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Sharia Adherence Mosque Survey: Correlations between Sharia Adherence and Violent Dogma in U.S. Mosques

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Abstract

A random survey of 100 representative mosques in the U.S. was conducted to measure the correlation between Sharia adherence and dogma calling for violence against non-believers. Of the 100 mosques surveyed, 51% had texts on site rated as severely advocating violence; 30% had texts rated as moderately advocating violence; and 19% had no violent texts at all. Mosques that presented as Sharia adherent were more likely to feature violence-positive texts on site than were their non-Sharia-adherent counterparts. In 84.5% of the mosques, the imam recommended studying violence-positive texts. The leadership at Sharia-adherent mosques was more likely to recommend that a worshipper study violence-positive texts than leadership at non-Sharia-adherent mosques. Fifty-eight percent of the mosques invited guest imams known to promote violent jihad. The leadership of mosques that featured violence-positive literature was more likely to invite guest imams who were known to promote violent jihad than was the leadership of mosques that did not feature violence-positive literature on mosque premises.

Preface[1]

The debate over the connection between Islam and its legal doctrine and system known as *Sharia* on the one hand and terrorism committed in the name of Islam on the other rages on among counter terrorism professionals, academics, policy experts, theologians, and politicians. Much of this debate centers on the evidence that the perpetrators of violence in the name of Islam source the moral, theological, and legal motivations and justifications for their actions in *Sharia*. Much of the opposition to this focus on *Sharia* centers on the argument that *Sharia* is and has been historically malleable and exploited for good and bad causes.

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This study seeks to enter this fray but at a more empirical level. Since we know that mosques are in fact a situs of recruitment and "radicalization" for terrorism committed in the name of Islam, this study seeks to enter into that domain to determine if there is an empirical correlation between actual, manifest *Sharia*-related behaviors and the presence of violent and *jihad*-based literature, and further, the promotion of that literature. While the presence of violent and *jihad*-based literature alone does not necessarily suggest the worshippers at such a mosque adopt the violent literature's approach to the use of violence, if the imams at such mosques also promote the literature, and if those mosques are more likely to invite guest imams and speakers who are known to promote violent *jihad*, the presence of these factors together would be strongly suggestive of an environment prone to *jihad* recruitment. Thus, this study also seeks to determine if the spiritual leadership in these mosques is supportive of this genre of literature.

Introduction

While scholarly inquiry into the root causes and factors supportive of the political violence known as terrorism has accelerated since the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States; a survey of research in the field reveals a lag in empirical studies that attempt to measure the relationship between specific variables and terrorism phenomena or support for terrorism. Most studies in the field of terrorism research are either based upon anecdotal or retrospective analysis of known data from prior reports of terrorism using multiple regression analysis. [2] Most of these studies disconfirm simplistic causative theories for terrorism, such as socio-economic deprivation. [3]

A 2007 study by Paul Gill noted that prior scholarship had not explored the complex interactions between the individual who becomes a suicide bomber, the terrorist organization that sponsors suicide bombers, and the society that supports the terrorist and terrorist organization. Instead, scholarship had taken a non-integrated approach and previous studies had focused on only one of these three dimensions. [4] The Gill study found, among other things, that the terrorist organization seeks societal support by creating a "culture of martyrdom" and that a theme common to suicide bombers, despite many differences, was that they received support of a community that esteemed the concept of martyrdom. [5] The Gill study advanced scholarship in the area of terrorism research by studying the complex dynamics at work between a terrorist organization, society, and individuals and also proposing that the interplay between those three dimensions enables radicalization and terrorist attacks. [6]

Recent studies, when viewed together, raise the prospect that all three dimensions may be present in highly *Sharia*-adherent mosques, such as those frequented by *Salafists*. This is significant because the mosque would be a convenient locus for making observations and gathering data in an attempt to measure the relationship between specific variables and support for terrorism if all three dimensions that enable radicalization and terrorist attacks are present in these highly *Sharia*-adherent mosques.

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A study by Sageman found a connection between highly *Sharia*-adherent *Salafist* Islam and violent *jihād*. This study's authors emphasize that the connection Sageman noticed between Islam and violent *jihād* concerns a particular stream of highly *Sharia*-adherent Islam and not Islam generically. The Sageman study found that 97% of the *jihādists* studied became increasingly devoted to highly *Sharia*-adherent *Salafist* Islam on their path to radicalization despite adhering to various devotional levels during their youths. [7] This noted increase in religious devotion to *Sharia*-adherent *Salafist* Islam was measured by outwardly observable behaviors that are objectively linked to *Sharia*-adherence such as wearing traditional Arabic, Pakistani, or Afghan clothing and growing beards. [8]

The mosque is a societal apparatus that might serve as a support mechanism for the violent *jihād*. Consistent with the findings of the Sageman study, a study conducted by the New York Police Department noted that, in the mosque context, high levels of *Sharia* adherence may relate to support for violent *jihād*. [9] Specifically the NYPD study found that highly *Sharia*-adherent mosques have played a prominent role in radicalizing several groups who conspired to commit acts of terrorism in the name of Islam, including some groups who were successful in carrying out high-profile attacks. [10] One plausible explanation for why the highly *Sharia*-adherent mosque is believed to have a connection to the radicalization process is that the global *jihād* is an Islamic revivalist movement centered on a common *Sharia*-driven mission [11] and the mosque serves as a locus for the intensification of religious beliefs. [12]

Further raising the profile of highly *Sharia*-adherent mosques is the fact that several of these mosques are known to contain brokers to the violent *jihād*; and in some instances, the broker may even be the mosque's imam. [13] The broker role may also be filled by ostensibly non-violent groups such as the *Tablighi Jamaat*, which counts several alumnae as members of the violent *jihād*. [14] Additionally, these mosques have been the *situs* where other radicals have met "spiritual sanctioners" who foster an "us-versus-them" perspective and provide moral justification for engaging in violent *jihād*. [15] The "spiritual sanctioner" presents *jihād* as a religious duty situated within traditional *Sharia* and the sanctioner's commitment to *jihād* is often the primary determinant of whether a radicalized group will engage in violent *jihād*. [16]

The presence of an imam or other respected member who serves as a "spiritual sanctioner" or even as a broker [17] to *jihād* is critical because a respected Islamic scholar who provides justification for violence against "the other" and presents *jihād* as a religious duty significantly influences the decisions made by one who is seeking a more religiously devout lifestyle. [18] The presence of pro-*jihād* imams and mosque members, and even ostensibly non-violent *Sharia*-advocating groups, serve to support a "culture of martyrdom" by providing moral justification for engaging in violent *jihād* and making available an avenue to participate in violent *jihād*. The presence of groups like the *Tablighi Jamaat*, as well as the presence of individual brokers and "spiritual sanctioners" within the highly *Sharia*-adherent mosques, raises concerns that activities and the atmosphere inside highly *Sharia*-adherent mosques contribute to the creation or maintenance of a "culture of martyrdom" where violence and *jihād* are accepted or encouraged.

In addition to the roles played by increased devotion to a highly *Sharia*-adherent strain of Islam, studies have also noticed a connection between violence-positive Islamic literature and violent *jihād*. A study by Quintan Wiktorowicz noted that the modern violent *jihād*, the current avatar of which is Al Qaeda and various groups inspired by Al Qaeda, relies on textual works to legitimize their violent activities. The texts that these *jihādist* groups rely on date from the medieval period, for example works by Ibn Kathir and Ibn Taymiyya, to the modern period, which includes the works of Abul A'la Maududi and Sayyid Qutb. [19] According to Wiktorowicz, violent *Salafists* such as Al Qaeda legitimize their violent activities by applying principles set forth in these texts in ways that take a more expansive and permissive view regarding the use of violence than has been allowed by alternative historical interpretations of these texts. [20] However, Wiktorowicz concedes that under certain circumstances these same texts can be used persuasively to garner the support of otherwise non-violent *Salafists* for the intentional targeting of the American civilian population. [21] Thus, violence-positive texts by Islamic thinkers and exegetes can be exploited not only to sanction engaging in violent *jihād*, but can also be utilized to gain the support of non-violent *Salafists* for the intentional killing of civilians.

These anecdotal studies, when viewed together, suggest that a relationship might be present between high levels of *Sharia* adherence, violence-positive Islamic literature, and institutional support for violence and violent *jihād* within the context of the highly *Sharia*-adherent mosque. The role authoritative, *Sharia*-centric Islam plays in creating or maintaining a culture that manifests behaviors that demonstrate esteem for political violence against an outgroup deserves investigation because the various Islamic terrorist groups and individual *jihādists*, for all their geographic, political, and ideological differences, embrace *Sharia* as their doctrinal legal and political authority for the establishment of a political order or state based on Islamic law as their goal. [22]

Moreover, these Islamic terrorist groups and individual *jihādists* cite *Sharia* as their legal and political justification for the political violence they term *jihād* and those who oppose them term terrorism. To date, almost all of the professional and academic work in the area of terrorism carried out in the name of Islam has been anecdotal surveys or case studies tracing backwards the personal history profiles of different Islamic terrorists and the socio-economic, and political environments from whence they came after the fact (either post mortem or post-capture). [23] There are almost no empirical studies attempting to identify specific behavioral variables (such as various indicia of *Sharia*-adherence) which might positively correlate with behaviors associated with a willingness to tolerate, accept, or even engage in terrorism.

One notable exception to this trend was a group of four studies conducted by Ginges, Hansen, and Norenzayan which sought to measure the association between *religious belief* versus *coalitional commitment* with attitudes directly supportive of terrorism or attitudes suggesting support for terrorism. [24] *Religious belief* was defined and measured by the subject self-reporting his or her frequency of prayer. [25] *Coalitional commitment* was defined and measured by the frequency with which the subject attended communal religious services at a house of worship. [26] The study concluded that a relationship exists between frequency of mosque attendance (coalitional commitment) and the likelihood that a person will support suicide attacks. [27] The study also concluded that there was no empirical evidence to support the religious-belief hypothesis which posits that support for suicide bombings is linked to some measurable index of religious devotion (prayer in this study). [28]

However, the study's methodology as it relates to gathering prayer frequency data may have been susceptible to weakness that introduced bias and led to a faulty conclusion. The study invited over-reporting by relying on Muslims to self-report their prayer frequency. A Muslim would be under social and/or psychological pressures to over-report his prayer frequency because status as a good or pious Muslim is linked to whether a Muslim fulfills his religious obligation to pray five times daily. [29] Status as a good or pious Muslim is not dependent on attending mosque with a high degree of frequency. A Muslim is permitted to pray outside of a mosque environment when necessary. [30] Hence, the pressure to over-report, which exists for self-reporting prayer frequency, is not present when a Muslim reports how frequently he or she attends mosque. Moreover, the measure of mosque attendance frequency is both a measure of coalitional commitment and religious devotion.

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In the two Palestinian surveys from the Ginges study, 69.3% of the respondents in the first survey and 85% of the respondents in the second survey reported praying five times per day. [31] The results for mosque attendance were more evenly distributed. [32] Thus, the extremely high percentage of respondents who reported praying five times a day makes it difficult to statistically discern whether a correlation exists between the independent variable (prayer frequency) and the dependent variable (support for suicide bombings). While the Ginges study authors disconfirmed the religious-belief hypothesis, a correlation may be shown to exist between indicia of religious devotion and behaviors that increase the likelihood that one is sympathetic to violence once the bias introduced by the self reporting of acts associated with piety is removed. Indeed, the confirmed hypothesis for coalitional commitment, insofar as mosque attendance is also a measure of religious devotion, suggests the Ginges study authors might have too hastily rejected the religious-belief hypothesis.

A primary purpose of this survey is to pursue the religious-belief hypothesis in the context of praxis, or the measurable adherence to *Sharia's* legal dictates of prayer worship and dress by Muslim worshippers who are sufficiently devout to pray in mosques. Specifically, this survey seeks to measure whether a correlation exists between measures of religious devotion as defined by certain behaviors objectively linked to *Sharia* adherence, on the one hand, and the presence of violence-positive materials at the mosque, on the other. This study also seeks to measure whether a correlation exists between the presence of violence-positive materials at a mosque and whether the mosque or mosque leadership will promote violence by recommending the study of violence-positive materials, promoting violent *jihad*, or inviting guest speakers who are known to have promoted violent *jihad*. However, this survey avoids the bias that might be introduced through self-reporting resulting from pressure on the respondent to demonstrate his or her piety.

Sharia and the Jurisprudential Consensus Across the Islamic Religio-Legal Schools

Sharia Defined and Its Role in Orthodox Islamic Jurisprudence Explained

Sharia is the Islamic system of law based primarily on two sources held by Muslims to be, respectively, direct revelation from Allah and divinely inspired: the *Quran* and the *Sunnah* (examples and traditions of Muhammad). [33] Additionally, two other sources, *ijma* (scholarly consensus among the accepted *Sharia* authorities -- *ulema*) and *qiyas* (analogy), may be utilized to provide authoritative guidance when the legal rule or solution is not self-evident from the literal text of the *Quran* or *Sunnah*. [34] While *Sharia* law and rulings based on *Sharia* are derived from the same source bodies, *Sharia* is not a monolithic institution. The *Umma*—or Muslim community—is arrayed along several legal, cultural, and nationalistic axes but the deepest legal fault line is the Sunni-Shia divide. Moreover, there are several distinct schools of religio-legal thought contained within both the Sunni and Shia sects. The Sunni sect has given rise to four primary schools of religio-legal thought known as *mathhabs* (or Arabic pl.: *mathahib*): *Hanafi*, *Shafii*, *Maliki*, and *Hanbali*, [35] all of which are considered by their respective adherents to be authoritative for their own followers [36] and indeed all permit a fair amount of freedom for adherents to migrate between and among rulings from the different schools. [37] The *Salafi* sects, such as the *Wahhabi* groups based mostly in the Arabian Peninsula, and the *Deobandis* based mostly in Pakistan and India, are also considered a distinct and legitimate approach to *Sharia* by most Sunni legal scholars. [38] Within Shia Islam, there are three primary *mathhabs*: *Ithna-Ashari*, *Zayadi*, and *Ismaili*. [39]

The differences among the legal schools are typically understood to exist at one of two levels. The first is at the level of positive law, or the definitive rulings on any given question typically answered in a scholar's ruling called a *fatwa*. This is typically referred to as the *fiqh*. The second distinction among the legal schools is found in the very jurisprudential methodology purportedly operating as the source for discovering the law. This is typically referred to as *usul al fiqh*, or the science of the law. [40]

In the first instance, diversity of the normative legal rulings of the *fiqh* across the *mathhabs* is illustrated in matters of personal status, for example the varying approaches in the areas of divorce and temporary marriage. Concerning divorce, *Hanafi* interpretation allows a woman to apply for a divorce when her husband is unable to consummate the marriage, but the other Sunni *mathhabs* require that a wife pay a sum before being released from marriage. [41] With regard to the concept of "temporary marriage," the Shia *Ithna-Ashari* school allows for "temporary marriage" while none of its Sunni counterparts recognize the practice. [42]

While there is room for these differences in the normative rulings of the *fiqh* between the various *mathhabs* in the Sunni world, and between the Sunni and Shia legal rulings, the divergence at the level of positive law is, given the fullness of the *corpus juris* of the *fiqh*, confined to relatively few issues and to ones that operate generally at the margins. Thus, there is unity and agreement across the Sunni-Shia split and across the various Sunni *mathhabs* on the core *Sharia* normative precepts that form the essentials of orthodox Islamic jurisprudence. The introduction to *Reliance of the Traveller* makes prominent note of the fact that the Sunni *mathhabs* are "identical in approximately 75 percent of their legal conclusions" and that differences among the four Sunni *mathhabs* are attributable to differences in methodology—not ideology. [43] This consistency and agreement on core *Sharia* rulings not only extend across the Sunni *mathhabs*, but also bridge the Sunni-Shia divide. Thus, in a 1959 fatwa, the head of the preeminent Sunni university, Al-Azhar in Cairo, Egypt, ruled that the Shia *Ithna-Ashari* mathhab was as religiously valid to follow as any of the recognized Sunni *mathhabs*; and going further, the fatwa stated that transferring from one recognized *mathhab* to another was no crime. [44] More recently, *The Amman Message* echoed the view that all major *mathhabs* are legitimate, that the followers of these major *mathhabs* may not be declared apostate, and that the major schools of Islamic thought express agreement on fundamental Islamic principles. [45] Presumably, if the normative rulings across the Sunni-Shia divide were inapposite on a majority of issues or on core issues, the leading Sunni legal authorities would not have granted Shia *fiqh* this prestigious standing, especially in light of the theological differences which have divided the Sunni and Shia sects historically.

The reason for this generous uniformity within the *corpus* of positive law rulings among the *ulema* of the various legal schools is a question for legal historians and possibly forensic anthropologists. The fact of this broad consensus, however, is indisputable. Interestingly, though, the differences in *usul al fiqh*, or the jurisprudential methodology said to underlie the normative rulings of the *fiqh*, are much greater. While this is true across the Sunni legal schools, it is unmistakably the case across the Sunni-Shia divide. While there are considerable similarities in the *usul al fiqh* of the Sunni and Shia worlds, it is fair to say that the standing of the Imamate in Shia methodology creates a difference operating at the core of methodology. [46]

This leads to an anomaly of sorts. If the methodologies between the Sunni-Shia axis are so starkly distinguishable, how is it that the normative rulings of the *fiqh* remain remarkably aligned? One scholar who has examined this anomaly has suggested that historically the articulated methodologies of the various legal schools represented by *usul al fiqh* in fact followed the actual development of the *fiqh*—representing a kind of *ex post facto* rationalization. Indeed, he suggests that even after the emergence of clearly articulated methodologies of the various legal schools, with clear divergences amongst them, the normative rulings of the *fiqh* continued within the pre-existent consensus. [47]

Violent Jihad is an Integral Part of Orthodox Sharia-Centric Islam

The propriety of violent *jihad*, expressed as kinetic warfare against non-Muslims, is a matter that finds agreement in orthodox Islamic, *Sharia* materials and Islamic tradition. This is true even though there is no universally accepted single doctrine of *jihad*. [48] *Jihad and the Islamic Law of War* notes that there are adherents to Islam of both Sunni and Shia extraction who believe that all non-Muslims, as well as those Muslims who are insufficiently devout, are legitimate targets for violence. [49] *Takfiri* and *jihadist* are the terms used to describe this group of militant Islamic fundamentalists. [50]

Jihad can be divided into two basic categories—defensive *jihad* and offensive *jihad*—each with its own implications for the Islamic community and individual Muslims. [51] Offensive *jihad* is waged to expand the territory controlled by Islam and is declared by the Caliph. [52] Defensive *jihad* is waged when lands under Islamic control are attacked by non-Muslim forces. [53] Defensive *jihad* is an individual obligation (*fard 'ayn*) incumbent on, at a minimum, every Muslim in the Muslim land under attack, and at a maximum, every Muslim globally to support the *jihad* by fighting, praying, or making financial contributions to the *jihad*. [54] In the modern era, with the conspicuous absence of a recognized Caliph, the issue of offensive *jihad* remains a doctrine with nebulous practical implications. Modern *jihad*s are almost always characterized as defensive *jihad*s, but it is also the case that the line between a defensive *jihad* and an offensive one is blurry at best given a world in which Muslim countries invariably interact with and often submit to the will of non-Muslim denominated countries and powers as a matter of international law and relations and judicial and diplomatic comity. [55]

The authors of *Jihad and the Islamic Law of War* speak derisively of the *Takfirist* approach taken by Osama bin Laden, the avatar of the modern *jihad* movement, accusing him and those like him of ignoring traditional Islamic law and relying selectively on only sources that support the conclusions desired by bin Laden and similar actors. [56] These authors argue that traditional Islamic law and its precedents act as a restraint against the illegal use of force and that traditional Islamic law does not permit non-combatants to be viewed as legitimate targets. [57]

A careful reading, however, of classical, orthodox Islamic exegetical and legal materials reveals that modern *jihadists* or *takfiris* have at least a colorable claim under orthodox *Sharia* sources, and historical precedent, to conduct the *jihad* they wage; and this includes the intentional targeting and killing of non-combatants. The classic and still highly authoritative *Sharia* exegetical resource, *Tafsir Ibn Kathir*, exhorts Muslims on several occasions to wage *jihad* and places few, if any, restrictions on how and when to conduct *jihad*. [58] The classical works of several respected jurists and scholars from the four Sunni *mathhabs* dating from the 8th to 14th centuries are all in agreement that violent *jihad* against non-Muslims is an obligation incumbent on Muslims. [59] Moreover, the respected classical jurist, Al-Shaybani, who was a disciple of the founder of the Sunni *Hanafi mathhab*, advised that it was lawful for a group of Muslims to attack non-Muslims in areas controlled by non-Muslims even without the approval of the Islamic *Caliph*. [60] Further, Shaybani advised that it was acceptable to kill non-Muslim prisoners of war and non-combatant civilians. [61]

Indeed, this pedigree for a rather full-throated *jihad* against the non-Muslim world has been noted by an important scholar in one of the first published works post-9/11 attempting to actually parse the modern doctrine of *jihad* by noting its roots in classical *fiqh*. Thus, Mary Habeck's *Knowing the Enemy* correctly notes:

The question of offensive *jihad* is even more complex and controversial. The most widely respected Islamic authorities: the six accepted collections of (Sunni) hadith; the authoritative commentators on, and exegetes of, the hadith and Qur'an; the leading ancient experts on Islamic law; and the four schools of Islamic *fiqh* all assume that Muslims have a duty to spread the dominion of Islam, through military offensives, until it rules the world. [62]

Directing violence against others on the basis of their status as non-Muslims as a normative, legally-sanctioned behavior is not a concept confined to Islam's distant history, but is also an accepted feature of modern orthodox, *Sharia*-centric Islam. Al-Azhar University, in its 1991 certification of an English translation of the classical manual, *Reliance of the Traveller*, stated that the English translation "conforms to the practice and faith of the orthodox Sunni community." [63] The translation certified by Al-Azhar University as conforming to orthodox Sunni practice, spends eleven pages discussing *jihad* as violence directed against non-Muslims. [64] Providing modern Shiite support for the concept of *jihad* as violence against non-Muslims, the prominent Shia authority and ruler Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini is recorded as saying,

Islam says: Kill them [the non-Muslims], put them to the sword and scatter [their armies]. ... People cannot be made obedient except with the sword! The sword is the key to Paradise, which can be opened only for the Holy Warriors! There are hundreds of other [Qur'anic] psalms and Hadiths [sayings of the Prophet] urging Muslims to value war and to fight. Does all this mean that Islam is a religion that prevents men from waging war? I spit upon those foolish souls who make such a claim. [65]

Therefore, while *Sharia* has room for a difference of opinion on some matters, the Islamic religio-legal schools express unity for core Islamic principles, which operates in a *de jure* and *de facto* manner as authoritative *ijma* or consensus. Additionally, as discussed above, violent *jihad* employed on the basis of the target's religious identity or practice is a concept that receives support from both Sunni and Shia legal authorities and this support is not confined to medieval literature, but is an idea that has also been advanced by prominent modern Islamic legal scholars and ideological leaders.

Methodology & Data Analysis

Sampling

The survey analyzed data collected from a random sample of 100 mosques. This sample size provided sufficient statistical power to find a modest significant association between the *Sharia* adherence and violence-positive variables. A sample size of 100 mosques also allowed the survey to extrapolate to all mosques in the United States at a 95% confidence interval with a margin of error of +/-9.6%. State-by-state estimates of the Muslim population were extracted from the only extant such survey [66] and used to create a listing of all states whose Muslim population represented at least 1% of the estimated total United States Muslim population. The final listing was comprised of eighteen states and the District of Columbia. [67] Fourteen states and the District of Columbia ("15 randomly selected states") were randomly selected from the final listing to accommodate limits on physical logistics and personnel resources. The study built a comprehensive list of mosques that could be located and surveyed in these 15 randomly selected states. The process is described in greater detail below.

The survey developed a site list of mosques located in each of the 15 randomly selected states after consulting several resources in order to build the most comprehensive list of existing mosques as possible. First, the survey combined the data on the 1,209 mosques listed in "Mosque in America: A National Portrait" [68] with the data on the 1,659 mosques obtained online from Harvard's Pluralism Project. [69] After the mosque lists from the two sources were combined, a review was conducted to ensure that each mosque address was not listed twice. If it was found, during the review, that a mosque address was listed twice, then one of the two addresses was removed from the mosque listing prior to the random selection process. The survey then identified the cities in each state where the highest concentrations of Muslims lived based on open source information relating Muslim demographics for each of the 15 randomly selected states. Additional mosques were located and added to the list by consulting telephone books, gathering information at existing mosques, and conducting visual field inspections. A Friday telephone call was made to every mosque on the site list in order to confirm the mosque's existence prior to sending a researcher for an onsite visit. Friday was selected as the day to attempt telephone contact because an employee or representative would most likely be present at mosque on that day. A mosque was excluded from the list if either it did not have a valid telephone number or its telephone remained unanswered after three Friday telephone calls. The final mosque site list for the 15 randomly selected states yielded a total of 1,401 mosques. The first 100 mosques on the site list were selected and arranged by metropolitan area. All remaining mosques were grouped by metropolitan area and then randomized.

The dates and prayer times (noon [*Dhuhr*]; afternoon [*Asr*]; sunset [*Maghrib*]; and evening [*Isha*]) for any given mosque surveyed were randomly selected. The randomly selected dates and times included both weekday and Friday prayers (the *Jumu'ah*). If the surveyor went to a mosque for a prayer service but found the mosque closed, abandoned, or was unable to locate the mosque at the address provided on the mosque site list, the next mosque that appeared on the randomized list for that city was chosen one after the other until the surveyor located a mosque that was open for the prayer service.

Prepatory Data Collection

The initial mosque visits were conducted between May 18, 2007, and December 4, 2008 ("Survey Period") by surveyors who visited mosques. Each of the mosques visited during the Survey Period were visited again between May 10, 2009, and May 30, 2010 ("Audit Period") to audit the findings of the Survey Period. The results of the Audit Period confirmed the findings in the Survey Period in all but nine mosques. Of these nine, four had closed or moved to an unknown location; the remaining five mosques had additional or different texts available. Of the four closed mosques, the next available mosque for that city on the random list was chosen for the survey. Of the five mosques which presented different texts during the Audit Period, surveyors visited the mosque on a third visit and recorded the findings. Only those texts available on two of the three visits were recorded as present.

Prior to visiting a mosque, a surveyor would obtain as much open source information about the mosque as possible. There were two primary open sources used to obtain mosque information: the Internet and materials from or about the subject mosque that were gathered when surveyors previously visited other mosques. When the dominant language of the subject mosque was determined to be other than English, such as Arabic, Urdu, or Farsi, the surveyor who visited the mosque was fluent in that language.

Survey Procedure

Mosque visits were conducted during the Survey Period and the Audit Period. Each mosque visit included attending and observing a prayer service and surveying materials distributed and texts made available on mosque premises. Additionally, the imam (or senior lay leader if no imam was present) was asked what materials he would recommend for further study. The surveyors recorded their observations on an instrument designed for the survey.

Instrument[70]

The surveyor completed the survey instrument which included noting the location, date, time of visit, type of structure (stand alone, store front, etc.), estimated number of worshipers, whether any of the following texts were present and represented at least 10% of the texts made available: books authored by Abul A'la Maududi or Sayyid Qutb; *Sharia* legal texts *Fiqh-us-Sunnah* or *Riyad-us-Saliheen*, and the *Quranic* commentary of *Tafsir Ibn Kathir*. The surveyor also noted the presence of other materials including texts, pamphlets, handouts, audio and video recordings, titles, and authors (if available). When the materials were provided to the surveyor to retain, the materials were collected and retained for further research. When not, the surveyor noted the substance of the material to the extent possible.

A section of 13 items on strictness of *Sharia* adherence was completed, which included: segregation of the sexes, prayer line alignment, garb and beard of imam and of worshipers, all of which are objectively linked to *Sharia* adherence. In addition, a section of 22 items rated materials pertaining to violent *jihad*, which included the promotion of violent *jihad* or the encouragement to join a *jihad* organization, the collection of funds supporting *jihad*, the promotion of violence in the service of *Sharia*, the distribution of memorabilia glorifying violent *jihad*, the presence of materials indicating that imams known to promote violent *jihad* were invited to speak as guest imams at the mosque, and whether violent *jihad* materials were distributed for free. Where possible, the surveyor recorded whether the imam recommended such materials. If the imam either recommended or unenthusiastically recommended the study of any violence-positive materials to one who presented as a new worshipper, then the surveyor recorded the imam as having recommended violence-positive materials. If the imam either did not recommend the study of and violence-positive materials to one who presented as a new worshipper or instructed against the study of violence-positive materials, then the surveyor recorded that the imam did not recommend the study of violence-positive materials.

Variable Selection

Behavior Variables [71]

Behavior variables were selected according to those behaviors that doctrinal, traditional *Sharia* adherents contend were exhibited and commanded by Muhammad as recorded in the *Sunna*; and, later discussed and preserved in *Sharia* literature such as *Reliance of the Traveller* and *Fiqh-us-Sunnah*. The behaviors selected enjoy sanction by authoritative Islamic sources such as *Reliance of the Traveller*—which as previously noted conforms to the practice of orthodox Sunni Islam—and as such, the selected behaviors are among the most broadly accepted by legal practitioners of Islam and are not those behaviors practiced only by a rigid subgroup within Islam—*Salafists* for example.

The selected behaviors were observable in the mosque environment; and, therefore, empirically measurable. The behaviors noted as being *Sharia* adherent are outward manifestations of internalized beliefs or commitments as praxes. These *Sharia*-adherent behaviors were selected precisely because they constitute observable and measurable praxes of an orthodox form of Islam; and were not merely internalized, non-observable articles of faith.

Among the mosque behaviors observed and scored as *Sharia* adherent were: (a) women wearing the *hijab*; (b) gender segregation during mosque prayers; and (c) enforcement of prayer lines. As previously mentioned, the behaviors were selected to be scored as *Sharia* adherent because they both enjoy sanction in authoritative *Sharia* literature and are practices that enjoy broad acceptance within Islamic orthodoxy. For example, *Reliance of the Traveller* and *Fiqh-us-Sunnah* express agreement on the obligation of a woman to wear the *hijab*. Excerpts from both authorities outlining the woman's obligation to wear the *hijab* follow:

There is no such dispute over what constitutes a woman's '*aurah* [private parts/nakedness]. It is stated that her entire body is '*aurah* and must be covered, except her hands and face. ... Allah does not accept the prayer of an adult woman unless she is wearing a headcovering (*khimar*, *hijab*).[72]

The nakedness of a woman (O: even if a young girl) consists of the whole body except the face and hands. (N: The nakedness of woman is that which invalidates the prayer if exposed (dis:w23). [73] ... It is recommended for a woman to wear a covering over her head (*khimar*), a full length shift, and a heavy slip under it that does not cling to the body. [74]

The *Sharia* literature also expresses similar agreement on the requirement that the genders be separated during prayers. For example, both *Reliance of the Traveller* and *Fiqh-us-Sunnah* express a preference that women should pray at home rather than at the mosque. [75] However, both sources further agree that if women do pray in the mosque, then they should pray in lines separate from the men's prayer lines.[76] Additionally, authoritative *Sharia* literature agrees that the men's prayer lines should be straight, that the men should be close together in their prayer lines, and that the imam should enforce alignment of the men's prayer lines. [77]

The fact that not all Muslims adhere to a completely *Sharia*-adherent lifestyle and not all mosques conduct their religious services in conformity with normative *Sharia* dictates allowed surveyors to observe and record variations in *Sharia* adherence levels among the mosques surveyed and the individuals who attended these mosques. This study borrowed from the analytical framework suggested by *Jihad and the Islamic Law of War*, which describes and categorizes—from extreme secularism to extreme sectarianism—the adherence levels of the world's Muslims.[78] Muslims who embrace secularism and modernism are referred to as "secular fundamentalists" and "modern secularists." [79] Muslims who fit into these categories—at a minimum—view Western values and civilization as "the 'norm' to which the Islamic world should adjust itself." [80] The extreme sectarian end of the Islamic adherence spectrum are occupied by Muslims who fit into the categories of "Puritanical literalist," also referred to as *Salafist*, and sometimes in the less precise political terms "Islamist" and "*Takfiri*" or *jihadist*. [81] Muslims who would be categorized as Puritanical literalists seek to duplicate the state created by Muhammad and rid society of elements that are not consistent with the earliest Muslim community. [82] A *Takfiri* is a Muslim who views non-Muslims and those who—in his opinion—are insufficiently devout as unbelievers and legitimate targets for violence. [83] Resting in between these two extremes are the Muslims categorized as "Traditionalists" who look to *Sharia* as a legal and normative structure to inform them how to conduct their affairs—both their inward and outward lives, but who might not adhere to all of its dictates literally. [84]

Surveyors observed the conduct of mosque services and the behavioral choices of worshippers at a given mosque, and then scored the observed behaviors as *Sharia* adherent if the behaviors were objectively linked to normative *Sharia* behaviors, as recorded in the *Quran* or *Haddith* and confirmed as such by extant and authoritative *Sharia* literature, or were behaviors that are understood as being preferred behaviors among a consensus of *Sharia* scholars. Given that *Jihad and the Islamic Law of War* divided the Muslim world into two basic camps—(a) those who believe the West should conform to traditional Islamic or *Sharia* norms and who embrace and practice *Sharia* in their personal lives and (b) those who largely or entirely reject traditional Islamic or *Sharia* norms and do not practice *Sharia* in their personal lives—the surveyors scored the observed behaviors and conduct of mosque services as being either *Sharia* adherent or not *Sharia* adherent. The mosques where the highest degrees of *Sharia* adherence were observed were the *Salafi-Wahabi* and *Deobandi* mosques. The levels of *Sharia* adherence decreased until there were minimally observed or no indicia of what could be thought of as "traditional" or "orthodox" *Sharia* adherence.

Texts Selected

Texts were selected for scoring based on the fact that they either called for violent *jihad* against non-Muslims or because the texts called for hatred of "the other." For example, *Reliance of the Traveller* is a selected text because it makes explicit demands for *jihad* against non-Muslims. A sampling of quotes on *jihad* and the non-Muslim from *Reliance of the Traveller*:

The caliph (o25) makes war upon Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians (N: provided he has first invited them to enter Islam in faith and practice, and if they will not, then invited them to enter the social order of Islam by paying the non-Muslim poll tax (*jizya*, def: o11.4)... [85]

The caliph fights all other peoples until they become Muslim (O: because they are not a people with a Book, nor honored as such, and are not permitted to settle with paying the poll tax (*jizya*)). [86]

The *Fiqh-us-Sunnah* and *Tafsir Ibn Kathir* were among the other books which were selected for scoring based on their promotion of violence against and hatred of "the other." A sample quote from both *Fiqh-us-Sunnah* and *Tafsir Ibn Kathir* follows:

Ibn 'Abbas reported that the Prophet, upon whom be peace, said, 'The ties of Islam and the principles of the religion are three, and whoever leaves one of them becomes an unbeliever, and his blood becomes lawful: testifying that there is no god except Allah, the obligatory prayers, and the fast of Ramadan.' (Related by Abu Ya'la with a hassan chain.) Another narration states, 'If anyone leaves one of [the three principles], by Allah he becomes an unbeliever and no voluntary deeds or recompense will be accepted from him, and his blood and wealth become lawful.' This is a clear indication that such a person is to be killed. [87]

Perform *jihad* against the disbelievers with the sword and be harsh with the hypocrites with words, and this is the *jihad* performed against them. [88]

Texts authored by Maududi and Qutb and similar materials, such as pamphlets and texts published and disseminated by the Muslim Brotherhood, were selected in part because these materials strongly advocate the use of violence as a means to establish an Islamic state. Maududi espoused that it was legitimate to direct violent *jihad* against "infidel colonizers" in order to gain independence and spread *Sharia*-centric Islam. [89] In the below excerpt from *Jihad in Islam*, Maududi explained the Islamic duty to employ force in pursuit of a *Sharia*-based order:

These [Muslim] men who propagate religion are not mere preachers or missionaries, but the functionaries of God, (so that they may be witnesses for the people), and it is their duty to wipe out oppression, mischief, strife, immorality, high handedness and unlawful exploitation from the world by force of arms. [90]

The ideas in Qutb's *Milestones* serve as the political and ideological backbone of the current global *jihad* movement. [91] In the quote below from *Milestones*, Qutb explains that violence must be employed against those who stand in the way of Islam's expansion:

If someone does this [prevents others from accepting Islam], then it is the duty of Islam to fight him until either he is killed or until he declares his submission. [92]

While works by Maududi and Qutb, as well as similar materials, were selected because of their strong endorsements of violence, these works were also selected because they help to contemporize the view that violent *jihad* is a legitimate vehicle for Islamic expansionism. This is especially true of Qutb whose ideas profoundly influenced the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda, the latter through its co-founder, Ayman Al-Zawahiri. [93]

These severe-rated violence-positive materials by Maududi, Qutb, and others distinguish themselves from the moderate-rated violence-positive materials because they are not Islamic legal texts per se, but rather polemical works seeking to advance a politicized Islam through violence, if necessary. Further, the authors of these severe-rated materials were not recognized *Sharia* scholars. Works such as *Tafsir Ibn Kathir*, *Reliance of the Traveller*, and *Fiqh-us-Sunnah* are Islamic legal and exegetical resources written by respected *Sharia* scholars. *Tafsir Ibn Kathir*, *Reliance of the Traveller*, *Fiqh-us-Sunnah* and similar works contain passages exhorting readers to commit violence against non-Muslims as a means to further an expansionist view of Islam. However, they also contain detailed instructions regarding how a Muslim should order his or her daily routine in order to demonstrate his or her piety to the Muslim community and to Islam's god.

This is especially true of the *Fiqh-us-Sunnah* which focused primarily on the internal Muslim community, family and individual believer, and did not frame *jihad* as an open-ended, divinely ordained imperative. Relatively speaking, the *Fiqh-us-Sunnah* expressed a very restrained view of violent *jihad* in comparison to the other rated materials. The text does not explicitly call for violent *jihad* against the West even though the text understands Western influence of Islamic governments as a force that is destructive to Islam itself. [94] The moderate-rated exegetical and legal materials were written by respected *Sharia* scholars—and although they express positive views toward the use of violence against “the other”—there may be legitimate, non-violent religious purposes to support their presence on mosque premises. By contrast, the severe-rated materials by Maududi, Qutb, and others were not primarily concerned with instructing Muslims on the mundane aspects of daily living, but rather on imparting a global view of Islam through polemical works extolling violent *jihad*.

Data Analysis

The first round of analysis was descriptive to allow presenting a profile of the mosques. The second round of analysis examined the association between *Sharia* adherence and key mosque, imam, and worshiper characteristics. The third round of analysis examined the association of texts recommended by the imam for study and the same key characteristics. To facilitate conducting the above analyses, a three-point scale of strictness of adherence of texts to *Sharia* and advocating the use of violence in the pursuit of a *Sharia*-based political order, including praising the use of violent *jihad* against the West and the use of violence to implement *Sharia*, was created. Based on an empirical analysis of texts (available upon request from authors), from most severe to least severe texts: (1) texts authored by Abul A'la Maududi, Sayyid Qutb, or other similar texts, and the *Sharia* legal text *Riyad-us-Saliheen*; (2) *Quranic* commentary of *Tafsir Ibn Kathir* and the *Sharia* legal text *Fiqh-us-Sunnah*; and (3) having no such texts. The association of the scale and *Sharia* adherence items were then examined using crosstabs with chi-square and a test of linearity for ordinal variables and analysis of variance for continuous variables. Similarly, we examined the association of key characteristics and whether or not the imam or lay leader recommended such materials that advocate the use of violence in the pursuit of a *Sharia*-based political order.

Results[95]

Violence-positive materials were found in a very large majority (81%) of the 100 mosques surveyed. Violence-positive materials were more likely to be found in mosques whose communal prayer practices, imams, and adult male worshipers exhibited greater indicia of *Sharia*-adherent behaviors than were their less *Sharia*-adherent counterparts. Moreover, the mosques that contained violence-positive materials were many times more likely than mosques that did not contain violence-positive materials to engage in several behaviors that promoted violence and violent *jihad*.


Association of Sharia Observance in Mosque Prayer Observance and Imam Appearance to the Presence of Violence-Positive Materials and Whether the Imam Recommended the Study of Violence-Positive Materials

Mosques that conducted their communal prayers in accordance with *Sharia* advocated norms were more likely to contain violence-positive materials, both moderate and severe, than those mosques whose communal prayer practices did not conform to *Sharia* norms.


Almost all of the mosques that engaged in gender segregation during prayer service, as advocated by *Sharia*, contained violence-positive texts on their premises. Sixty percent (60%) of the mosques that engaged in gender segregation contained severe materials; 35% contained moderate materials; and 5% contained no violence-positive materials. Mosques that did not segregate women from men during communal prayer were more likely than mosques that segregated men from women to contain no materials (26%); and were less likely to contain moderate materials (27%) or severe materials (47%).

In addition to containing violence-positive materials, mosques that engaged in gender segregation during communal prayer services were more likely to be led by imams who recommended that worshipers study violence-positive materials than were mosques that did not engage in gender segregation during communal prayer. Ninety-four percent (94%) of the imams at mosques that engaged in gender segregation recommended that worshipers study violence-positive materials; while only 6% did not recommend that worshipers study violence-positive materials. Imams who led mosques that did not engage in gender segregation were less likely than the imams of mosques that segregated men from women during prayers to recommend that worshipers study violence-positive materials. Eighty percent (80%) of the imams who led congregations that did not engage in gender segregation during prayers recommended that worshipers study violence-positive materials; and 20% of these imams did not recommend that worshipers study such materials.

Association of Gender Segregation During Mosque Prayer and the Severity of Materials Found on Mosques' Premises




Association of Gender Segregation During Mosque Prayer and Whether the Imams Recommended the Study of Violence-Positive Materials




Mosques that had either a layperson or an imam enforce alignment of the men's prayer lines were more likely to contain violence-positive materials than were mosques that did not enforce the alignment of men's prayer lines. Of the mosques that enforced alignment of men's prayer lines, 59% contained severe materials; 37% contained moderate materials; and 4% contained no violence-positive materials. Forty-two percent (42%) of the mosques that paid little attention to men's prayer line alignment contained severe materials; 22% contained moderate materials; and 36% contained no materials.

Mosques that enforced alignment of men's prayer lines were more likely to be led by an imam who recommended that worshipers study violence positive materials than were mosques that did not enforce men's prayer line alignment. Imams of 96% of the mosques that enforced men's prayer line alignment recommended the study of violence-positive materials and only 4% did not recommend the study of such materials. Imams at 72% of the mosques that did not enforce alignment of men's prayer lines recommended that worshipers study violence-positive materials while 28% of the imams at these mosques did not recommend that worshipers study violence-positive materials.


Association of Alignment of Men's Prayer Lines and the Severity of Materials Found on Mosques' Premises



Association of Alignment of Men's Prayer Lines and Whether the Imams Recommended the Study of Violence-Positive Materials



Similar to gender segregation during prayer service and enforcement of men's prayer lines, the imams' choice of beard was also related to the presence of violence-positive materials on mosque property and whether the imam would recommend the study of violence-positive materials. Sixty-one percent (61%) of mosques led by an imam who wore a Sunna beard contained severe materials; 33% contained moderate materials; and 7% contained no violence-positive materials. Mosques led by an imam who did not wear a Sunna beard were less likely to contain severe materials and more likely to contain no violence-positive materials than the mosques led by imams who wore a Sunna beard. Forty-six percent (46%) of mosques led by an imam who did not wear a Sunna beard contained severe materials; 28% contained moderate materials; and 26% contained no violence-positive materials. Imams who wore a Sunna beard were more likely to recommend that worshipers study violence-positive materials than were imams who did not wear a Sunna beard. Of the imams who wore a Sunna beard, 93% recommended that worshipers study violence-positive materials and 7% did not recommend worshipers study violence-positive materials. Seventy-eight percent (78%) of imams who did not wear a Sunna beard recommended that worshipers study violence-positive materials; and 22% did not recommend worshipers study violence-positive materials.



Other measures of the imams' *Sharia* adherence—whether the imam wore a head covering; whether the imam wore traditional, or non-Western garb; and whether an imam wore his watch on his right wrist—were also indicative of whether a mosque would be more likely to contain violence-positive materials than mosques where the imam did not practice these *Sharia*-adherent behaviors. However, the relationship between these behaviors and the presence of violence-positive materials was not statistically significant.

Mosques led by imams who wore a religious head covering were more likely to contain violence-positive materials than mosques that were led by imams who did not wear a religious head covering. Of the mosques led by imams who wore a religious head covering, 60% contained severe materials; 26% contained moderate materials; and 14% contained no violence-positive materials. Of the mosques led by imams who did not wear a religious head covering, 46% contained severe materials; 35% contained moderate materials; and 20% contained no violence-positive materials.

Mosques led by imams who wore traditional Islamic clothing were more likely to contain violence-positive materials than were mosques led by imams who wore Western clothing. Of mosques led by imams who wore traditional Islamic clothing, 62% contained severe materials; 29% contained moderate materials; and 10% contained no violence-positive materials. Of mosques led by imams who wore Western clothing, 43% contained severe materials; 32% contained moderate materials; and 25% no violence-positive materials.

Mosques led by imams who wore a watch on their right wrist were more likely to contain violence-positive materials than mosques led by imams who did not wear a watch on their right wrist. Of the mosques led by imams who wore a watch on their right wrist, 42% contained severe materials; 50% contained moderate materials; and 8% contained no violence-positive materials. Of the mosques led by imams who did not wear a watch on their right wrist, 54% contained severe materials; 28% contained moderate materials; and 18% contained no violence-positive materials.

These same measures of *Sharia* adherence by a mosque's imam were also indicative of whether the imam would recommend that a worshiper study violence-positive materials. Of the three behaviors, the relationship between an imam wearing traditional Islamic garb and whether an imam would recommend the study of violence-positive materials was the only statistically significant relationship. The relationship between both (a) an imam wearing a head covering and (b) an imam wearing a watch on his right hand and whether an imam would recommend the study of violence-positive materials was not statistically significant.

Imams who wore head coverings were more likely to recommend that a worshiper study violence-positive materials than were imams who did not wear head coverings. Ninety percent (90%) of imams who wore head coverings recommended that worshipers study violence-positive materials. Eighty percent (80%) of imams who did not wear head coverings recommended the study of violence-positive materials.


Imams who wore traditional Islamic clothing were more likely to recommend the study of violence-positive materials than were imams who wore Western garb. Of the imams who wore traditional Islamic dress, 92% recommended the study of violence-positive materials. Seventy-seven percent (77%) of the imams who wore Western garb recommended worshipers study violence-positive materials.

The severity of violence-positive materials present on mosque premises increased as the percentage of adult male worshipers who exhibited *Sharia*-adherent appearance characteristics increased. In mosques where no violence-positive material was found, an average of 14% of the men wore beards. An average of 36% of the men wore beards at mosques where only moderate materials were found; and an average of 48% of the men wore beards at mosques that contained severe materials.

In mosques where no violence-positive materials were found, an average of 16% of the men wore religious hats. An average of 34% of the men wore religious hats at mosques where only moderate materials were found; and an average of 47% of the men wore religious hats at mosques that contained severe materials.


A negative relationship was shown to exist between adult male worshipers exhibiting a Western or assimilative appearance the presence of violence-positive materials on mosque premises. In mosques where no violence-positive materials were found, an average of 73% of the men wore Western garb. An average of 35% of the men wore Western garb at mosques that contained only moderate materials; and an average of 34% of the men wore Western garb at those mosques that contained severe materials.

Association of Adult Male Worshiper Characteristics and the Severity of Violence-Positive Materials Found on Mosques' Premises



The mosques where imams recommended the study of violence-positive materials were marked by higher percentages of adult male worshipers who exhibited *Sharia*-adherent appearance characteristics and lower percentages of adult males who wore Western, assimilative clothing than those mosques where the imam did not recommend the study of violence-positive materials. In mosques led by an imam who recommended the study of violence-positive materials, 44% of the adult male worshipers wore beards; 42% wore religious hats; and 34% wore Western clothing. In mosques led by an imam who did not recommend the study of violence-positive materials, 13% of the adult males worshipers wore beards; 15% wore religious hats; and 87% wore Western garb.

Association of Adult Male Worshiper Characteristics and Whether the Imams Recommended the Study of Violence-Positive Materials



Measures of *Sharia* adherence by non-adult male worshipers that failed to show either a relationship or a statistically significant relationship between the behavior and the presence of violence-positive materials on premises were: (a) the percentage of women with the modern hijab (as opposed to the traditional hijab or the niqab); (b) the percentage of girls with the hijab; and (b) the percentage of boys with a head covering. In mosques with no violence-positive materials, 57% of the women wore the modern hijab. Thirty-eight percent (38%) of the women wore the modern hijab in mosques that contained moderate materials; and 42% of the women wore the modern hijab in mosques that contained severe materials.

Twenty-nine percent (29%) of the girls in attendance at mosques that contained no violence-positive materials wore the hijab. Fourteen percent (14%) of the girls at mosques that contained moderate materials wore the hijab; and 36% of the girls who attended mosques that contained severe materials wore the hijab.

Of the boys in attendance at mosques that contained no violence-positive materials, 14% wore a head covering. Twenty-four percent (24%) of the boys who attended the mosques that contained moderate materials wore a head covering; and 32% of the boys who attended the mosques that contained severe materials wore a head covering.

The percentage of women in attendance at mosque who wore a modern hijab (as opposed to the traditional hijab or the niqab) showed a statistically significant negative relationship to whether the imam would recommend the study of violence positive literature. At mosques led by imams who did not recommend the study of violence-positive materials, 70% of the women wore the non-*Sharia*-adherent modern hijab; while 41% of the women wore the modern hijab at mosques led by imams who recommended worshipers study violence-positive materials.

Both the percentage of girls who wore the hijab and the percentage of boys who wore head coverings demonstrated a statistically significant relationship with whether an imam would recommend the study of violence-positive materials. However, neither of these relationships were statistically significant. Twenty percent (20%) of the girls wore a hijab at mosques that were led by an imam who did not recommend the study of violence-positive materials; and 29% of the girls wore a hijab at mosques led by an imam who recommended the study of violence-positive materials. Zero percent (0%) of the boys wore a head covering at mosques that were led by an imam who did not recommend the study of violence-positive materials; and 30% of the boys wore a head covering at mosques that were led by imams who recommended the study of violence-positive materials.


Association of Presence and Strictness of Materials Found on Mosque Premises to the Promotion of Violence and Violent Jihad

The presence of violence-positive materials on mosque premises was correlated to several indicia of whether the mosque would promote violence and violent jihad. Of the mosques that contained severe materials, 100% were led by an imam who recommended that worshipers study violent materials; 100% promoted violent jihad; 98% promoted the financial support of terror; 98% promoted the establishment of the Caliphate in the United States; 100% praised terror against the West; and 76% invited guest speakers known to have promoted violent jihad.

The observed incidences of the promotion of violence and violent jihad were not substantially different for the mosques that contained only moderate materials. Of the mosques that contained only moderate materials, 97% were led by an imam who recommended the study of violent materials; 97% promoted violent jihad; 97% promoted the financial support of terror; 97% promoted the establishment of the Caliphate in the United States; 97% praised terror against the West; and 60% invited guest speakers known to have promoted violent jihad.

Mosques that contained no violence-positive materials on their premises were substantially less likely to engage in several measures of violence- and violent-jihad-promoting behaviors than were mosques that contained such materials. Of the mosques that contained no violence-positive materials, 18% were led by an imam who recommended the study of violent materials; 5% promoted violent jihad; 5% promoted the financial support of terror; 5% promoted the establishment of the Caliphate in the United States; 5% praised terror against the West; and 5% invited guest speakers known to have promoted violent jihad.

Association of Severity of Materials Found on Mosques' Premises and the Mosques' Promotion of Violence and Violent Jihad



Either no relationship existed or no statistically significant relationship existed between the presence of materials found on mosque premises and whether mosques: (a) promoted joining a terrorist organization; (b) collected money openly for a known terrorist organization; and (c) distributed memorabilia that featured jihadists or terrorist organizations. Of the mosques that contained severe materials, 10% promoted joining a terrorist organization; 8% collected money openly for known terrorist organizations; and 12% distributed memorabilia that featured jihadists or terrorist organizations.

Of the mosques that contained moderate materials, 7% promoted joining a terrorist organization; 3% collected money openly for known terrorist organizations; and 7% distributed memorabilia that featured jihadists or terrorist organizations.

Of the mosques that contained no violence-positive materials, 5% promoted joining a terrorist organization; 5% collected money openly for known terrorist organizations; and 5% distributed memorabilia that featured jihadists or terrorist organizations.

Validity of Variable Selection

While violence-positive literature was found at both mosques that manifested the more strict, orthodox *Sharia*-adherent behaviors and their non-*Sharia*-adherent counterparts, violence-positive literature was more likely to be found in those mosques whose behaviors conformed to orthodox, *Sharia*-adherent Islam. The survey results report a modest statistically significant correlation between the presence of violence-positive literature in mosques and the presence of a greater percentage of adult male worshippers who exhibit *Sharia*-adherent behavioral characteristics.

In addition to this modest correlation between *Sharia* adherence and the presence of violence-positive literature, the presence of violence-positive literature was also related to whether mosque leadership would engage in certain behaviors that are promotive of violence and violent *jihad*. Imams of mosques that contained violence-positive literature were more likely to recommend that worshippers study violence-promoting texts than were imams of mosques where no violence-positive literature was found. Additionally, mosques where violence-positive literature was present were more likely to invite guest speakers who are known to have promoted violent *jihad* than were the mosques where no violent literature was present. The fact that the imams in the *Sharia*-adherent mosques, as measured by the behavior of the worshippers, were more likely to recommend the violence-positive literature and the fact that these mosques were more likely to have invited guest speakers known to have promoted violent *jihad* further confirms the variable selection.

The authors of this survey are not asserting that there is no legitimate reason for mosques to have the surveyed texts available on mosque premises. However, the results are noteworthy precisely because this correlation with violence-positive literature combined with its promotion at *Sharia*-adherent mosques was almost non-existent in mosques typified by more assimilative behaviors.

The Role of the Sharia-Centric Mosque in Supporting the Violent Jihad

This survey serves as empirical support for anecdotal studies that have noted a connection between highly *Sharia*-adherent mosques and the recruitment of those among their respective worshippers who commit political violence in the name of Islam. [96] The mosque leadership of some highly *Sharia*-adherent mosques with known terrorist connections have praised suicide bombers and the mosques have sold literature that advocated violence against disfavored groups. [97]

This survey's results help to provide insight into the role that *Sharia*-adherent behaviors possibly play in defining group identities, creating an us-versus-them outlook, and projecting violence against outgroups such as the West and non-Muslims, which is mirrored by the *Sharia* literature found in the mosques prone to violent literature. [98] The mosques where greater indicia of *Sharia*-adherent behaviors were observed were more likely to contain materials that conveyed a positive attitude toward employing violent *jihad* against the West and non-Muslims than were mosques where more Western, assimilative behaviors were observed. These materials may be instrumental in drawing a fault line between the ingroup of devout, *Sharia*-adherent Muslims and the outgroup comprised of non-Muslims and those Muslims who embrace Western values.

The fact that "spiritual sanctioners" who help individuals become progressively more radicalized are known to be connected to highly *Sharia*-adherent mosques [99] is another concern in addition to the presence of violence-positive texts at these mosques. The imams at *Sharia*-adherent mosques are far more likely to recommend that their worshippers study materials that promote violence. A recommendation from a respected religious leader that a worshipper study violence-promoting legal and normative literature may legitimize the material's message that it is acceptable to use violence against outgroup members. Additionally, receiving permission from a religious leader to immerse oneself in materials that promote violence against outgroup members may serve as tacit permission to employ violence against an outgroup.

Mosques where greater indicia of *Sharia*-adherent behaviors are observed also manifest behaviors that are at least sympathetic to violent *jihad* and those who commit violent *jihad*. Mosques where the greatest indicia of *Sharia*-adherent behaviors were observed were the mosques most likely to contain materials holding positive views of violent *jihad*. In almost every instance, the imams at these mosques where violence-positive materials were available recommended that worshippers at their mosques study texts that promote violence. These same highly *Sharia*-adherent mosques where violence-positive materials were present—almost without exception—engaged in activities that promoted violent *jihad* and were several times more likely to invite guest preachers who were known to have supported violent *jihad* than were mosques in which violence-positive materials were not available.

Non-Sharia-Centricism and "Reform" Islam


The authors recognize—and the survey demonstrates—that there are mosques and mosque-going Muslims who are interested in a non-*Sharia*-centric Islam where tolerance of the other, rather than hatred of the other, at least as evidenced by the absence of violence-positive and *jihad*-promoting literature is the norm. The survey helps to confirm previous anecdotal [100] and less rigorous empirical efforts [101] that have observed that a majority of the mosques in the U.S. have been inundated with Salafist violent literature and Saudi-trained imams and that only a minority of mosques eschew all forms of violent literature and dogma. These exceptional mosques where violence-positive literature were not recommended exhibited significantly fewer indicia of orthodox, *Sharia*-adherent behaviors than those mosques where such literature was recommended for study and were also significantly less likely to promote violent *jihad* or invite speakers known to have promoted violent *jihad* than mosques that were typified by *Sharia*-adherent behaviors.

Discussion of the Broader Policy Implications

Prior Surveys and the Search for Predictive Variables

Recent polling surveys of several predominantly Muslim countries present a picture of a global Muslim community that is in conflict about support for employing violence against civilians and the groups who commit violence against civilians. On the one hand, an April 2007 survey by WorldPublicOpinion.org revealed that majorities in Morocco (57%), Egypt (77%), Pakistan (81%), and Indonesia (84%) believe that attacks on civilians designed to achieve political goals are never justified. [102] Strong majorities in these countries, except for Pakistan, believe groups that employ violence against civilians do so in contradiction to Islamic tenets. Strikingly, in Pakistan, only 30% of the respondents agree with the proposition that groups violate Islamic principles when they employ violence against civilians. However, 66% of Moroccans agreed with the proposition; as did 88% of Egyptians; and 65% of Indonesians. [103] It is noteworthy that the survey questionnaire did not make it clear whether the target civilians were Muslims or non-Muslims.

While support for political violence in the survey was a mixed bag, the survey did find that majorities in each country favored (a) strict application of *Sharia* law in every Islamic country and (b) keeping Western values out of Islamic countries. Both of these attitudes are consistent with the goals of Al Qaeda and were understood as aligned with Al Qaeda by the respondents: [104]



These survey results appear to be supported by a more recent 2010 Pew Survey, which surveyed Muslims in Indonesia, Egypt, Nigeria, Jordan, Pakistan, Lebanon, and Turkey. The Pew Survey found that very large majorities in each of these countries (except Turkey) support a dominant role for Islam in politics. [105] Even more significantly, large segments of the populations in these countries favor *Sharia* criminal punishments, including capital punishment for those who choose to leave Islam (i.e., apostasy): [106]

Views of Harsh Punishments

% Favor

	Stoning people who commit adultery	Whippings/cutting off of hands for theft and robbery	Death penalty for people who leave the Muslim religion
	%	%	%
Turkey	16	13	5
Egypt	82	77	84
Jordan	70	58	86
Lebanon	23	13	6
Indonesia	42	36	30
Pakistan	82	82	76
Nigeria	56	65	51

Asked of Muslims only.
PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q108b-d.

A recent study by Andrew F. March in the field of political theory pursued an inquiry into whether Islamic doctrine would allow Muslims to cooperate socially with non-Muslims and sincerely affirm liberal citizenship, as that term is understood in its Western democratic sense. March found grounds for an overlapping consensus based on a study of the *Quran* as well as works by some contemporary Muslim jurists and exegetes, but he also noted that there exists contemporary and prominent *Sharia* scholars who cite to authoritative texts holding that Muslims are either at war with non-Muslims or, at best, are in a state devoid of any obligation to socially cooperate with non-Muslims. [107] Additionally, March noted that the underpinnings of his theoretical overlapping consensus might in fact be negated by empirical evidence showing that a large percentage of Muslims were unaware of [or reject] the theological or philosophical arguments that militate toward a moral affirmation of liberal citizenship. [108]

The results of both the World Public Opinion Survey and the Pew 2010 Survey suggest that there are large segments of the Muslim world, representing demographics which rival the West, that reject quite emphatically the notion of liberal citizenship, freedom of worship, and other political mores taken for granted in the West. These surveys, however, report the attitudes of residents in non-Western countries which enforce *Sharia* to varying degrees. We might expect Muslims in the West—who are immersed in Western culture, values, and representative government—to express different attitudes than their counterparts in the Middle East, Far East, and North Africa.

Unfortunately, the results of this survey suggests that Islam—at least as it is generally practiced in mosques across the United States—continues to manifest a resistance to a sufficiently tolerant religio-legal framework that would allow its followers to make a sincere affirmation of Western citizenship. This survey provides empirical support for the view that mosques across the U.S., as institutional and social settings for mosque-going Muslims, provide a milieu resistant to, the legal, theological, or political arguments that make political, civic, and social cooperation within a secular constitutional political order ideal.

This Survey's Limitations

This survey only examined the presence of *Sharia*-adherent behaviors, the presence of violence-positive materials in mosques, whether an imam would promote the study of violence-positive materials, and whether an imam would use his mosque as forum to promote violent *jihad*. The authors note that most of the content of the texts used to rank strictness of dogma and violence in the moderate category of violence in the cause of *Sharia* includes material that does not relate to these topics and incorporates a host of other theological matters. This survey sampling of mosques also has several limitations. Since there is no central body to which all mosques belong, it was difficult to be certain that our sampling universe list was complete. Additionally, despite our preparatory efforts, many mosques were no longer at their address of record. This may have introduced bias into our sampling, although we found no evidence of any systemic distortions.

Further, the results of this survey do not tell us the percentage of American Muslims that actually attend mosques with any regularity, or at all, nor does it tell us what relative percentage of all American Muslims present as *Sharia*-adherent and non-*Sharia*-adherent. Moreover, although this study captured whether imams at highly *Sharia*-adherent mosques would recommend studying violence-positive materials and would utilize their mosques for behaviors supportive of violent *jihad*, the survey did not capture the individual mosque attendees' attitudes toward violence and violent *jihad*. It is reasonable to conclude, the authors believe, that the worshippers at the more *Sharia*-adherent mosques, where the imam is more likely to promote the violent literature and *jihad* generally, are more inclined to be sympathetic to the message conveyed in the violent and *jihad* literature than their counterparts who attend the lesser *Sharia*-adherent mosques where the material is either not present or the imam does not promote it. A follow-up survey of individual mosque attendees would provide better insight regarding the relationship, if any, between *Sharia*-adherence on the individual or mosque level and an individual's attitude toward violence and violent *jihad*.

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Notes:

[1] These survey results were first published in "Shari'a and Violence in American Mosques," *Middle East Quarterly*, Summer 2011, pp. 59-72, available at <http://www.meforum.org/2931/american-mosques>. The authors would like to acknowledge the **Center for Security Policy** for its funding the largest portion of the survey costs. The authors would also like to acknowledge **Professor Jonathan Rabinowitz**, of Bar-Ilan University's Louis and Gabi Weisfeld School of Social Work, for his assistance in data and statistical analysis, and **Pete Rowe, Esq.**, for his invaluable and dedicated contribution in finalizing this article for publication.

[2] See Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (University of Pennsylvania Press 2004) and James A. Piazza, *Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages*, 18 *Terrorism and Political Violence* 159, 159-77 (2006).

[3] Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* 73-74 (University of Pennsylvania Press 2004) and James A. Piazza, *Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages*, 18 *Terrorism and Political Violence* 159, 170-71 (2006).

[4] Paul Gill, *A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing*, 1(2) *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 142, 142-59 (2007).

[5] *Id.* at 157.

[6] See *Id.* at 142-159.

[7] Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* 93 (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

[8] *Id.*

[9] See Mitchell D. Silber & Arvin Bhatt, *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat* (New York City Police Department 2007).

[10] See *Id.*

[11] Sageman, *supra* note 1, at 63.

[12] *Id.* at 115.

[13] *Id.* at 143-44.

[14] Susan Sachs, *A Muslim Missionary Group Draws New Scrutiny in U.S.*, N.Y. Times, July 14, 2003, and avail. at <http://www.hvk.org/articles/0703/113.html>, accessed December 8, 2010 (discussing the *Tablighi Jamaat* practice of setting up residence by sleeping in mosques and the *Tablighi Jamaat* connection to American Taliban John Walker Lindh) and Salah Uddin Shoaib Choudhury, *Tablighi Jamaat—Preaching Jihad*, *American Chronicle*, Oct. 14, 2009, and avail. at <http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/123722>, accessed December 8, 2010 (discussing the *Tablighi Jamaat* connection with members of an Oregon cell that plotted to blow up synagogues, Lyman Harris, who planned to blow up the Brooklyn Bridge, and Jose Padilla, who planned to set off a 'dirty bomb' in an American city).

[15] Silber and Bhatt, *supra* note 8, at 38.

[16] *Id.* at 10, 38.

[17] See *id.* at 41-42 (discussing the role of “spiritual sanctioners” Imam Abdul Nacer Benbrinka in the Melbourne and Sydney, Australia terror cells and Qayyum Abdul Jamaal in the Toronto, Canada terror cell) and Ethan Sacks, *Who is Anwar al-Awlaki? Imam Contacted by Fort Hood Gunman has Long Radical Past*, N.Y. Daily News, Nov. 11, 2009, and avail. at <http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2009/11/11/2009-11-11-who-is-anwar-alawlaki-imam-contacted-by-fort-hood-gunman-nidal-malik-hasan-has-l.html>, accessed January 2, 2011 (discussing Anwar Al Awlaki’s connections to several 9/11 hijackers and accused Fort Hood terrorist, Nidal Malik Hassan).

[18] Silber and Bhatt, *supra* note 8, at 38.

[19] See Quintan Wiktorowicz, *A Genealogy of Radical Islam*, 28 *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 75, 75-97 (2005).

[20] *Id.* at 76-77.

[21] *Id.* at 90.

[22] Martin Harrow, *The Complexity of Transnational Islamist Militancy: Why Islamist Militancy Causes Islamist Militancy*, Paper Presented at ISA Conference: Complexity Science in International Relations, San Francisco, California (March 25, 2008).

[23] See Sageman, *supra* note 1 and Piazza, *supra* note 1.

[24] Jeremy Ginges, et al., *Religion and Support for Suicide Attacks*, 20(2) *Psychology Science* 224, 224-30 (2009).

[25] *Id.*

[26] *Id.*

[27] *Id.* at 230.

[28] *Id.*

[29] Saba Mahmood, *Rehearsed Spontaneity and the Conventionality of Ritual: Disciplines of Salat*, 28(4) *American Ethnologist* 827, 830(Nov. 2004).

[30] Daniel Winchester, *Embodying the Faith: Religious Practice and the Making of Muslim Moral Habitus*, 4(86) *Social Forces* 1753, 1765 (June 2008) and 2 Sayid Sabiq, *Fiqh-us-Sunnah* English Transl. 67-74 (American Trust Publications 1991).

[31] Ginges et al., *supra* note 24, at 225-26.

[32] *Id.*

[33] Azman Ismail, *Sharia Framework for Takaful* 1, avail. at http://www.takaful.coop/doc_store/takaful/Shariah%20Framework%20of%20Takaful.pdf, accessed Nov. 1, 2010.

[34] Azman Ismail, *Sharia Framework for Takaful*, avail. at http://www.takaful.coop/doc_store/takaful/Shariah%20Framework%20of%20Takaful.pdf, accessed Nov. 1, 2010.

[35] GlobalSecurity.org, *Sunni Islam*, avail. at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam-sunni.htm> accessed Nov. 1, 2010.

[36] Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* 68 at fn.1 (Oxford University Press 1982).

[37] 1 Choucri Cardahi, *Law in the Middle East* 341-42 (The Middle East Institute 1955).

[38] The Royal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, *The Three Points of the Amman Message (2007)*, avail. at http://ammanmessage.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=91&Itemid=74, accessed Nov. 21, 2010.

[39] The Royal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, *Jihad and the Islamic Law of War* 57 (2007), and avail. at <http://ammanmessage.com/media/jihad.pdf>, last accessed Nov. 6, 2010.

[40] Wael B. Hallaq, *Shari’a: Theory, Practice, Transformations*, 72-78 (Cambridge University Press 2009).

[41] James Thornback, *The Portrayal of Sharia in Ontario*, 10(1) *Appeal: Review of Current Law and Law Reform* (citing to D.S. El Alami & D. Hinchcliffe, *Islamic Marriage and Divorce Laws of the Arab World* 3 (Klewer Law International 1996).

[42] *Id.* (citing to D.S. El Alami & D. Hinchcliffe, *Islamic Marriage and Divorce Laws of the Arab World* 3 (Klewer Law International 1996)).

[43] Ahmad Ibn Naqib Al-Misri, *Reliance of the Traveller and Tools for the Worshipper* vii-Introduction (Sheikh Nuh Ha Mim Keller trans., 1991) and avail. at <http://www.shafiifiqh.com/maktabah/relianceoftraveller.pdf>, accessed Nov. 21, 2010.

[44] Sheyk al-Akbar Mahmud Shaltut, Head of the al-Azhar University, *Fatwa Announced July 6, 1959* and avail. at <http://www.freewebs.com/islamic-site/pic/azhar.jpg>, accessed Nov. 6, 2010.

[45] The Royal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, *The Amman Message* 16-18 (2007) and avail. at <http://ammanmessage.com/media/Amman-Message-pdf-booklet-v-2-5-2-08.pdf>, accessed Nov. 6, 2010.

[46] Wael B. Hallaq, *Shari’a: Theory, Practice, Transformations* 113-24 (Cambridge University Press 2009).

[47] *Id.* at 72-78.

[48] Sageman, *supra* note 1, at 1.

[49] The Royal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, *supra*, note 39, at 60.

[50] *Id.*

[51] Sageman, *supra* note 1, at 2.

[52] Andrew F. March, *Islam and Liberal Citizenship: The Search for an Overlapping Consensus* 116 (Oxford University Press 2009) and See Sageman, *supra* note 1, at 2.

[53] March, *supra* note 52, at 117 and Sageman, *supra* note 1, at 2.

[54] March, *supra* note 52, at 117 and Sageman, *supra* note 1, at 2.

[55] March, *supra* note 52, at 119.

[56] The Royal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, *supra* note 39, at 64-66.

[57] *Id.* at 66.

[58] See e.g. 1 Hafiz Ibn Kathir, *Tafsir Ibn Kathir* Abridged, 596 (Darussalam Publishers 2000); 3 Hafiz Ibn Kathir, *Tafsir Ibn Kathir* Abridged, 170 (Darussalam Publishers 2000); and 4 Hafiz Ibn Kathir, *Tafsir Ibn Kathir* Abridged, 376 (Darussalam Publishers 2000).

[59] See David Yerushalmi, *Selected Classical Sources on Jihad (Law Offices of David Yerushalmi 2009)*, and avail. at <http://www.saneworks.us/uploads/application/52.pdf>, accessed Nov. 6, 2010.

[60] *Id.* at 2-3.

[61] *Id.* at 1-2.

[62] Mary Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror*, 116 (Yale Univ. Press 2006).

[63] Al Azhar University, *Certification of Reliance of the Traveller* (1991), and avail. at <http://www.exmuslim.org/Certificate%20Al-Azhar%20Reliance%20of%20the%20Traveller.pdf>, accessed Nov. 7, 2010.

[64] David Yerushalmi, *supra* note 59, at 6.

[65] Amir Taheri, *Holy Terror: Inside the World of Islamic Terrorism* 242-43 (Adler & Adler 1987).

[66] Barry A. Kosmin & Seymour P. Lachman, *One Nation Under God: Religion in Contemporary American Society* (Harmony Books 1993).

[67] See *id.* at 96-97, 286 (Due to the margin of error of +/- 0.2% in the Muslim population statistics, we included South Carolina with a 0.97% Muslim population. The District of Columbia was added because of the sizable Muslim populations in Maryland and Virginia that work in the District and thus pray in mosques located in the District and near their places of work).

[68] Ihsan Bagby et al., *The Mosque in America: A National Portrait* (2001), and avail. at http://sun.cair.com/Portals/0/pdf/The_Mosque_in_America_A_National_Portrait.pdf, accessed Oct. 30, 2010.

[69] Harvard University, *Pluralism Project*, avail. at <http://pluralism.org/directory/index/country:US/state:all/tradition:9>, accessed Oct. 30, 2010.

[70] See Appendix A for a complete explanation of the behaviors that were scored as Sharia adherent, the materials that were scored as violence positive, and the behaviors that were scored as promoting violence or violent jihad.

[71] *Id.*

[72] 1 Sayid Sabiq, *Fiqh-us-Sunnah* English Transl., 113 (American Trust Publications 1991).

[73] Al-Misri, *supra* note 43, at F5.3.

[74] *Id.* at F5.6.

[75] Al-Misri, *supra* note 43, at F12.4 and 2 Sayid Sabiq, *Fiqh-us-Sunnah* English Transl., 50, 56 (American Trust Publications 1991).

[76] *Id.* at F12.32 and see Sabiq, *supra* note 73, at 64a.

[77] Al-Misri, *supra* note 43, at F8.2 and Sabiq, *supra* note 73, at 50,56.

[78] The Royal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, *supra* note 39, at 58.

[79] *Id.* at 58-59.

[80] *Id.* at 59.

[81] *Id.* at 59.

[82] *Id.*

[83] *Id.* at 60.

[84] *Id.* at 59.

[85] Al-Misri, *supra* note 43, at O9.8.

[86] *Id.* at O9.9.

[87] Sabiq, *supra* note 70, at 77b.

[88] 4 Hafiz Ibn Kathir, *Tafsir Ibn Kathir* Abridged, 475 (Darussalam Publishers 2000).

[89] Sageman, *supra* note 1, at 6-7.

[90] Abul A'la Maududi, *Jihad in Islam*, and avail. at http://www.muhammadanism.org/Terrorism/jihah_in_islam/jihad_in_islam.pdf, accessed Nov. 26, 2010.

[91] Sageman, *supra* note 1, at 9.

[92] Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones* 34, and avail. at <http://majalla.org/books/2005/qutb-nilestone.pdf>, accessed Nov. 26, 2010.

[93] Sageman, *supra* note 1, at 9.

[94] 3 Sayid Sabiq, *Fiqh-us-Sunnah* 76 (American Trust Publications 1991).

[95] See Appendix B to view the tables containing the data referenced in both the Results discussion and the graphs embedded within the Results discussion.

[96] See Silber and Bhatt, *supra* note 8.

[97] *Id.* at 33.

[98] See Appendix A for excerpts from the Sharia literature found in those mosques that made available materials supportive of violence.

[99] Silber and Bhatt, *supra* note 8, at 35 and Sacks, *supra* note 16 (discussing Anwar Al Awalki's connections to several 9/11 hijackers and accused Fort Hood terrorist, Nidal Malik Hassan).

[100] See, e.g., Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani, *Islamic Extremism: A Viable Threat to U.S. National Security*, presentation delivered at Open Forum at the U.S. Department of State, January 7, 1999 and avail. at <http://members.fortunecity.com/amirm/Extremism.html>, accessed March 23, 2011; see also Kabbani, *The Muslim Experience in America is Unprecedented*, 7(2) Middle East Qtrly, June 2000, at 6-7 and avail. at <http://www.meforum.org/61/muhammad-hisham-kabbani-the-muslim-experience-in>, accessed March 23, 2011.

[101] See, e.g., Center for Religious Freedom & Freedom House, *Saudi Publications on Hate Ideology Invade American Mosques* (2005) and avail. at http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/special_report/45.pdf, accessed March 23, 2011.

[102] WorldPublicOpinion.org, The Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland, *Muslim Public Opinion on U.S. Policy, Attacks on Civilians, and Al Qaeda* (April 24, 2007), pp. 9-10.

[103] *Id.*, p. 10.

[104] *Id.* at 15, 21-22.

[105] Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Project, *Muslim Publics Divided on Hamas and Hezbollah*, pp. 10-11.

[106] *Id.*, p. 14.

[107] March, *supra* note 52, at 266.

[108] *Id.* at 274.

[NB. Appendices A,B and C can be downloaded as separate PDF files from the "Supplementary Files" link under the "Article Tools" menu on the righthand side of this page.]



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