tribe of Muhammad, only to usher another dynastic monarchy styled as caliphate from 750 CE. This period is seen formative in Sunni Islam as the founders of the four schools viz, Abu Hanifa, Malik bin Anas, Shafi’i and Ahmad bin Hambal all practiced during this time, so also did Jafar al Sadiq who elaborated the doctrine of imamate, the basis for the Shi’a religious thought. There was no clearly accepted formula for determining succession in the Abbasid caliphate. Two or three sons or other relatives of the dying caliph emerged as candidates to the throne, each supported by his own party of supporters. A trial of strength ensued and the most powerful party won and expected favors of the caliph they supported once he ascended the throne. The caliphate of this dynasty ended with the death of the Caliph al-Ma’mun in 833 AD, when the period of Turkish domination began.

Sunni Islam In The Contemporary Era

The fall of the Ottoman, the biggest Sunni empire in the world for six centuries, the mightiest power in the Mediterranean world and one of the important participants in World War I which joined the war on the side of the Central Powers, bringing caliphate to an end was an epochal event. This resulted in Sunni protests in far off places including the Khilafat Movement in India, which was later on upon gaining independence from Britain divided into Sunni dominated Pakistan and secular India. Pakistan, the most populous Sunni state at its birth, however later got partitioned into Pakistan and Bangladesh. The demise of Ottoman caliphate also resulted in the emergence of Saudi Arabia, a dynastic absolute monarchy with the support of the British and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism. This was followed by a considerable rise in Wahhabism, Salafism and Jihadism under the influence of the preaching of Ibn Taymiyyah a follower of Ahmad bin Hanbal. The expediencies of cold war resulted in encouragement of Afghan refugees in Pakistan to be radicalized, trained and armed to fight the communist regime backed by USSR forces in Afghanistan giving birth to Taliban. The Taliban wrestled power from the communists in Afghanistan and formed a government under the leadership of Mohammed Omar, who was addressed as the Emir of the faithful, an honorific way of addressing the caliph. The Taliban regime was recognised by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia till after 9/11 perpetrated by Osama bin Laden a Saudi national by birth harbored by the Taliban took place, resulting in a war on terror launched against the Taliban.

The sequence of events of the 20^th century has led to resentment in some quarters of the Sunni community due to the loss of pre-eminence in several previously Sunni-dominated regions such as the Levant, Mesopotamia, the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Indian sub continent. The latest attempt by a section of Salafis to re establish a Sunni caliphate can be seen in the appearance of ISIS whose leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi is known among his followers as caliph and Amir-al-maumineen “The Commander of the Faithful.” Jihadism is however being opposed from within the Muslim community, Ummah as it is called in Arabic in all quarters of the world as evidenced by turnout of almost 2 percent of the Muslim population in London protesting.

Adherents

Sunnis believe that the companions of Muhammad were the best of Muslims. This belief is based upon prophetic traditions such as one narrated by Abdullah, son of Masud, in which Muhammad said: “The best of the people are my generation, then those who come after them, then those who come after them.” Support for this view is also found in the Qur’an, according to Sunnis. Sunnis also believe that the companions were true believers since it was the companions who were given the task of compiling the Qur’an. Furthermore, narrations that were narrated by the companions (ahadith) are considered by Sunnis to be a second source of knowledge of the Muslim faith. A study conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2010 and released January 2011 found that there are 1.62 billion Muslims around the world, and it is estimated over 85–90 percent are Sunni.

Organizational Structure

Sunni Islam does not have a formal hierarchy. Leaders are informal, and gain influence through study to become a scholar of Islamic law, called Shari’a. According to the Islamic Center of Columbia, South Carolina, anyone with the intelligence and the will can become an Islamic scholar. During Midday Mosque services on Fridays, the congregation will choose a well-educated person to lead the service, known as a Khateeb (one who speaks).

Jurisprudence

Schools Of Law

There are many intellectual traditions within the field of Islamic law, often referred to as legal schools. These varied traditions reflect differing viewpoints on some laws and obligations within Islamic law. While one school may see a certain act as a religious obligation, another may see the same act as optional. These schools aren’t regarded as sects; rather, they represent differing viewpoints on issues that are not considered the core of Islamic belief. Historians have differed regarding the exact delineation of the schools based on the underlying principles they follow.

Many traditional scholars saw Sunni Islam in two groups: Ahl al-Ra’i, or “people of reason,” due to their emphasis on scholarly judgment and discourse; and Ahl al-Hadith, or “people of traditions,” due to their emphasis on restricting juristic thought to only what is found in scripture. Ibn Khaldun defined the Sunni schools as three: the Hanafi school representing reason, the Ẓāhirīte school representing tradition, and a broader, middle school encompassing the Shafi’ite, Malikite and Hanbalite schools.

During the Middle Ages, the Mamluk Sultanate in Egypt delineated the acceptable Sunni schools as only Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali, excluding the Ẓāhirī school. The Ottoman Empire later reaffirmed the official status of four schools as a reaction to the Shi’ite character of their ideological and political arch-rival, the Persian Safavids, though former Prime Minister of Sudan Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, as well as the Amman Message issued by King Abdullah II of Jordan, recognize the Ẓāhirī and keep the number of Sunni schools at five.

Differences In The Schools

The Great Mosque of Kairouan (also known as the Mosque of Uqba) was, in particular during the 9^th, 10^th and 11^th centuries, an important center of Islamic learning with an emphasis on the Maliki Madh’hab. It is located in the city of Kairouan in Tunisia.

Interpreting Islamic law by deriving specific rulings – such as how to pray – is commonly known as Islamic jurisprudence. The schools of law all have their own particular tradition of interpreting this jurisprudence. As these schools represent clearly spelled out methodologies for interpreting Islamic law, there has been little change in the methodology with regard to each school. While conflict between the schools was often violent in the past, today the schools recognize one another as viable legal methods rather than sources of error or heresy in contrast to one another. Each school has its evidences, and differences of opinion are generally respected. Conflict between the schools was often violent in the past.

Pillars Of Iman

All the branches of Sunni Islam testify to six principal articles of faith known as the six pillars of iman (Arabic for “faith”), which are believed to be essential. These are:

Belief in the Oneness of Allah;
Belief in the Angels of Allah;
Belief in the Divine Revelations (Books);
Belief in the Prophets of Allah;
Belief in Resurrection after Death and the Day of Judgment; and,
Belief in Preordainment (Qadar)

These six articles are what all present-day Sunnis agree on, from those who adhere to traditional Sunnism to those who adhere to latter-day movements. Additionally, classical Sunni Islam also outlined numerous other cardinal doctrines from the eighth-century onwards in the form of organized creeds such as the Creed of Tahawi, in order to codify what constituted “Sunni orthodoxy.” While none of these creeds gained the importance attributed to the Nicene Creed in Christianity, primarily because ecumenical councils never happened in Islam, the beliefs outlined in these creeds became the “orthodox” doctrine by ijma, or binding consensus. But while most of the tenets outlined in the classical creeds are accepted by all Sunnis, some of these doctrines have been rejected by the aforementioned movements as lacking strictly scriptural precedent. Traditionally, these other important Sunni articles of faith have included the following (those that are controversial today because of their rejection by such groups shall be denoted by an asterisk):

Belief in the six principal articles of faith being essential for salvation for Muslims;
Belief in Allah having created creation with His wisdom;
Belief in Muhammad having been the Seal of the Prophets or the last prophet sent to mankind;
Belief in the Qur’an being the eternal, uncreated Word of Allah;
Belief in the beatific vision being a reality in the afterlife, even if it will not be all-encompassing and the “manner” of it remains unknown;
Belief in the Night Journey of Muhammad having happened in a bodily form, while he was “awake;”
Belief in the intercession of Muhammad being a reality on the Last Day;
Belief in Allah’s covenant with Adam and his offspring having been “true;”
Belief in Abraham having been Allah’s “intimate friend;”
Belief in Moses having conversed directly with Allah without a mediator;
Belief in the idea that wrong works in themselves does not make a Muslim an “unbeliever” and that it is forbidden to declare takfir on those who know that what they are doing is wrong;
Belief in it being wrong to “make a distinction” between the various prophets of Allah;
Belief in believing in that which “all the prophets” brought from Allah;
Belief in avoiding “deviations, divisions, and differences” in the fold of Islam;
Belief in venerating all the Companions of Muhammad;
Belief in the existence of saints, and in venerating them and accepting the traditional narratives of their lives and miracles;
Belief that saints, while exalted in their own right, occupy an infinitely lesser rank than the prophets and that “one of the prophets is greater than all the saints put together;”
Belief in the Signs of the Apocalypse;
Belief that Jesus is the Promised Messiah of Allah and that all Muslims await his Second Coming.

Theological Traditions

Some Islamic scholars faced questions that they felt were not explicitly answered in the Qur’an and the Sunnah, especially questions with regard to philosophical conundra such as the nature of Allah, the existence of human free will, or the eternal existence of the Qur’an. Various schools of theology and philosophy developed to answer these questions, each claiming to be true to the Qur’an and the Muslim tradition (sunnah). Among Sunni Muslims, various schools of thought in theology began to be born out of the sciences of kalam in opposition to the textualists who stood by affirming texts without delving into philosophical speculation as they saw it as an innovation in Islam. The following were the three dominant schools of theology that grew. All three of these are accepted by Muslims around the globe, and are considered within “Islamic orthodoxy.” The key beliefs of classical Sunni Islam are all agreed upon (being the six pillars of Iman) and codified in the treatise on Aqeedah by Imam Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Tahawi in his Aqeedat Tahawiyyah.

Ash’ari

Founded by Abu al-Hasan al-Ash’ari (873–935). This theological school of Aqeedah was embraced by many Muslim scholars and developed in parts of the Islamic world throughout history; al-Ghazali wrote on the creed discussing it and agreeing upon some of its principles.

Ash’ari theology stresses divine revelation over human reason. Contrary to the Mu’tazilites, they say that ethics cannot be derived from human reason, but that Allah’s commands, as revealed in the Qur’an and the Sunnah (the practices of Muhammad and his companions as recorded in the traditions, or hadith), are the sole source of all morality and ethics.

Regarding the nature of Allah and the divine attributes, the Ash’ari rejected the Mu’tazili position that all Qur’anic references to Allah as having real attributes were metaphorical. The Ash’aris insisted that these attributes were as they “best befit His Majesty.” The Arabic language is a wide language in which one word can have 15 different meanings and spellings, so the Ash’aris endeavor to find the meaning that best befits Allah and is not contradicted by the Qur’an. Therefore, when Allah states in the Qur’an, “He who does not resemble any of His creation,” this clearly means that Allah cannot be attributed with body parts because He created body parts. Ash’aris tend to stress divine omnipotence over human free will and they believe that the Qur’an is eternal and uncreated.

Maturidi

Founded by Abu Mansur al-Maturidi (died 944). Maturidiyyah was a minority tradition until it was accepted by the Turkish tribes of Central Asia (previously they had been Ash’ari and followers of the Shafi’i school, it was only later on migration into Anatolia that they became Hanafi and followers of the Maturidi creed. One of the tribes, the Seljuk Turks, migrated to Turkey, where later the Ottoman Empire was established. Their preferred school of law achieved a new prominence throughout their whole empire although it continued to be followed almost exclusively by followers of the Hanafi school while followers of the Shafi and Maliki schools within the empire followed the Ash’ari and Athari schools of thought. Thus, wherever can be found Hanafi followers, there can be found the Maturidi creed.

Traditionalist

Traditionalist theology is a movement of Islamic scholars who reject rationalistic Islamic theology (kalam) in favor of strict textualism in interpreting the Qur’an and sunnah. The name derives from “tradition” in its technical sense as translation of the Arabic word hadith. It is also sometimes referred to by several other names.

Adherents of traditionalist theology believe that the zahir (literal, apparent) meaning of the Qur’an and the hadith have sole authority in matters of belief and law; and that the use of rational disputation is forbidden even if it verifies the truth. They engage in a literal reading of the Qur’an, as opposed to one engaged in ta’wil (metaphorical interpretation). They do not attempt to conceptualize the meanings of the Qur’an rationally, and believe that their realities should be consigned to Allah alone (tafwid). In essence, the text of the Qur’an and Hadith is accepted without asking “how” or “Bi-la kaifa.”

Traditionalist theology emerged among scholars of hadith who eventually coalesced into a movement called ahl al-hadith under the leadership of Ahmad ibn Hanbal. In matters of faith, they were pitted against Mu’tazilites and other theological currents, condemning many points of their doctrine as well as the rationalistic methods they used in defending them. In the tenth century al-Ash’ari and al-Maturidi found a middle ground between Mu’tazilite rationalism and Hanbalite literalism, using the rationalistic methods championed by Mu’tazilites to defend most tenets of the traditionalist doctrine. Although the mainly Hanbali scholars who rejected this synthesis were in the minority, their emotive, narrative-based approach to faith remained influential among the urban masses in some areas, particularly in Abbasid Baghdad.

While Ash’arism and Maturidism are often called the Sunni “orthodoxy,” traditionalist theology has thrived alongside it, laying rival claims to be the orthodox Sunni faith. In the modern era it has had a disproportionate impact on Islamic theology, having been appropriated by Wahhabi and other traditionalist Salafi currents and spread well beyond the confines of the Hanbali school of law.

Sunni Mysticism

There has also been a rich group tradition of mysticism within Sunni Islam, which has most prominently manifested itself in the principal orders of Sunni Sufism. Historically, Sufism became “an incredibly important part of Islam” and “one of the most widespread and omnipresent aspects of Muslim life” in Islamic civilization from when it began to permeate nearly all major aspects of Sunni Islamic life in regions stretching from India and Iraq to Senegal. Sufism continued to remain a crucial part of daily Islamic life until the twentieth century, when its historical influence upon Islamic civilization began to be combated by the rise of Salafism1 and Wahhabism. Islamic scholar Timothy Winter has remarked: “[In] classical, mainstream, medieval Sunni Islam … [the idea of] ‘orthodox Islam’ would not . . . [have been possible] without Sufism,” and that the classical belief in Sufism being an essential component of Islam has only weakened in some quarters of the Islamic world “a generation or two ago” with the rise of Salafism. In the modern world, the classical interpretation of Sunni orthodoxy, which sees in Sufism an essential dimension of Islam alongside the disciplines of jurisprudence and theology, is represented by institutions such as Al-Azhar University and Zaytuna College, with Al-Azhar’s current Grand Imam Ahmed el-Tayeb defining “Sunni orthodoxy” as being “of any of the four schools of [legal] thought (Hanafi, Shafi’i, Maliki or Hanbali) and . . . [also] of the Sufism of Imam Junayd of Baghdad in doctrines, manners and [spiritual] purification.”

In the eleventh-century, Sufism, which had previously been a less “codified” trend in Islamic piety, began to be “ordered and crystallized” into orders which have continued until the present day. All these orders were founded by a major Sunni Islamic saint, and some of the largest and most widespread included the Qadiriyya (after Abdul-Qadir Gilani [d. 1166]), the Rifa’iyya (after Ahmed al-Rifa’i [d. 1182]), the Chishtiyya (after Moinuddin Chishti [d. 1236]), the Shadiliyya (after Abul Hasan ash-Shadhili [d. 1258]), and the Naqshbandiyya (after Baha-ud-Din Naqshband Bukhari [d. 1389]). Contrary to popular perception in the West, however neither the founders of these orders nor their followers ever considered themselves to be anything other than orthodox Sunni Muslims, and in fact all of these orders were attached to one of the four orthodox legal schools of Sunni Islam. Thus, the Qadiriyya order was Hanbali, with its founder, Abdul-Qadir Gilani, being a renowned Hanbali jurist; the Chishtiyya was Hanafi; the Shadiliyya order was Maliki; and the Naqshbandiyya order was Hanafi. Thus, “many of the most eminent defenders of Islamic orthodoxy, such as Abdul-Qadir Gilani, Ghazali, and the Sultan Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn (Saladin) were connected with Sufism.”

The contemporary Salafi and Wahhabi strands of Sunnis, however, do not accept the traditional stance on mystical practices.

Sunni View Of Hadith

The Qur’an as it exists today in book form was compiled by Muhammad’s companions (Sahabah) within a handful of months of his death, and is accepted by all sects of Islam. However, there were many matters of belief and daily life that were not directly prescribed in the Qur’an, but were actions that were observed by Muhammad and the early Muslim community. Later generations sought out oral traditions regarding the early history of Islam, and the practices of Muhammad and his first followers, and wrote them down so that they might be preserved. These recorded oral traditions are called hadith. Muslim scholars have through the ages sifted through the hadith and evaluated the chain of narrations of each tradition, scrutinizing the trustworthiness of the narrators and judging the strength of each hadith accordingly.

Kutub al-Sittah

Kutub al-Sittah are six books containing collections of hadiths. Sunni Muslims accept the hadith collections of Bukhari and Muslim 2@as the most authentic (sahih, or correct), and while accepting all hadiths verified as authentic, grant a slightly lesser status to the collections of other recorders. There are, however, four other collections of hadith that are also held in particular reverence by Sunni Muslims, making a total of six:

Sahih al-Bukhari of Muhammad al-Bukhari;
Sahih Muslim of Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj;
Sunan al-Sughra of Al-Nasa’I;
Sunan Abu Dawud of Abu Dawood;
Jami’ at-Tirmidhi of Al-Tirmidhi;
Sunan Ibn Majah of Ibn Majah.

There are also other collections of hadith which also contain many authentic hadith and are frequently used by scholars and specialists. Examples of these collections include:

AàMusannaf of Abd al-Razzaq of ‘Abd ar-Razzaq as-San’ani;
Musnad of Ahmad ibn Hanbal;
Mustadrak of Al Haakim;
Muwatta of Imam Malik;
Sahih Ibn Hibbaan;
Sahih Ibn Khuzaymah of Ibn Khuzaymah;
Sunan al-Darimi of Al-Darimi.

Historical Overview

Practiced by the majority of Muslims, Sunnī Islam is based primarily on the sunnah, the customary practice of the prophet Muḥammad. This practice is preserved in the ḥadīth (tradition), which consists of the accounts of what the Prophet said or did. The tradition and the Qurʿān are the main sources of Sunnī religious law. Also important is ijmāʿ, the consensus of the religious scholars which reflects the Sunnī emphasis on community and its collective wisdom, guided by the Qurʿān and the Sunnah. Sunnī Muslims have thus referred to themselves as ahl al-sunnah wa al-jamāʿah (people of the sunnah and the community).

Sunnī Islam, however, is not monolithic. It comprises several theological and legal schools, as well as a variety of attitudes and outlooks conditioned by historical setting, locale, and cultural circumstances. Sunnī Muslims do, however, share certain distinctive beliefs. They differ from the Shīʿa—the party of ʿAlī (the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law)—in denying that the Prophet designated ʿAlī to succeed him as leader of the Islamic community. ʿAlī, the fourth of the Rightly Guided Caliphs (al-khulafāʿ al-rāshidūn), like the first three, became a legitimate caliph through a form of public acclamation. Sunnīs also distinguished themselves from other Islamic sects whose views they believe constitute innovations (bidaʿ, singular form bidʿah), that is, departures from the beliefs of the community at large.

Sunnī Islam developed as a result of political and religious struggles within Islam that began early in its history. Among the most important events in these complex struggles was an army mutiny in 656 AD which resulted in the murder of the third caliph, ʿUthmān, a member of the Umayyad clan of the Quraysh tribe of Mecca. ʿAlī was proclaimed caliph, but ʿUthmān’s kinsman, the Umayyad Muʿāwiyah, governor of Syria, demanded that ʿAlī bring to justice the murderers of ʿUthmān and refused to acknowledge him as caliph. During the inconclusive civil war between them, part of ʿAlī’s army withdrew its support from him but remained opposed to Muʿāwiyah. This group formed the basis of the sect of “the Seceders” (al-Khawārij) with its various divisions. They were united in rejecting both ʿUthmān and ʿAlī as legitimate caliphs and confronted Muslims with pivotal theological questions that conditioned the development of sectarian thought. In 661, a Khārijite assassinated ʿAlī, and Muʿāwiyah was acknowledged caliph, founding the Umayyad caliphate which lasted until 750.

This period witnessed the polarization of religious attitudes that became formal doctrine. Dispute over such questions as the definition of true belief, the status of those who profess Islam and commit a great sin but remain unrepentant, and especially the question of the freedom of the will and predestination. These questions were discussed by Sunnī thinkers as they strove to formulate theologies consistent with the Qurʿān and the sunnah. In 750 the Umayyad caliphate was toppled by the ʿAbbāsids, descendants of the Prophet’s uncle al-ʿAbbās. The new ʿAbbāsid caliphate lasted until 1258, when the Mongols brought it to an end. The Sunnī Umayyads, however, reestablished their power in Islamic Spain, until l037. The various Islamic powers that succeeded them in Spain remained predominantly Sunnī.

During the ʿAbbāsid period, Sunnī Islam came into its own. The four schools of Sunnī law, founded by Abū Ḥanīfah (d. 767), Mālik Ibn Anas (d. 797), al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820), and Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 855) became firmly established. The history of Sunnī Islam in this period is marked by Muslim reaction to excessive rationalism in theology and to developments in Shīʿism.

The rationalist school of speculative theology (kalām), the Muʿtazilī, which had its roots in the late Umayyad period, alienated the more conventional Muslims, for whom Muʿtazilī intellectualism missed the spirit of the Qurʿān. Things came to a head when the ʿAbbāsid caliph al-Maʿmūn (r. 813–833) supported the Muʿtazilah and attempted to impose their doctrine of the created Qurʿān; essentially, although the speech of Allah, the Qurʿān is not coeternal with the divine essence, but has an origination in time. This attempt which continued with his two successors, saw the persecution of dissidents, including Ibn Ḥanbal. A reaction to the Muʿtazilah set in, and it lost its political power and its dominance as a school of kalām and was gradually superseded by the school of al-Ashʿarī (d. 935), who used kalām to defend traditional Islamic belief. Not all Sunnī Muslims subscribed to Ashʿarism: some belonged to another school of Sunnī kalām, that of al-Māturīdī (d. 944); others, the followers of the influential religious thinker Ibn Taymīyah (d. 1328), disavowed kalām.

Shīʿism in the ʿAbbāsid period was dominated by two related groups, the Ismāʿīlīyah, or Seveners, and the IthnāʿAsharīyah, or Twelvers. Both maintained that the rightful Islamic leader, the imam, must be a descendant of Ḥusayn, son of ʿAlī and Fāṭimah, the prophet’s daughter, and that this imam is endowed with special knowledge. They disagreed, however, on the identity of the rightful seventh imam. The Twelvers gained prestige and influence when the Shīʿī Būyid dynasty became the effective ruler in Baghdad (945–1055), although it continued to acknowledge the ʿAbbāsid caliph. The Ismāʿīlīyah established in 910 a counter-caliphate, the Fāṭimid, in North Africa, and conquered Egypt in 969 and made it their base. The tenth century witnessed a substantial growth of Shīʿī power. Sunnī power, however, was revived when the Seljuk Turks, who were Sunnīs, conquered Baghdad in 1055. They provided effective military opposition to the Fāṭimids in Syria and ideological opposition through the writings of such prominent Sunnī thinkers as al-Ghazālī (d. 1111). In 1171, Islam’s great counter-crusader, Saladin (Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, d. 1193) brought an end to the Fāṭimid caliphate.

Twelver Shiism fared better when Shah Ismāʿīl (d. 1523), founder of the Ṣafavid Persian state espoused it; Shiism retains its strong base in modern-day Iran. The Ṣafavids’ rival, the larger Ottoman empire, was, however, Sunnī.

Islam spread to India gradually. It arrived initially with the Umayyad expansion into northern India which was brought about by trade and peaceful conversion as well as by warfare. Under the tolerant policies of the Mughal emperor Akbar (d. 1605), especially toward his Hindu subjects, Islam took greater hold, partly because of his conciliatory policies toward his Hindu subjects. Through peaceful conversions, Indian Islam, predominantly Sunnī, spread eastward to Indonesia which is now the world’s most populous Muslim country.

Modern Sunnī Thought

Any consideration of modern Sunnī thought has to take into account new interpretations of the Qur’ān, which started to appear at the end of the nineteenth century in the works of reformers who wanted to go back to 2scripture and early tradition in order to rene

Islamic thought. Because any innovating thought that wants to carry weight for a Muslim audience has to refer to the Qur’ān, the reformers Muḥammad ῾Abduh (1849–1905) and Muḥammad Rashīd Riḋā (1865–1935) presented their ideas in the form of a new commentary on the Qur’ān, which was published in the monthly issues of the Egyptian journal Al‐manār between 1903 and 1935 (later published separately in twelve volumes). A number of such tafsīrs (exegetical studies) were produced in twentieth‐century Egypt. In the Indo‐Pakistan subcontinent, Sayyid Aḥmad Khān’s (1817–1898) commentary on the first seventeen surahs of the Qur’ān (seven vols., 1880–1907) was the first modern reformist commentary. In the 1940s, the Egyptian scholar Amīn al‐Khūlī at the University of Cairo, along with his students Muḥammad Aḥmad Khalafallāh and ῾Ā’ishah ῾Abd al‐Raḥmān, initiated a new approach to the study of the Qur’ān, regarding it as a literary document to be studied by literary methods without the interference of theological doctrine. In 1947, Khalafallāh submitted his doctoral dissertation on the art of narration in the Qur’ān (in Arabic) in which he proved that the Qur’ān contains reinterpretations of earlier versions of scriptural stories. It met with strong resistance from al‐Azhar authorities and could only be published in 1951, in a revised version. More recently, research has been carried out on the Qur’ān by Ḥamad Naṣr Abū Zayd at the University of Cairo.

Besides his Qur’ānic research and other publications on Islam, Sayyid Aḥmad Khān carried out extensive studies on Christianity that resulted in a commentary on the first chapters of Genesis and Matthew (1862, 1865, 1887), and the Egyptian scholar Muḥammad Kāmil Ḥusayn also paid considerable attention to the study of Christianity in addition to his work on the Qur’ān.

Two Algerian scholars have also developed new approaches to the Qur’ān. One scholar, Malek Bennabi, has concentrated on how to understand the Qur’ān as revelation and how to account for Muḥammad’s subjectivity in the revelatory process. Published in France in 1946, his book The Qur’ānic Phenomena appeared in English translation in 1988. The other scholar, Mohammed Arkoun (b. 1928), in his publications pays attention to “reading” the Qur’ān in the light of modern semiotic theory.

In recent years, renewed attention has been paid to the sīrah literature, which deals with the biography of Muḥammad. Quite a few literary biographies of the person of Muḥammad have seen the light since World War I. There have been studies on the sociopolitical conditions of ancient Mecca in search of historical causes for the rise of the Islamic state under Muḥammad’s leadership. The question of the reliability of ḥadīths on the subject is part of the broader field of Muslim work on ḥadīth literature. Western scholarship has denied the historical authenticity of at least part of this literature. Several Muslim scholars recognize the historical problems involved, and Muslim scholarship on the question of the historical authenticity of these texts has been studied at length.

Another field of major concern in nineteenth‐ and twentieth‐century Sunnī thought is sharī’a (the divine law). Formulating sharī’a in human terms, consequently, is an ongoing enterprise. Some contend that sharī’a should be based on the Qur’ān only. Much thought has been given to matters related to sharī’a, as distinct from the civil codes enacted in nearly all Muslim countries in the course of the twentieth century.

By the end of the nineteenth century, Islamic jurisprudence was recognized in the four fiqh schools (madhhabs) for the study of what sharī’a implies in specific cases. By thus combining not only different Qur’ānic texts but also opinions drawn from different law schools, it turned out to be possible to “modernize” or liberalize certain traditionally valid rules about polygamy, repudiation, and divorce.

No less spectacular has been the development of thought about the implications of sharī’a for constitutional law and the organization of the state. The immediate cause of the revision of traditional doctrine was the formal abolition of the caliphate (which had already been reduced to a largely titular post) by the Turkish National Assembly first in November 1922 and definitively in March 1924. In 1922–1923, a new concept of the caliphate had already been proposed as a parallel religious and political structure which would encompass all Muslim countries. In 1925, an Egyptian scholar published a study on Islam and the fundamentals of government (in Arabic); powerful arguments were used to deny that the institution of the caliphate has a Qur’ānic and Islamic foundation, as well as to combat the traditional idea that Islam requires a particular form of state and government. It was asserted that Muslims are free to choose the form of government they prefer in their countries, since political authority does not constitute a fundamental principle of Islam. This was, of course, meant to give Muslims responsibility for the particular ways in which they wanted to build their states. Since the author made a distinction between Muḥammad as a prophet and religious teacher of eternal truth and as a statesman in historical circumstances, he asserted that the religious character of Islam is distinct from its political character, implying a separation between religion and state. This went against established tradition and doctrine, and the book was banned. It should be realized that in the 1920s the question of the caliphate and the implications of its abolition by the Turkish government led to discussions all over the Muslim world, but in particular in the Near East and India. In Turkey, the USSR, and a few other countries, there were jurists who favored a separation between sharī’a and the state, that is, between state and religion.The reaction came not only from a bastion of established Islam, but also from the circle of the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928 and spread to Syria, Palestine, and elsewhere over the next twenty years. It was held in these quarters that Islam prescribes an Islamic social order (al‐niẓām al‐islāmī), and the idea developed that such an Islamic social order could only be developed in an Islamic state. Under the circumstances of the time (foreign rule, World War II, the establishment of the state of Israel), the vision of an Islamic state, if necessary to be established by force, gained ground among the Muslim Brothers. The Muslim Brotherhood’s structural parallel in Pakistan was the Jamā῾at‐i Islāmī intent on turning Pakistan into an Islamic state based on sharī’a. To achieve it, an Islamic “revolution,” not necessarily of a violent nature, was required, and this would guarantee the fundamental transformation of society, its islamization. But, the hoped‐for realization of sharī’a in an Islamic social order did not take place, as the various Islamic states applied sharī’a in widely differing ways.

A different kind of Sunnī thought developed when the attempt was made not to oppose Islam to things Western (as in the idea of an Islamic order and an Islamic state) but to reconcile some prominent Western ideologies with Islam. Was nationalism compatible with Islam? Until the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 al‐Azhar scorned all nationalist divisions among Muslims, maintaining the ideal of the political unity of all Muslims, notwithstanding the fact that a number of new nation-states with Muslim majorities had been and were being founded. Insofar as Islamic sentiment had supported the struggle for independence, there was no conflict; the problem arose, however, when the nationalist leaders created secular rather than Islamic states. Was democracy compatible with Islam? Its proponents argued that Islam possesses an embryonic democracy in the Qur’ānic concept of shūrā, as an advisory council to the head of the state. It was also felt that democracy, with its insistence on the responsibility of the citizens and its legitimation of the state as representative of responsible citizens, was a necessity for the development of Muslim societies. But most Muslim societies had been governed on the lines of “Oriental despotism,” religion in fact legitimizing the use of power from above. The adherents of an Islamic state affirm that the democracy which Islam brings about is different from the Western model of democracy.

Most discussions, however, have been carried on about the relationship between socialism and Islam; this also had an immediate political relevance, since some Muslim countries had an open market economy according to the capitalist model, whereas other Muslim countries have at times followed varieties of the socialist model. The Syrian thinker Muṣṭafā al‐Sibā῾ī’s fervent plea for an Islamic socialism, in his 1959 book on the socialism of Islam, was welcomed by Nasser and others at the time when Egypt and other Arab countries were moving to the left. But there turned out to be several versions of Islamic socialism, one being proposed by Sayyid Quṭb, who took a critical distance to the state. There were also different versions of Arab socialism which developed differently in Syria and Iraq. And if a revolution was to take place, should it be a socialist or an Islamic revolution?

In any case, most Muslim thinkers stressed the idea of justice and particularly social justice in Islam. The status of women in Islam continued to be a subject of debate.

A different area of thought cherished in Muslim circles is the more speculative realm of metaphysics and theology, for instance, the problem of the relationship between reason and revelation. Traditional doctrine held that the use and domain of reason is circumscribed by the data of revelation: in the end, reason is subordinated to revelation. The modernist Sunnī reformers, however, assumed a basic parallelism of reason and revelation, in the visible as well as in the invisible sphere. Inspired by the Muslim philosophical heritage and impressed by the achievements of Western science and thought, some gave reason a higher place than it occupied in traditional kalām (metaphysical theology); there is an essential harmony among reason, revelation, and moral conscience; sharī’a was to be accepted as basically identical with natural law; and Islam became a religion of progress.

In recent times, the need for rationality and intellectual rigor is increasingly felt as a counterweight to the irrationalisms of modern times. Similar rational concerns are alive with present‐day thinkers, such as Ḥasan Ḥanafī, who works for a new tanwīr (Enlightenment) in Arab‐Muslim thought and wants to replace theology by anthropology. Other Muslim countries too, have their champions of rational thought, such as Muḥammad Abū Jābirī in Morocco and ῾Abd al‐Majīd Sharfī in Tunisia. These thinkers have often studied in the West and are open to dialogue and to a common struggle for the causes of humanity. Throughout the twentieth century Muslim thought has been stressing the responsibility of man and woman as persons, and much more attention has been given to the problem of human freedom than in earlier times.

Another field of modern Muslim thought is that of history. As far as the Middle East is concerned, European imperialism, Western neocolonialism and exploitation by socialist bloc countries, the World Wars and the following Cold War, the establishment of Israel, mutual rivalries, petrodollars, and other factors have made it one of the crisis areas of twentieth‐century history. Some Muslim authors are fascinated by the rise and fall of nations and civilizations, with the lurking question of whether the West or Islam will dominate the world of the future.

In a similar vein others have discussed the place of Islam in the ongoing history of religions. Here and there a scholarly interest in religions other than Islam is visible, as distinct from the apologetic and polemical spirit that pervades so much writing on this subject and prevents true dialogue between cultures and religions. Such a dialogue requires, as a first condition, a free development of thought in Muslim countries, and this, unfortunately, is under constant threat. Certain trends of thought have scope to develop among Muslims living in the West and not in Muslim countries. The tragic end of the Sudanese independent thinker Maḥmūd Muḥammad Ṭāhā (d. 1985) is a warning signal.

One of the striking features of late twentieth‐century Muslim societies is the increasing “critical consciousness” of Islam and Islamic norms and values. Against Western secular history, economics, education, and thought, calls can increasingly be heard for an Islamic view and methodology, just as an Islamic Declaration of Human Rights has been proposed besides the United Nations’ one. The growing concern with Islamic specificities, norms, and values has led, at least in the Arab‐Muslim world, to an increasing concentration on Islamic subjects: jihād and religious tolerance, dhimmah and religious freedom, the status of woman in Islam as opposed to that in the West, and so forth.

Under the manifold pressures of the present, traditional concerns with Islam as a distinctive entity have apparently developed to where typical thinking makes it the exclusive concern, with Islam as a total system embracing all aspects of life, religious as well as worldly (dīn wa‐dunyā). Man is seen as vicegerent of Allah on earth, the Muslim community as fulfilling Allah’s plan with the world.

In this view, the Western world, its culture and religion, is seen as the historical enemy of the Muslim world and a threat to Islam. The Islamic identity itself is threatened by Western secular scholarship, secular methodology, secular education, and ongoing Western cultural and intellectual imperialism, which is seen as incapable of dialogue and of discerning any spiritual quality in things Islamic. Against this sombre image and perception of the West, Islam is seen as eternal and perfect, and Muslims can appropriate it, by zeal and commitment, through orienting themselves to the Qur’ānic view of reality. In this line of thought, Islam is presented as the sole subject of reflection, the absolute religion, accessible either through specific scriptural texts (as held by the fundamentalists) or through the coherent system of a rationalized Islam (as held by the ideologists). The versions of this absolute Islam vary according to political regimes and their oppositions, and on closer analysis they are largely conditioned by political forces.

Yet there are other ways of thinking about Islam as well, where Islam is a domain of personal experience, of communal norms and values, of creative effort in the sense of Muhammad Iqbal (1875–1938), or enlightenment in the sense of Mohammed Arkoun, who wants to free Muslim thought from political conditioning.

Reading the expressions of modern Sunnī thought and also some works of literature, one becomes aware of an immense variety among Muslim thinkers and of the multiple interpretations permitted by Islam. And if more Muslims could express their thinking freely, this variety in Muslim thought would be still more visible than it is today.

All these thinkers work under great political, economic, and social pressures. Under the same pressures states in Muslim lands tend to become authoritarian while the deprived population finds an outlet for its misery in protest movements appealing to Islam.

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